Sieges were a popular subject in medieval romances. Tales of the Crusades featured champions of Christianity capturing towns in the Holy Land or mounting heroic defences. The fall of a great city such as Troy, Thebes, or Jerusalem provided opportunities for the recreation of ancient chivalry and for reflections on historical change. Images of the siege in romances also point to other forms, such as drama and love allegory, where it represents the trial of the soul or the pursuit of the beloved. This book is the first full-length study of an important theme in medieval literature. Close reading of selected Middle English shows how writers used descriptions of sieges to explore such subjects as military strategy, heroism, chivalry, and attitudes to the past. This study also draws on a wide range of writings in several languages, to set the romances in a broad context. When they are seen against a background of military manuals, patristic commentary, pageantry, and love poetry, the sieges of romance take on deeper resonances of meaning and reflect the vitality of the theme in medieval culture as a whole.

Sieges played a key role in the crusades, but they tend to be overshadowed by the famous battles fought between the Franks and the Muslims, and no detailed study of the subject has been published in recent times. So Michael Fulton's graphic, wide-ranging and thought-provoking book is a landmark in the field. He considers the history of siege warfare in the Holy Land from every angle - the tactics and technology, the fortifications, the composition of the opposing armies, and the ways in which sieges shaped Frankish and Muslim strategy at each stage of the conflict. The differences and similarities between the Eastern and Western traditions are explored, as is the impact of the shifting balance of power in the region. The conclusions may surprise some readers. Neither the Muslims nor the Franks possessed a marked advantage in siege technology or tactics, their fortifications reflected different purposes and an evolving political environment and, although there were improvements in technologies and fortifications, the essence of siege warfare remained relatively consistent. Michael Fulton's book is a fascinating all-round reassessment of an aspect of the crusades that had a decisive impact on the outcome of the struggle. It will be essential reading for medieval and military historians.

Civilian control of the armed forces is crucial for any country hoping to achieve a successful democratic transition. In this remarkable book, Narcis Serra, Spanish Minister of Defence between 1982 and 1991, explains the steps necessary to reduce the powers of armed forces during the process of a democratic transition. Spain's military reform proved a fundamental and necessary element for the consolidation of Spanish democracy and is often viewed as a paradigm case for the transition to democracy. Drawing on this example, Serra outlines a simple model of the process and conditions necessary to any democratic military reform. He argues that progress in military transition must include legal and institutional reforms, changes to the military career structure and doctrine, and control of conflict levels.

Technology is championed as the solution to modern security problems, but also blamed as their cause. This book assesses the way in which these two views collide in the debate over ballistic missile defence: a complex, costly and controversial system intended to defend the United States from nuclear missile attacks. Columba Peoples shows how, in the face of strong scientific and strategic critique, advocates of missile defence seek to justify its development by reference to broader culturally embedded perceptions of the promises and perils of technological development. Unpacking the assumptions behind the justification of missile defence initiatives, both past and present, this book illustrates how common-sense understandings of technology are combined and used to legitimate this controversial and costly defence programme. In doing so it engages fundamental debates over understandings of technological development, human agency and the relationship between technology and security.

This is a comparative study of the fighting systems of the British and German armies in The Great War. Taking issue with revisionist historians, Samuels argues that German success in battle can be explained by their superior tactical philosophy. The book provides a fascinating insight into the development of infantry tactics at a seminal point in the history of warfare.

This account of the Yorktown campaign of the American Revolution presents six full-colour battle scenes detailing the critical points in the battle. By 1781 Britain's struggle to contain rebels in her American colonies had reached an inglorious stalemate. Her strategy had been to isolate General Washington's army in the middle states between Canada and the South, which she hoped to secure with aid of the Royal Navy. However, after defeat at Saratoga and with the northern army holed up in New York, King George's forces now saw this plan backfire. Yorktown would be a model example to the British Crown of the impossible odds she now faced in holding onto her colonies.

In this unique examination of Civil War leadership, W. J. Wood looks at the tactical and strategic problems that threatened to overwhelm untried Civil War generals and the pragmatic strategies, born of necessity, that they developed to solve them. Focusing on three decisive battles involving six generals, Wood provides the background necessary to understand the problems confronting commanders on both sides of the war, then looks at the campaign of Cedar Mountain, directed by Stonewall Jackson and Nathaniel Banks the battle of Chickamauga, where Confederate Army leader Braxton Bragg and Union General William Rosecrans faced each other the battle of Nashville, where Jon Bell Hood led his Southern troops against George H. Thomas and his Union army. Deftly describing the art of war these men developed, an art that provides paradigms for military leaders to this day, Wood demonstrate why Civil War remains a topic of never-diminishing interest.

This edited volume analyses siege warfare as a discrete type of military engagement, in the face of which civilians are particularly vulnerable. Siege warfare is a form of combat that has usually had devastating effects on civilian populations. From the near-contemporary Siege of Sarajevo to the real and mythical sieges of the ancient Mediterranean, this has been a recurring type of military engagement which, through bombardment, starvation, disease and massacre, places non-combatants at the heart of battle. To date, however, there has been little recognition of the effects of siege warfare on civilians. This edited volume addresses this gap. Using a distinctive regressive method, it begins with the present and works backwards, avoiding teleological interpretations that suggest the targeting of civilians in war is a modern phenomenon. Its contributors interrogate civilians' roles during sieges, both as victims and active participants; the laws and customs of siege warfare; its place in historical memory, and the ways civilian survivors have dealt with trauma. Its scope and content ensure that the collection is essential reading for all those interested in the place of civilians in war. Chapter 2 of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com

In 1979 the Soviet Union moved from military `help' to active intervention in Afghanistan. Four-fifths of the Afghan National Army deserted in the first year of the war, which, compounded with the spread and intensification of the rebellion led by the formidable guerrilla fighters of the Mujahideen, forced the Soviets to intensify their involvement. The Soviet army was in generally poor condition when the war started, but the troops of the airborne and air assault units were better trained and equipped. As a result they developed aggressive, sometimes effective tactics against an enemy that refused to behave the way most Soviet commanders wished him to. Featuring specially commissioned artwork, this absorbing study examines the origins, combat role and battlefield performance of the Soviet Union's paratroopers and their Mujahideen adversaries during the long and bloody Soviet involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

A translation that captures the power of one of the greatest war stories ever told-Julius Caesar's account of his brutal campaign to conquer Gaul Imagine a book about an unnecessary war written by the ruthless general of an occupying army-a vivid and dramatic propaganda piece that forces the reader to identify with the conquerors and that is designed, like the war itself, to fuel the limitless political ambitions of the author. Could such a campaign autobiography ever be a great work of literature-perhaps even one of the greatest? It would be easy to think not, but such a book exists-and it helped make Julius Caesar a legend. This remarkable translation of Caesar's War for Gaul captures, like never before in English, the powerfully concise style of the future emperor's dispatches from the front lines in what are today France, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland.

This edited volume analyses siege warfare as a discrete type of military engagement, in the face of which civilians are particularly vulnerable. Siege warfare is a form of combat that has usually had devastating effects on civilian populations. From the near-contemporary Siege of Sarajevo to the real and mythical sieges of the ancient Mediterranean, this has been a recurring type of military engagement which, through bombardment, starvation, disease and massacre, places non-combatants at the heart of battle. To date, however, there has been little recognition of the effects of siege warfare on civilians. This edited volume addresses this gap. Using a distinctive regressive method, it begins with the present and works backwards, avoiding teleological interpretations that suggest the targeting of civilians in war is a modern phenomenon. Its contributors interrogate civilians' roles during sieges, both as victims and active participants; the laws and customs of siege warfare; its place in historical memory, and the ways civilian survivors have dealt with trauma. Its scope and content ensure that the collection is essential reading for all those interested in the place of civilians in war. Chapter 2 of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com

How psychology explains why a leader is willing to use military force to protect or salvage reputation In Who Fights for Reputation, Keren Yarhi-Milo provides an original framework, based on insights from psychology, to explain why some political leaders are more willing to use military force to defend their reputation than others. Rather than focusing on a leader's background, beliefs, bargaining skills, or biases, Yarhi-Milo draws a systematic link between a trait called self-monitoring and foreign policy behavior. She examines self-monitoring among national leaders and advisers and shows that while high self-monitors modify their behavior strategically to cultivate image-enhancing status, low self-monitors are less likely to change their behavior in response to reputation concerns. Exploring self-monitoring through case studies of foreign policy crises during the terms of U.S. presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, Yarhi-Milo disproves the notion that hawks are always more likely than doves to fight for reputation. Instead, Yarhi-Milo demonstrates that a decision maker's propensity for impression management is directly associated with the use of force to restore a reputation for resolve on the international stage. Who Fights for Reputation offers a brand-new understanding of the pivotal influence that psychological factors have on political leadership, military engagement, and the protection of public prestige.

Conceptualising the foundations of national defence and organising a conformingly robust military structure is a humungous task of extremely complexities. Even nations who possess pristine strategic vision and deep rooted military culture find it practically impossible to home on to the right equation between their political goals, military power and optimal resource allocation. The reason lies in the fact that no matter what mock drills one puts up, outcome of military campaigns often remain uncertain and unpredictable, and independent of the forces fielded to secure victory. There can be no right formulae, no right examples and no practice round to hone one`s concepts and practices before the final, bloody and destructive showdown. Irreversibility of war further makes it a nightmare for military planners to guarantee success. At the best they can apply their professional insight to anticipate adverse situations, notionally replicate these and then harness tactical acumen to find possibly the most effective courses of actions to deal with the circumstances. It is here that the salience of various issues discussed in this book come into contention. The book does not offer formulae for the achievement of military success. Rather it offers an insight into the ingredients and processes that enable military planners to conceive the best possible force composition to win wars.

This book is part of the unique Book of Samurai series that comprises the works of 17th-century samurai tactician Natori Sanjuro Masazumi, retainer and advisor to the lords of Kishu domain. It offers an unparalleled insight into the weaponry and armour of the samurai era, as well as tactical advice for use on the battlefield and off - wisdom that can be applied to many scenarios today.Heieki Yoho, the first scroll translated in this book, offers advice for every possible situation, from moving troops to besieging a castle to fighting on the open battlefield. From turning thieves or cowards to good service, to practising "external listening" in order to obtain information from as many sources as possible, to penetrating the deeper motives of those who slander (or praise) others, the advice here is thought provoking and paints a vivid picture of samurai Japan at war.Heigu Yoho, the second scroll, gives us a rare and precious glimpse into samurai arms and armour, including their construction, status regulations and connected ceremonies, mythology and Buddhist doctrine: a helmet's ventilation hole, for example, allows access to the 98,000 gods of war. There is an accessible introduction and a glossary, as well as 130 line drawings that include illustrations of arms and armour, strategic diagrams and beautiful examples of Japanese calligraphy.

Daniel Whittingham presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell (1859-1928). It tells the story of his life, which included service in military intelligence, the South African War, and on the General Staff before and during the First World War. It also presents the first comprehensive analysis of his writing: from his well-known books Small Wars (1896) and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance (1905), to a host of other books and articles that are presented here for the first time. Through a study of Callwell's life and works, this book offers a new perspective on the nature and study of military history, the character of British strategy, and on the army to which he belonged.

Follow the epic 5,000-year story of warfare - from the earliest battles to the War on Terror - with this guided tour of every major conflict. Combining a clear and compelling historical narrative with a wealth of fascinating eyewitness accounts and photography throughout, this is the ultimate guide to the history of military conflict, from the armies of ancient Egypt to the rise of Isis in Syria and Iraq, and the ongoing Yemeni civil war. War explores the battles, the warriors, the tactics, and the weapons and technology that have shaped conflict worldwide. Lavishly illustrated with paintings, photographs, artefacts, and maps, this book offers a uniquely detailed and visually rich view of all major aspects of human conflict. Whether on the bloody battlefields of the ancient world or in the modern era of drones and laser-guided missiles, this is the complete story of the wars that have shaped our world.

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne. Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a 'Schlieffen plan'.

An examination of the military doctrine that animated the French defense against the German invasion in 1940.- Argues that the French learned the wrong lessons from World War I and were ill prepared for World War II- Lessons for modern armies about how to learn from past wars and prepare for future wars- Winner of the Paul Birdsall Prize of the American Historical Association

In Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Paddy Griffith argues that, far from being the first 'modern' war, it was the last 'Napoleonic' war, and that none of the innovations of industrialized warfare had any signiticant effect on the outcome. 'Provocative, challenging and intelligent. Griffith's knowledge of military history in general from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries is so wide and deep that he is able to put the Civil War into a broader context more effectively and informatively than anyone else.' James M McPherson, author of Battle Cry for Freedom.

General John Bell Hood tried everything he could: Surprise attack. Flanking march. Cavalry raid into the enemy's rear lines. Simply enduring his opponent's semi-siege of the city. But nothing he tried worked. Because by the time he assumed command of Confederate forces protecting Atlanta, his predecessor Joe Johnston's chronic, characteristic strategy of gradual withdrawal had doomed the city to fall to William T. Sherman's Union troops. Joe Johnston lost Atlanta and John Bell Hood has gotten a bum rap, Stephen Davis argues in his new book, Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions. The fall of the city was inevitable because Johnston pursued a strategy that was typical of his career: he fell back. Again and again. To the point where he allowed Sherman's army to within five miles of the city. Against a weaker opponent, Johnston's strategy might have succeeded. But Sherman commanded superior numbers, and he was a bold, imaginative strategist who pressed the enemy daily and used his artillery to pound their lines. Against this combination, Johnston didn't have a chance. And by the time Hood took over the Confederate command, neither did he. Atlanta Will Fall provides a lively, fast-paced overview of the entire Atlanta campaign from Dalton to Jonesboro. Davis describes the battles and analyzes the strategies. He evaluates the three generals, examining their plans of action, their tactics, and their leadership ability. In doing so, he challenges the commonly held perceptions of the two Confederate leaders and provides a new perspective on one of the most decisive battles of the Civil War. An excellent supplemental text for courses on the Civil War and American nineteenth-century history, Atlanta Will Fall will engage students with its brisk, concise examination of the fight for Atlanta.

The British Empire employed a diverse range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over its overseas territories in the Middle East. This new interpretation of how Britain maintained order, protected its interests and carried out its defence obligations in the Gulf in the decades before its withdrawal from the region in 1971 looks at how the British government increasingly sought to achieve security with great economy of force by building up local militaries instead of deploying costly military forces from the home country. Benefitting from the extensive use of recently declassified British Government archival documents and India Office records, this highly original narrative weighs the successes and failures of Britain's use of 'indirect rule' among the small states of Eastern Arabia, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States and Oman. Drawing important lessons for scholars and policymakers about the limitations of trying to outsource security to local partners, Security in the Gulf is a remarkable study of the deployment of British colonial policy in the Middle East before 1971.

A Times/Sunday Times Book of the Year 'Powerful . . . there is rage in his ink. McKay's book grips by its passion and originality. Some 25,000 people perished in the firestorm that raged through the city. I have never seen it better described' Max Hastings, Sunday Times In February 1945 the Allies obliterated Dresden, the 'Florence of the Elbe'. Explosive bombs weighing over 1,000 lbs fell every seven and a half seconds and an estimated 25,000 people were killed. Was Dresden a legitimate military target or was the bombing a last act of atavistic mass murder in a war already won? From the history of the city to the attack itself, conveyed in a minute-by-minute account from the first of the flares to the flames reaching almost a mile high - the wind so searingly hot that the lungs of those in its path were instantly scorched - through the eerie period of reconstruction, bestselling author Sinclair McKay creates a vast canvas and brings it alive with touching human detail. Along the way we encounter, among many others across the city, a Jewish woman who thought the English bombs had been sent from heaven, novelist Kurt Vonnegut who wrote that the smouldering landscape was like walking on the surface of the moon, and 15-year-old Winfried Bielss, who, having spent the evening ushering refugees, wanted to get home to his stamp collection. He was not to know that there was not enough time. Impeccably researched and deeply moving, McKay uses never-before-seen sources to relate the untold stories of civilians and vividly conveys the texture of contemporary life. Dresden is invoked as a byword for the illimitable cruelties of war, but with the distance of time, it is now possible to approach this subject with a much clearer gaze, and with a keener interest in the sorts of lives that ordinary people lived and lost, or tried to rebuild. Writing with warmth and colour about morality in war, the instinct for survival, the gravity of mass destruction and the manipulation of memory, this is a master historian at work. 'Churchill said that if bombing cities was justified, it was always repugnant. Sinclair McKay has written a shrewd, humane and balanced account of this most controversial target of the Anglo-American strategic bombing campaign, the ferocious consequence of the scourge of Nazism' Allan Mallinson, author of Fight to the Finish 'Beautifully-crafted, elegiac, compelling - Dresden delivers with a dark intensity and incisive compassion rarely equalled. Authentic and authoritative, a masterpiece of its genre' Damien Lewis, author of Zero Six Bravo 'Compelling . . . Sinclair McKay brings a dark subject vividly to life' Keith Lowe, author of Savage Continent 'This is a brilliantly clear, and fair, account of one of the most notorious and destructive raids in the history aerial warfare. From planning to execution, the story is told by crucial participants - and the victims who suffered so cruelly on the ground from the attack itself and its aftermath' Robert Fox, author of We Were There

This is the most comprehensive, and most comprehensively chilling, study of modern torture yet written. Darius Rejali, one of the world's leading experts on torture, takes the reader from the late nineteenth century to the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, from slavery and the electric chair to electrotorture in American inner cities, and from French and British colonial prison cells and the Spanish-American War to the fields of Vietnam, the wars of the Middle East, and the new democracies of Latin America and Europe.

As Rejali traces the development and application of one torture technique after another in these settings, he reaches startling conclusions. As the twentieth century progressed, he argues, democracies not only tortured, but set the international pace for torture. Dictatorships may have tortured more, and more indiscriminately, but the United States, Britain, and France pioneered and exported techniques that have become the lingua franca of modern torture: methods that leave no marks. Under the watchful eyes of reporters and human rights activists, low-level authorities in the world's oldest democracies were the first to learn that to scar a victim was to advertise iniquity and invite scandal. Long before the CIA even existed, police and soldiers turned instead to "clean" techniques, such as torture by electricity, ice, water, noise, drugs, and stress positions. As democracy and human rights spread after World War II, so too did these methods.

Rejali makes this troubling case in fluid, arresting prose and on the basis of unprecedented research--conducted in multiple languages and on several continents--begun years before most of us had ever heard of Osama bin Laden or Abu Ghraib. The author of a major study of Iranian torture, Rejali also tackles the controversial question of whether torture really works, answering the new apologists for torture point by point. A brave and disturbing book, this is the benchmark against which all future studies of modern torture will be measured.