This book examines the strategies and military tactics of the Byzantines and their enemies in Eastern Anatolia, Syria and in Upper Mesopotamia in the tenth century. This period of conflict is difficult to define: it was too inactive to be called a 'war' but too active to be called a 'cold war'. Nevertheless, it was a 'war', even if it lacked the numerous pitched battles or protracted sieges that defined other periods or other operational theatres of war. This study examines the way the Byzantines innovated and adapted their strategies and tactics to those of their enemies in the East, giving a rich picture of tenth-century Byzantine warfare.

In this comprehensive study, 12 experts describe and analyse the military budgetary processes and degree of oversight and control in eight African countries-Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa-spanning the continent's sub-regions. Each country study addresses a wide range of questions, such as the roles of the finance and defence ministries, budget offices, audit departments and external actors in the military budgetary processes; the extent of compliance with standard public expenditure management procedures; and how well official military expenditure figures reflect the true economic resources devoted to military activities in these countries. The framework for the country studies is provided by a detailed model for good practice in budgeting for the military sector. The individual studies are tied together by a synthesis chapter, which provides a comparative analysis of the studies, classifies the eight countries according to their adherence to the principles of public expenditure management and explains why individual countries find themselves with a certain classification. The book draws on the results of the country studies and their analysis by making concrete recommendations to the governments of African countries and the international community. While the military sector in many African states is believed to be favoured in terms of resource allocation and degree of political autonomy, it is not subject to the same rules and procedures as other sectors. Because of the unique role of the armed forces as the guarantor of national security, and their demand for a high degree of confidentiality in certain activities, the military sector receives a significant proportion of state resources and is not subject to public scrutiny. The book argues that while the military sector requires some confidentiality it should be subject to the same standard procedures and rules followed by other state sectors.

The US Airborne force fielded some of the toughest, best-trained and most resourceful troops of World War II - all necessary qualities in a force that was lightly armed and which would in most operational circumstances be surrounded from the moment it landed on the battlefield. The German Wehrmacht grew to rely on a series of defensive measures to combat the airborne threat, including fortifications, localized reserves, and special training to help intercept and disrupt airborne troops both in the air and on the ground. Despite such methods it was cool-headed command and control that would prove to be the real key to blunting the Airborne's edge.

Using specially commissioned artwork, this book examines the development of the American airborne forces that spearheaded the Allied effort in Sicily, Normandy and Operation Market Garden, and the German countermeasures that evolved in response to the threat of Allied airborne landings.

No modern intervention is intended to endure indefinitely; indeed some fashion of exit is always envisioned from the outset. This commitment to an exit is normally informed by an exit strategy. Whilst strategies of closure have been scrutinised recently, not least in light of charges of defective intentions and planning, the relations between the strategies, operations and tactics of exit have not been contextualised. Focus on the local, specific and bottom-up manifestations of transitions offers significant enhances to historical, theoretical and applied understandings. This book is an introduction not just to the issues of transition, handover and withdrawal, but to exit as a package of theoretical concepts and how these have been understood, shaped and employed in historic and contemporary perspective. Drawing on a wide range of post-1945 examples derived from a variety of regions and periods, At the End of Military Intervention provides researchers and practitioners with a source book on what forms a crucial and often overlooked element of past and present interventions.

The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne. Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a 'Schlieffen plan'.

In contemporary missions, soldiers often face unconventional opponents rather than enemy armies. How do Western soldiers deal with war criminals, rioters, or insurgents? What explains differences in behavior across military organizations in multinational missions? How does military conduct impact local populations? Comparing troops from the United States, Britain, Germany, and Italy at three sites of intervention (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan), this book shows that militaries in the field apply idiosyncratic organizational routines. Friesendorf uses the concept of routines to explain, for example, why US soldiers are trigger-happy, why British soldiers patrol on foot, and why German soldiers avoid risk. Despite convergence in military structures and practices, militaries continue to fight differently, often with much autonomy. This bottom-up perspective focuses on different routines at the level of operations and tactics, thus contributing to a better understanding of the implementation of military missions, and highlighting failures of Western militaries to protect civilians.

'War is too important to be left to the generals' snapped future French prime minister Georges Clemenceau on learning of yet another bloody and futile offensive on the Western Front. One of the great questions in the ongoing discussions and debate about the First World War is why did winning take so long and exact so appalling a human cost? After all this was a fight that, we were told, would be over by Christmas. Now, in his major new history, Allan Mallinson, former professional soldier and author of the acclaimed 1914: Fight the Good Fight, provides answers that are disturbing as well as controversial, and have a contemporary resonance. He disputes the growing consensus among historians that British generals were not to blame for the losses and setbacks in the 'war to end all wars' - that, given the magnitude of their task, they did as well anyone could have. He takes issue with the popular view that the 'amateur' opinions on strategy of politicians such as Lloyd George and, especially, Winston Churchill, prolonged the war and increased the death toll. On the contrary, he argues, even before the war began Churchill had a far more realistic, intelligent and humane grasp of strategy than any of the admirals or generals, while very few senior officers - including Sir Douglas Haig - were up to the intellectual challenge of waging war on this scale. And he repudiates the received notion that Churchill's stature as a wartime prime minister after 1940 owes much to the lessons he learned from his First World War 'mistakes' - notably the Dardanelles campaign - maintaining that in fact Churchill's achievement in the Second World War owes much to the thwarting of his better strategic judgement by the 'professionals' in the First - and his determination that this would not be repeated. Mallinson argues that from day one of the war Britain was wrong-footed by absurdly faulty French military doctrine and paid, as a result, an unnecessarily high price in casualties. He shows that Lloyd George understood only too well the catastrophically dysfunctional condition of military policy-making and struggled against the weight of military opposition to fix it. And he asserts that both the British and the French failed to appreciate what the Americans' contribution to victory could be - and, after the war, to acknowledge fully what it had actually been.

By the end of the American War in Vietnam, the coastal province of PhU YEn was one of the least-secure provinces in the Republic of Vietnam. It was also a prominent target of the American strategy of pacification-an effort, purportedly separate and distinct from conventional warfare, to win the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese. In Robert J. Thompson III's analysis, the consistent, and consistently unsuccessful, struggle to place PhU YEn under Saigon's banner makes the province particularly fertile ground for studying how the Americans advanced pacification and why this effort ultimately failed. In March 1970 a disastrous military engagement began in PhU YEn, revealing the enemy's continued presence after more than three years of pacification. Clear, Hold, and Destroy provides a fresh perspective on the war across multiple levels, from those making and implementing policy to those affected by it. Most pointedly, Thompson contends that pacification, far from existing apart from conventional warfare, actually depended on conventional military forces for its application. His study reaches back into PhU YEn's storied history with pacification before and during the French colonial period, then focuses on the province from the onset of the American war in 1965 to its conclusion in 1975. A sharply focused, fine-grained analysis of one critical province during the Vietnam War, Thompson's work demonstrates how pacification is better understood as the foundation of U.S. fighting in Vietnam.

This is the book that answers the question: Could Germany have won World War Two? This is a closely argued and wide-ranging assessment of just how, with so many alternatives open, the German High Command chose the path that led, ultimately, to its own destruction. Heinz Magenheimer examines in detail the options that were open to the Germans as the war progressed. He identifies the crucial moments at which fateful decisions needed to be taken and considers how decisions different from those actually taken could have propelled the conflict in entirely different directions. Using the very latest source material, in particular new research from Soviet/Russian sources, the author analyses motives and objectives and considers the opportunities taken or rejected, concentrating especially on specific phases of the conflict.

BRISTOL 1943 and life for the Tobacco Girls isn't getting any easier...Bridget Milligan has donned a uniform and joined the nursing services where she becomes intrigued with the miracles of modern medicine. She's also torn between family loyalty, her new career and Lyndon O'Neill, the love of her life. Is it too impossible to hope that everything will come out right in the end? Phyllis Harvey is still serving in Malta where she sees the casualties of war first hand. Finally it seems like Phyllis is blessed with true in love, but fate can sometimes be a rocky road and nothing is that certain. Maisie Miles is left holding the home front at the tobacco factory but with the sudden death of her grandmother finds herself once more alone in the world. However, thanks to a substantial inheritance, she is able to extend a helping hand to a friend in desperate need. There are tears and laughter, goodbyes and new arrivals along with the hope that new beginnings are not far over the horizon. Praise for Lizzie Lane: 'A gripping saga and a storyline that will keep you hooked' Rosie Goodwin 'The Tobacco Girls is another heartwarming tale of love and friendship and a must-read for all saga fans.' Jean Fullerton 'Lizzie Lane opens the door to a past of factory girls, redolent with life-affirming friendship, drama, and choices that are as relevant today as they were then.' Catrin Collier 'If you want an exciting, authentic historical saga then look no further than Lizzie Lane.' Fenella J Miller

When the American media published photographs of U.S. soldiers abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the Bush administration assured the world that the abuse was isolated and that the perpetrators would be held accountable. Over the next three years, it refined its narrative at the margins, but by and large its public position remained the same. Yes, the administration acknowledged, some soldiers abused prisoners, but these soldiers were anomalous sadists who ignored clear orders. Abuse, the administration said, was aberrational-not systemic, not widespread, and certainly not a matter of policy. The government's own documents, obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union, tell a starkly different story. They show that the abuse of prisoners was not limited to Abu Ghraib but was pervasive in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay. Even more disturbing, the documents reveal that senior officials endorsed the abuse of prisoners as a matter of policy-sometimes by tolerating it, sometimes by encouraging it, and sometimes by expressly authorizing it. Records from Guantanamo describe prisoners shackled in excruciating "stress positions," held in freezing-cold cells, forcibly stripped, hooded, terrorized with military dogs, and deprived of human contact for months. Files from Afghanistan and Iraq describe prisoners who had been beaten, kicked, and burned. Autopsy reports attribute the deaths of those in U.S. custody to strangulation, suffocation, and blunt-force injuries. Administration of Torture is the most detailed account thus far of what took place in America's overseas detention centers, including a narrative essay in which Jameel Jaffer and Amrit Singh draw the connection between the policies adopted by senior civilian and military officials and the torture and abuse that took place on the ground. The book also reproduces hundreds of government documents--including interrogation directives, FBI e-mails, autopsy reports, and investigative files--that constitute both an important historical record and a profound indictment of the Bush administration's policies with respect to the detention and treatment of prisoners in U.S. custody abroad.

Among the operations known as Plan Bodyguard, the deception devised to cover the Allies' Normandy landing, was the little known but critical Plan Zeppelin, the largest and most complex of the Bodyguard plans. Zeppelin, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Strategy, succeeded in pinning down sixty German divisions from southern France to the Balkans in time for D-Day. This was the work of "A" Force, Britain's only military organization tasked with carrying out both strategic and tactical deception in World War II. Whitney T. Bendeck's Diversion and Deception finds "A" Force at its finest hour, as the war shifted from North Africa to Europe. Focusing on the years 1943 to 1945, Bendeck describes how "A" Force, under the leadership of Dudley Clarke, orchestrated both strategic and tactical deception plans to create notional threats across the southern perimeter of Europe, with the chief objective of keeping the Germans pinned down across the Mediterranean. Her work offers a close and clarifying look at "A" Force's structure and command, operations and methods, and successes and failures and, consequently, its undeniable contribution to the Allies' victory in World War II. By shining a light on the often overlooked Mediterranean theater and its direct connection to European plans and operations, Diversion and Deception also provides a deeper understanding of Allied grand strategy in the war. Combining military and deception histories-so often viewed in isolation-this book provides context for the deceptions and adds a layer of knowledge regarding the planning of military operations. The result is a more complete and nuanced view of Allied operations than is to be found in most histories of World War II.

As Clausewitz observed, ""In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect."" The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case, the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.

The Royal Navy's Submarine Command Course, or 'Perisher', is a unique course, training, assessing and qualifying officers for submarine command which is, itself, unique, challenging and demanding; the epitome of mission command, with no succour, referral or support in a continuously threatening environment. It is therefore essential that those 'in command' are proven to be worthy and capable of their appointment. The evolution of 'Perisher' is in recognisable periods: the earliest days, following the submarine's introduction into the Royal Navy, was an autodidactic existence with COs learning from their peers and by experimentation. By 1917 circumstances had conflated to create the Periscope School and the Periscope Course to train and qualify COs whose characteristics were now fully formed. The interwar period was a difficult time, but it produced new submarines and technological innovations just in time for the Second World War and the most intense evolutionary period for 'Perisher'. Post-1945 to 1969 experienced two evolutions: Commander Sandy Woodward's codification of the art of attacking and a shift in emphasis from purely 'periscope eye' attacking toward the development of safety and tactical prowess in students. In the 1970s-1980s, two parallel courses satisfied the demand for COs from an expanding diesel-nuclear submarine fleet using SSKs and then in 1989, an SSN. The final period, 1990-2017 continues today with an all-nuclear Perisher and a curriculum to meet a changing battlespace, new weapons and tactics. Throughout its history, 'Perisher' has shaped the submarine commanding officer and he, in return, has shaped 'Perisher'.

As of early 2010, more than two million U.S. troops have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the American public is neither much engaged in the issues of these two wars nor particularly knowledgeable about the troops experiences, which have ranged from positive and energizing to searing and debilitating. Based on scores of interview--some culled from the Library of Congress Veterans History Project and others conducted by the author himself--"Through Veterans Eyes" presents a composite narrative of the experiences of U.S. service personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Minear quotes more than 175 veterans by name and includes a dozen of their own photos from the conflict theaters. Thematic chapters cover duty and service, politics, cultural and ethical challenges, relationships to local populations, and reentry into American society. Neither pro-war nor anti-war, Minear s approach encourages veterans to express their views on issues critical to the nation. What has motivated U.S. military personnel to enlist? What specific challenges have they faced in Iraq and Afghanistan? What have been the impacts of deployment on their families and communities? Is their experience changing their views of their country and the world? What lessons may be learned from their stories? Veterans candid responses to these and other probing questions deserve pondering.

From the author of Panzer Commander Hermann Balck and False Flags comes The Blind Strategist: John Boyd and the American Art of War. Colonel John Boyd (1927-1997), a maverick fighter pilot, revolutionized the American art of war through his ideas on conflict and the human mind. Boyd claimed that victory is won by the side which transitions through 'decision cycles' faster than the enemy, which paralyses their ability to effectively react and mentally checkmates them with minimal violence. From this revelation, he studied history searching for insights to guide military success and this quest resulted in maneuver warfare theory, a new warfighting creed which gained influential converts in the Pentagon who were seeking a new way of waging war after years of wasted attrition in Vietnam. Boyd's ideas triggered a revolution within the American military and maneuver warfare concepts became doctrine during the 1980s. Maneuver warfare has since been credited with America's swift victory during the Gulf War in 1991 and the lighting advance to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. However, such claims have little basis in reality and Boyd's legacy has accidently undermined American security. When formulating his theories on conflict, Boyd relied upon fraudulent accounts of World War II written by Wehrmacht veterans who fabricated historical evidence to disassociate their reputations from Germany's defeat and to cover up their willing participation in Nazi war crimes. Boyd fell for this deception campaign and unknowingly injected dangerous misinformation into the American military mind. Maneuver warfare has accordingly corrupted the art of war and resulted in catastrophic decisions made in Iraq and Afghanistan during 21st century conflict. In this in-depth account, acclaimed historian Stephen Robinson critically evaluates the maneuver warfare revolution that has transformed the American military. The Blind Strategist separates fact from fantasy and exposes the myths of maneuver warfare through a detailed evidence-based investigation and is a must-read for anybody interested in American military history.

This book has complete coverage of some of the greatest Indian Sepoys, who have, given the Indian Army their extensive support and dedication. A true tribute to the glorious traditions of the Gorkhas, the Sikh, the Punjabi Mussalman, the Mahrattas, and the Dogras, among others. This book offers readers a collective analysis of the sociopolitical settings of the British Empire and also tracks the story of the formation of the Indian Army.

The training which in ordinary times would form the course of study for years now has to be crammed into a few months, and it stands to reason that much which is essential remain unlearnt. I have generally found that the best way to train young officers in minor tactics is by giving them as realistically as possible little problems to solve, and afterwards in the presence of their comrades to discuss their proposed dispositions and then to tell them clearly what they ought to have done, giving reasons for every step taken.

THE TIMES 100 BEST BOOKS FOR SUMMER AN ECONOMIST BOOK OF THE YEAR 'AN IMPORTANT BOOK' Sir Richard Dearlove, Former Director of MI6 'The Freakonomics of modern warfare' Conn Iggulden Everything you think you know about war is wrong. The rules have changed, and we are dangerously unprepared. In Goliath, former paratrooper and Professor of Strategy Sean McFate teaches us the ten new rules of war for today. __________ War is timeless. Some things change - weapons, tactics, leadership - but our desire to go into battle does not. We are living in an age of conflict: global terrorism, Russia's resurgence and China's rise, international criminal empires, climate change and dwindling natural resources. But while the West has been playing the same old war games, the enemy has changed the rules. Sean McFate has been on the front lines of conflict. He has seen first-hand the horrors of battle, and as a strategist, he understands the complexity of the current military situation. In this new age of war: - Technology will not save us - Victory will belong to the cunning, not the strong - Plausible deniability is more potent than firepower - New types of world powers will rule Learn how to triumph in the coming age of conflict in ten new rules. Adapt and we can prevail. Fail, and size and strength won't protect us. This is The Art of War for the 21st century. __________ 'Some of what he says makes more sense than much of what comes out of the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence' Max Hastings, Sunday Times 'Thought-provoking' Johnathon Evans, Former Head of MI5 'Fascinating and disturbing' Economist

For more than two thousand years strategists in China have followed a single, coherent system of military principles and teachings. In The Science of War, Christopher MacDonald tells how those principles and teachings first crystallized into the treatise attributed to Sun Tzu, how they were honed by generals and rulers in the centuries that followed, and how they guide the decision-making of China's military and political leaders to this day. Supported by a masterly new translation of Sun Tzu's classic, MacDonald analyses what the application of that ancient system of thought, borne into the twenty-first century on the back of China's remarkable economic resurgence, bodes for military strategy in the region. The result is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what the PRC is planning for Taiwan, the South China Sea and the Western Pacific.

The Australia-United States Alliance has been critical to Australian foreign and defence policy since the ANZUS Treaty was signed in 1951. For 63 years it has been an enduring feature of Australian defence planning, yet the contemporary alliance is, arguably, in one of the more important phases of reinterpretation in its long history. Despite the critical importance of the Australian-US Alliance and the evolving nature of the regional and global strategic environment there have been few studies that attempt to provide an in-depth understanding of how the Alliance is developing, and what this means for Australian defence policy. Australia's American Allianceaims to fill this significant gap in order to provide the general public, policy and academic communities a more nuanced understanding of the Alliance and related choices for Australia, that will provide for a better informed debate over the future of Australia's most significant strategic partnership.

'This is what an SAS career is really like' AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE MAGAZINE Elite SAS Patrol Commander Stuart 'Nev' Bonner takes us inside the extraordinary and dangerous world of secret combat operations in this explosive, behind-the-scenes look at life inside the SAS. A world where capture means torture or death, and every move is trained for with precision detail to bring elite soldiers to the very peak of fighting ability. In a career spanning twenty years, fourteen of them in the SAS, Bonner shares with us the inside story of being out in front - and often behind enemy lines. From patrolling the mountains of East Timor to covert operations in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, from sweeping into the Iraqi desert ahead of invading US forces to cripple Saddam Hussein's communications to patrolling in war-torn Baghdad and being in the middle of the disastrous Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan - this is a no-holds-barred account of what it's like to live, eat and breathe SAS. Now part of the HACHETTE MILITARY COLLECTION.

The book Assassin's Mace: A Chinese Game Changer is an intriguing and captivating analysis of China's ancient strategy that advocates use of 'surprise weapons' by an inferior (person or force) to defeat a superior adversary and adaptation of this strategy by modern China as she takes strides towards enhancing her position in global order. The long term goal for China is to avenge its historical suppression and make the Middle Kingdom the numero uno nation of the world. International relationship, economic development and security issues are being orchestrated with finesse to attain the objective. The author has examined China's attempt to focus her efforts to meet her goal. After an objective assessment of China's international relationship and security concerns and likely future actions, the author brings focus of the reader to the evolution of Assassin's Mace weapons. The book attempts to trace the trajectory in the evolution of combat disruptive technologies and unveils scenarios in which Assassin's Mace may be employed in future high technology environment.

Fratricide, or 'Friendly Fire', is a persistent and unwelcome feature in war. Can it be avoided? How can it be properly understood? Beginning with a historical analysis, Fratricide in Battle examines all aspects of the problem, covering both human and technical factors, before looking at a range of measures currently in use to tackle the issue. Charles Kirke brings together an international group of experts in the field, from both military and academic backgrounds, to provide a thorough examination of this crucial subject. Taken together, their contributions offer a comprehensive understanding of fratricide in its historical context and suggest important lessons for future generations.

Almost half a century ago, the Australian National University's TB Millar penned a seminal book on Australian defence policy in the lead up to the Vietnam War. Today, Australia's defence forces are returning from long conflicts overseas, while the rise of China and the economic integration in the Indo-Pacific presents a complex mix of challenges and opportunities. Drawing inspiration from Millar's original volume, Australia's Defence: Towards a New Era? brings together leading experts to examine the domestic and international context of Australia's defence policy, Australian strategy and the size and state of our armed forces. As the country heads towards a new era, this book provides an in-depth overview and key insights into the past, present and future of Australia's defence.