This timely handbook traces the development of cyber capabilities from their roots in information warfare and cryptology to their potential military application in combat. Cyber warfare is gaining prominence as a serious tactic in military conflicts throughout the world. And, as the most network-dependent nation on earth, the United States is the most vulnerable. Military expert and author Paul J. Springer examines the many facets of cyber combat-from the threats of information exposure that American civilians encounter on a daily basis, to the concern of keeping up with the capabilities of China and Russia, to the inherent dangers in ignoring cyber threats. This essential reference-the only of its kind to include an overview of other cyber warfare literature-emphasizes the importance of cyber operations in modern conflicts, detailing the efforts that have been made by government agencies to create networks that are secure. Noted experts in the field weigh in on the problems of attribution during a cyber attack, the detection of cyber intrusions, and the possible solutions for preventing data breaches. The book features profiles of theorists, commanders, and inventors; as well as organizations dedicated to cyber attacks, including government and military operations, industrial cyber security companies, and academic centers. Incorporates expertise from diverse viewpoints from the military, government agencies, industry, and academia Provides an informative timeline of key events in the development of cyber warfare capabilities Highlights the most prominent and effective cyber attacks in history as well as legal attempts to curb them

A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines systematically the "Colossal Cracks" operational technique employed by Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group and demonstrates the key significance that morale and casualty concerns exerted on this technique. To ensure a full understanding of the campaign, one needs to look not only at Montgomery's methods but at those of his army commanders, Dempsey and Crerar; thus, this study addresses the scant attention to date paid to these two figures. Hart suggests that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested. In fact, "Colossal Cracks," the concentration of massive force at a point of German weakness, represented the most appropriate weapon the 1944 British Army could develop under the circumstances. Previous studies have been characterized by an overemphasis on Montgomery's role in the campaign, rather than a systematic examination of overall British methods. They have ignored the difficulties that the 1944 British Army faced given its manpower shortage, and they have underestimated the appropriateness of Monty's methods to the campaign war aims that Britain pursued: namely, the desire that Britain's modest military forces secure a high profile within a larger Allied effort. The cautious, firepower-laden approach used by the 21st Army Group was both crude and a double-edged sword; however, despite these weaknesses, "Colossal Cracks" represented an appropriate technique given the nature of British war aims and the relative capabilities of the forces involved. It proved to be just enough to defeatthe Germans and keep alive British hopes that her war aims might be achieved.

Most studies of ancient warfare focus only on the Greeks and the Romans, but this sweeping study covers the whole of the ancient world from Greece and Rome to the Near East, then eastward to Parthia, India, and China. Bradford transports the reader into the midst of ancient battles behind such great leaders as Thutmose III, Ashurbanipal, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and the First Emperor of China. He details the rise and fall of empires, the role of leadership, and the development of tactics and strategy. One sees the clash of peoples: nomads against agricultural societies, infantry against cavalry, as well as the greatest technological change in history--the combination of the composite bow and the chariot. This readable account analyzes ancient armies in terms of modern military doctrine, allowing the reader to make comparisons between the combatants. Recruitment, for example, varied tremendously with Romans drawing from a limited pool of recruits for service terms of twenty to thirty years and Chinese planners preferring a large pool with short-term service. While various types of governments prepared for and waged war in significantly different ways, Bradford finds that better organization led to success on the battlefield and that, for the most part, societal innovation was more important than technological innovation. The ongoing discussion of the lessons of ancient warfare around the globe will provide valuable insights for interested general readers and military professionals alike.

By September 1944, Allied forces had broken out from the Normandy beachheads, liberated Paris, and found themselves poised on the German border. As this offensive gained momentum, Patton and Montgomery, hoping to exploit the enemy's temporary weakness in the West, concocted their own alternatives to Eisenhower's broad front strategy. Each proposed a single thrust aimed directly into the German heartland, designed to bring the troops home by Christmas. This study examines this so-called broad front-single thrust controversy and concludes that the idea of early victory was wishful thinking--a product of the erroneous and dangerous assumption that the Nazi regime was already tottering on the brink of collapse.

Precisely because of its lightning pace, the Allied advance resulted in severe logistical problems, limiting Patton's proposed operation to only ten combat divisions, while Montgomery's closer proximity to the coast might have allowed for as many as sixteen. But it should have been obvious that either thrust faced certain destruction against the 250 divisions still fielded by the Wehrmacht on all fronts in September. In light of this substantial German military capacity, despite serious losses and strategic setbacks, the single thrust could not have been a decisive war-ending maneuver. In fact, Andidora argues, it could not even have provided for its own security against the forces that would have coalesced against it. Rather than unnecessarily prolonging the war, as some have argued, Eisenhower's decision to stay the strategic course probably averted a military disaster.

During World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower became convinced that the era of separate land, sea, and air operations was over and that future military operations would involve all three elements acting in concert. He foresaw that, once peace had been restored, the waste and duplication of effort which characterized America's military operations during the war would not be tolerated by an economy-minded Congress. A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower saw national security as dependent upon maintaining a healthy economy and a strong military. His goal, therefore, was the achievement of an efficient, properly balanced military establishment within the context of a healthy economy through the unification of the services into a single Cabinet level department.

As Army Chief of Staff, adviser to Secretaries of National Defense James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, and then as president, Eisenhower was a leader in the effort to achieve unification. The final result of these efforts, the Military Reorganization Act of 1958, did not encompass all of the changes that Eisenhower originally sought. However, he had been instrumental in transforming the unorganized military establishment of pre-war America into a highly centralized organization led by a powerful secretary of defense. This structure would remain unchanged for twenty-eight years.

The original and bestselling leadership book!

Sun Tzu's ideas on survival and success have been read across the world for centuries. Today they can still be applied to business, politics and life. The Art of War demonstrates how to win without conflict. It shows that with enough intelligence and planning, it is possible to conquer with a minimum of force and little destruction.

This luxury hardback edition includes an introduction by Tom Butler-Bowdon that draws out lessons for managers and business leaders, and highlights the power of Sun Tzu's thinking in everyday life.

An inside account of the U.S. military operation to restore Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in 1994, this study demonstrates progress made in joint warfighting in the period following the end of the Cold War, including improvements in command and control, joint force integration, and techniques for successful humanitarian operations. DEGREESL With ties to Haiti that date back over one hundred years, the United States could not stand by as a coup ousted Aristide in 1990. When the coup leaders refused to leave peacefully, forces authorized by the U.N. Security Council deployed toward Haiti. Diplomatic efforts by former President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn eventually obtained the cooperation of coup leaders in the final hour, and on September 19, 1994, the first of over 50,000 U.S. military personnel arrived to ensure security, facilitate Aristide's return, and professionalize the Haitian security forces. DEGREESL General Henry Shelton, later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commanded the joint task force that entered Haiti under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter during one of the few recent instances of U.N. intervention without the concurrence of the host nation. While the operation was unique, its innovations will benefit planners for decades as humanitarian actions around the world continue to be important. This book illustrates the challenges of remaining engaged in support of the United Nations and of conducting modern military operations, which are highly dependent on close interagency and multinational coordination.

How Effective is Strategic Bombing is a thought provoking analysis on the subject of air power and bombing and the use of surveys to explain the effects of air power on the enemy in conflict."
-- "Parameters"

In the wake of World War II, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President Harry S. Truman established the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, to determine exactly how effectively strategic air power had been applied in the European theater and in the Pacific. The final study, consisting of over 330 separate reports and annexes, was staggering in its size and emphatic in its conclusions. As such it has for decades been used as an objective primary source and a guiding text, a veritable Bible for historians of air power.

In this aggressively revisionist volume, Gian Gentile examines afresh this influential document to reveal how it reflected to its very foundation the American conceptual approach to strategic bombing. In the process, he exposes the survey as largely tautological and thereby throwing into question many of the central tenets of American air power philosophy and strategy.

With a detailed chapter on the Gulf War and the resulting Gulf War Air Power Survey, and a concluding chapter on the lessons of the Kosovo air war, How Effective is Strategic Bombing? is the most comprehensive and important book on air power strategy in decades.

In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.

For centuries, mounted cavalry dominated the battlefield through shock and mobility. Man maintained a symbiotic relationship with the horse, which became particularly sacrosanct on the battlefield and even created a new, exalted social class. These mounted warriors sought to preserve their prestige despite the advent of new technologies threatening to render them obsolete. In Cavalry from Hoof to Track, Roman Jarymowycz traces the evolution of the cavalry from the warhorse to the armored tank and demonstrates how its survival is a history of determined and creative responses to the changing dynamics of modern warfare. Ultimately, he argues, the very concept of cavalry exists as its own state of mind. The cavalry and its doctrine are misunderstood, and its tactics and operations remain a mystery for many civilians. New technology and the increased integration of the armed forces create the illusion that the cavalry no longer exists as a distinct military entity and philosophy. Jarymowycz clarifies these misconceptions by offering a comprehensible overview while explaining military terminology and outlining basic cavalry principles. The book concludes by suggesting how the cavalry will continue to evolve in response to contemporary third world conflicts, perhaps even reverting to its original, tactical role of close quarter combat.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the most important CIA spymaster in history, singlehandedly led America's intelligence service from the age of Mata Hari into the space age. Under his guidance the U-2 spy-plane, the SR-71 "Blackbird," and the Corona spy satellite were developed, and the agency rose to the pinnacle of its power. Bissell was also, however, the architect of the infamous Bay of Pigs operation that failed to overthrow Castro in 1961 and led to the decline of the CIA. In this compelling memoir, Bissell gives us an insider's view of the personalities, policies, and historical forces surrounding these and other covert operations and the lessons learned during those times of conflict. Bissell begins by describing his early years as a member of America's unofficial aristocracy. Born in a house that his father bought from Samuel Clemens, he was educated at Groton and Yale and befriended by Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh, among others. Bissell recounts how he became acting head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the agency in charge of the Marshall Plan after World War II, and helped to create the European Payments Union. Bissell was brought into the CIA in 1954, where he initiated a revolution in intelligence-gathering techniques. He reveals the details of these developments, as well as of the unique CIA-Lockheed partnership he pioneered, his participation in the CIA-sponsored coup to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala, and his involvement in crises in Laos and the Congo. Bissell's memoir sheds light not only on pivotal points of American foreign policy but also on America's evolution from isolationist to interventionist superpower.

This book investigates strategy formulation by comparing military & business practices. It assesses whether the strategy process in the business field also prevails in the military context. Based on interviews and case studies, the author uses a framework of influences including organization, leadership, risk, theory and context to consider the areas of similarity and difference. While significant parallels can be found, greater importance is placed on the formulation of aims and goals, and the identification and training of leaders in the military. This provides valuable lessons for business strategists.

“A date which will live in infamy.”—US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt Sunday, December 7, 1941, was supposed to be a day of rest for the military personnel at Hawaii’s Pearl Harbor naval base on the island of Oahu. But at 7:55 a.m., Japanese carrier-based planes launched a surprise attack on the US Pacific Fleet moored in the harbour. Thousands of lives were lost that day, drawing the United States into World War II and beginning a new phase of the war in East Asia. In Pearl Harbor, our expert author offers a concise photographic guide to this key turning point in World War II. The book is divided into chapters covering the origins and military strength of the naval station; Japanese plans and dispositions; the attack itself; the damage caused; the clean-up operation and aftermath; and the life of the base today. See rare photographs of Japanese airplanes taking off to launch the attack; aerial views of the US naval base before and during the air attack; the destruction wrought; the key figures involved on both sides; and the memorials that have been erected, especially to the sunken battleship USS Arizona. Pearl Harbor provides a photographic exploration of this momentous event and its aftermath in 160 dramatic photos.

This is a wide-ranging study of how the British were more successful in managing the strains of modern industrial war than the French. The book addresses such current historical debates as the nature of the political Right and Left in Europe during the 1930s, the extent of rearmament and economic mobilization, and the causes of France's defeat in 1940.

Describing the radical transformation in German Infantry tactics that took place during World War I, this book presents the first detailed account of the evolution of stormtroop tactics available in English. It covers areas previously left unexplored: the German Infantry's tactical heritage, the squad's evolution as a tactical unit, the use of new weapons for close combat, the role of the elite assault units in the development of new tactics, and detailed descriptions of offensive battles that provided the inspiration and testing ground for this new way of fighting. Both a historical investigation and a standard of excellence in infantry tactics, Stormtroop Tactics is required reading for professional military officers and historians as well as enthusiasts. Contrary to previous studies, Stormtroop Tactics proposes that the German Infantry adaption to modern warfare was not a straightforward process resulting from the top down intervention of reformers but instead a bottom up phenomenon. It was an accumulation of improvisations and ways of dealing with pressing situations that were later sewn together to form what we now call Blitzkrieg. Focusing on action at the company, platoon, and squad level, Stormtroop Tactics provides a detailed description of the evolution of German defensive tactics during World War I--tactics that were the direct forbears of those used in World War II.

Form New York Times bestselling author Don Mann and Ralph Pezzulo, Navy SEAL expert advice on surviving in the jungle, in the mountains, in the desert, or at sea. As the elite of the military elite, U.S. Navy SEALs know that they can be deployed anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. Whether in a temperate, tropical, arctic, or subarctic region, they might find themselves alone in a remote area with little or no personal gear. In The U.S. Navy SEAL Survival Handbook, decorated Navy SEAL Team Six member and New York Times bestselling author Don Mann provides a definitive survival resource. From basic camp craft and navigation to fear management and strategies for coping with any type of disaster, it is an essential resource. It covers: Water Shelter and fire Food and hunting Weather Navigation Survival medicine Survival kits And much more Complete with 150 color photographs, this comprehensive guide includes life-saving information for SEALs, for other special operations forces, or for anyone who might fight themselves in a life-threatening situation.

Initially published on the eve of the German blitzkrieg against France in 1940, this analysis of the German doctrine of defense as it evolved in 1915-1918 is often overlooked because of its misleading title. No understanding of the failure of the Allied offensives on the Western Front in World War I is adequate without reference to this work which explores the problem from the German point of view.

Throughout history, wars have been invariably fought over the control of territory. While political geography addresses the causes of such conflicts, military geography consists of the use of geographical knowledge to describe and analyze the deployment of armed forces. In this work, Patrick O'Sullivan offers an academic and impersonal study of military geography, weighing the balance of advantage for combatants in different geographic settings. He fully explores the effect of geographical circumstances on the outcome of violent conflict, and examines the lessons learned from recent wars about the effects of global position and environmental conditions on the interplay of geostrategy, tactical decisions, and results. The study begins with a look at the global variety of physical habitats and their human occupation, as well as a survey of the geography of war since 1945 including the current geography of conflict. A geographical analysis of selected ancient and modern battles follows, out of which O'Sullivan characterizes classical tactical ploys. A broad examination of modern weapons, tactics, and the required appreciation of the battlefield form the central portion of the book, with two particular topics--guerrilla/counterinsurgency operations and warfare on urban terrain--receiving extensive treatment. The volume concludes by drawing together political geography, strategy, and tactics in a description of the urban-based British Army/IRA conflict, and with an examination of the geographical aptitudes and attitudes of soldiers. This unique work will be an important source for courses in military geography, history, and tactics, and a valuable addition to college and university libraries.

In the desperate summer of 1942, Hitler seemed to be on the verge of victory in Russia and the Middle East. With Rommel nearing Cairo, a little known lieutenant-general, Bernard Montgomery, took charge of what Churchill called a "baffled and bewildered" British 8th Army. Assuming command, Montgomery issued his famous order, "Here we will stand and fight;...If we can't stay here alive, then let us stay here dead," and led the Army to one of the Allies' greatest victories--El Alamein. "Monty" became an instantly recognizable Allied leader, but as a man with strong views, unbending principles, and outspoken frankness, he was both loved and disliked, praised and criticized. This bibliography presents and evaluates the extensive body of literature that has grown up around the controversial Field Marshal. Any serious study of World War II military campaigns must confront Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, an individualist with both admirers and detractors. This book provides an extensive historiographical overview of the literature in Part I and a bibliography of significant works in Part II. It is a basic reference and research guide for the student, scholar, and general reader.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a collection of vignettes written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas. The material was originally collected and published by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College to serve as a text on combat against a guerrilla force in mountain-desert terrain. It was originally intended for internal use only and as such provides examples of both good and bad military practice. The hard lessons learned are not specifically 'Russian' in nature and many of the same mistakes and successes would apply equally to the American Army in Vietnam. Indeed, the knowledge gained from these reports should also apply to future conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rugged terrain.
This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, but rather a series of snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers. It is an intimate look at the boring, brutal business of counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror.
Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

This work contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, Rear Admiral Menon develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall political objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.

Menon argues that current technological trends are likely to lead to fleets re-exerting their lost superiority against land-based means of conducting warfare, so long as the navies involved rebuild their structures to speed up the battle, since faster battle is the current strategic trend. Littoral superiority then becomes a naval objective on which to construct joint warfare.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Army aviation began to evolve from an observatory role to a mobility role. Helicopter air mobility began to develop in the Army from 1949 onwards. The outbreak of the Korean war assisted and accelerated the acceptance of greater helicopter air mobility within the Army. The Eisenhower period was a golden age for Army aviation, with rapid and extensive developments in air mobility doctrine and tactics. There was also a strong research and development effort to overcome the initial technological lag. These developments allowed the formation of the first air mobile division in 1965 to meet the growing demands of the Vietnam war. This work gives a new understanding of the process of military innovation. Moreover, this case study has important general implications for future military policy-making.

In From Flintlock to Rifle, Professor Ross traces the development of infantry tactics from the mid-eighteenth century, when infantry fought in rigid linear formations, until the second half of the nineteenth century, by which time infantrymen with rifled weapons were learning to advance in open order and use aimed fire. The author demonstrates that this transition in tactics involved social and technological change as well as military innovation. Old Regime armies, recruited from a narrow social base and armed with slow-firing, short-range, inaccurate weapons, relied upon harsh discipline and formalized evolutions to attain tactical proficiency. When the French Royal Army collapsed it was replaced with a mass citizen army. This contained elements of the old tactical system but placed a new emphasis on mobility, flexibility, and individual initiative. Napoleon's rivals either imitated aspects of the French system or sought to copy the spirit of the new tactics, engineering social reforms from above and creating their own citizen armies. After 1815, generals and politicians continued to develop tactical doctrines that embodied the lessons of the Napoleonic wars. Industrialization had a swift impact on weapons technology and firearms improved in range, accuracy, and rate of fire. As a result, military men had to modify their drill and battle tactics to cope with increased firepower. A process initiated by the French Revolution was thus accelerated by the Industrial Revolution.

Steven Woodworth's previous book, the critically acclaimed "Jefferson Davis and His Generals," won the prestigious Fletcher Pratt Award and was a main selection of the History Book Club. In that book he showed how the failures of Davis and his military leaders in the west paved the way for Confederate defeat. In Davis and Lee at War, he concludes his study of Davis as rebel commander-in-chief and shows how the lack of a unified purpose and strategy in the east sealed the Confederacy's fate.

Woodworth argues that Davis and Robert E. Lee, the South's greatest military leader, had sharply conflicting views over the proper conduct of the war. Davis was convinced that the South should fight a defensive war, to simply outlast the North's political and popular support for the war. By contrast, Lee and the other eastern generals-notably P.G.T. Beauregard, Gustavus Smith, and Stonewall Jackson-were eager for the offensive. They were convinced that only quick and decisive battlefield victories would prevent the North from eventually defeating them with its overwhelming advantage in men and materials.

Davis and Lee, Woodworth shows, shared a mutual respect for each other for most of the war. But it was respect mixed with a stubborn resistance to the other's influence. The result of this tense tug-of-war was Davis's misguided pursuit of a middle ground that gave neither strategy its best chance for success. The war finally ground to a bloody conclusion with Davis as indecisive as ever and virtually blind to how little confidence his generals had in his leadership.

Drawing extensively upon the papers of Jefferson Davis and the works of leading Civil War historians, Woodworth places the eastern military campaigns in an entirely new light and expands our understanding of Davis as leader of the Confederacy.