The book Assassin's Mace: A Chinese Game Changer is an intriguing and captivating analysis of China's ancient strategy that advocates use of 'surprise weapons' by an inferior (person or force) to defeat a superior adversary and adaptation of this strategy by modern China as she takes strides towards enhancing her position in global order. The long term goal for China is to avenge its historical suppression and make the Middle Kingdom the numero uno nation of the world. International relationship, economic development and security issues are being orchestrated with finesse to attain the objective. The author has examined China's attempt to focus her efforts to meet her goal. After an objective assessment of China's international relationship and security concerns and likely future actions, the author brings focus of the reader to the evolution of Assassin's Mace weapons. The book attempts to trace the trajectory in the evolution of combat disruptive technologies and unveils scenarios in which Assassin's Mace may be employed in future high technology environment.

'War is too important to be left to the generals' snapped future French prime minister Georges Clemenceau on learning of yet another bloody and futile offensive on the Western Front. One of the great questions in the ongoing discussions and debate about the First World War is why did winning take so long and exact so appalling a human cost? After all this was a fight that, we were told, would be over by Christmas. Now, in his major new history, Allan Mallinson, former professional soldier and author of the acclaimed 1914: Fight the Good Fight, provides answers that are disturbing as well as controversial, and have a contemporary resonance. He disputes the growing consensus among historians that British generals were not to blame for the losses and setbacks in the 'war to end all wars' - that, given the magnitude of their task, they did as well anyone could have. He takes issue with the popular view that the 'amateur' opinions on strategy of politicians such as Lloyd George and, especially, Winston Churchill, prolonged the war and increased the death toll. On the contrary, he argues, even before the war began Churchill had a far more realistic, intelligent and humane grasp of strategy than any of the admirals or generals, while very few senior officers - including Sir Douglas Haig - were up to the intellectual challenge of waging war on this scale. And he repudiates the received notion that Churchill's stature as a wartime prime minister after 1940 owes much to the lessons he learned from his First World War 'mistakes' - notably the Dardanelles campaign - maintaining that in fact Churchill's achievement in the Second World War owes much to the thwarting of his better strategic judgement by the 'professionals' in the First - and his determination that this would not be repeated. Mallinson argues that from day one of the war Britain was wrong-footed by absurdly faulty French military doctrine and paid, as a result, an unnecessarily high price in casualties. He shows that Lloyd George understood only too well the catastrophically dysfunctional condition of military policy-making and struggled against the weight of military opposition to fix it. And he asserts that both the British and the French failed to appreciate what the Americans' contribution to victory could be - and, after the war, to acknowledge fully what it had actually been.

Fratricide, or 'Friendly Fire', is a persistent and unwelcome feature in war. Can it be avoided? How can it be properly understood? Beginning with a historical analysis, Fratricide in Battle examines all aspects of the problem, covering both human and technical factors, before looking at a range of measures currently in use to tackle the issue. Charles Kirke brings together an international group of experts in the field, from both military and academic backgrounds, to provide a thorough examination of this crucial subject. Taken together, their contributions offer a comprehensive understanding of fratricide in its historical context and suggest important lessons for future generations.

For soldiers who want to increase their professional knowledge of the Army and prepare themselves for promotion boards, this revised and expanded edition of the Soldier's Study Guide contains more than 1,460 questions in 58 subject areas. The questions cover Army programs, basic combat skills, combat stress, leadership, maintenance of equipment, customs and courtesies, justice, physical training, NBC warfare, uniforms and insignia, weapons, and more . * For soldiers who want to increase their professional knowledge of the Army and prepare themselves for promotion boards * Covers army programs, basic combat skills, combat stress, leadership, maintenance of equipment, customs and courtesies, justice, physical training, NBC warfare, uniforms and insignia, weapons, and more * More than 100,000 sold

'Extraordinary. This book will inspire you to reach your full potential' Jason Fox Are you stuck in a rut? Do you have more to give? Do you dream of leading a different life? Ben Williams was struggling with drug addiction and battling suicidal thoughts when he saw an advert for the Royal Marines Commandos that changed his life forever. Serving ten years in the Commandos, he learnt important lessons about purpose, integrity, motivation and teamwork. Leaving the Commandos because of injury, Ben set up a coaching business that has helped high-performance companies and professional sports teams like the England Football Squad, coaching them in the build-up to their outstanding performance at the 2018 World Cup. Now Ben is sharing his principles for success. In Commando Mindset, Ben reveals his process for achieving goals of any size to help you take your life to the next level. Inside you'll learn how to: - identify your personal inspirations and values - overcome your fears - set and achieve realistic goals - keep yourself motivated Whether you want to set up a business, run a marathon for the first time or learn a new skill, the Commando Mindset will help you reach your full potential and achieve anything you set your mind to.

This book is a history of the Battle of Mons in August 1914. It diverges widely from the story enshrined as fact in the Official History, and by subsequent accounts dependant on it. It is based on an examination of the war diaries of almost every British unit involved in the battle, with particular reference to the artillery, thus illuminating the tactical intentions of all arms in every phase of the battle. The artillery had made tactical preparations for the handling of their guns in battle. All units in the British Army conformed to Field Service Regulations. The central role that both these played in the battle is explored. In documenting the orders to, and subsequent actions of, junior units, many routinely referenced statements in even recent publications pertaining to the battle are challenged. The British went into battle without much of its field artillery. The German field artillery went into battle with totally defective ammunition. These two facts alone profoundly alter the conventional narrative. The primary importance of well-positioned artillery, supporting British army manoeuvres, is explained. The routine protection that the guns supplied to their allocated infantry battalions is described; and the devastating effect of German howitzer fire on a number of British infantry and artillery units documented. Each of the three senior British generals reacted differently to the stress of battle, and their anxieties can be followed and explored in detail. General French, in command of the British Expeditionary Force, remained in tighter control of events than is generally portrayed. General Smith-Dorrien, of II Corps, is confirmed as the main architect of the fighting on the day; and with luck on his side, fought an almost faultless campaign. Both were relying on General Haig, to bring his I Corps up in support II Corps. Not only did he disobey this order to advance, but he did not warn either General French or II Corps that he was withholding support. This breached Army Regulations, and endangered the whole force. The records reveal that he side-lined his staff, and issued such a series of orders and counter-orders, that he exasperated and demoralised his men. General Haig's report on the battle is an oft-quoted primary source. From the day before the battle, it is so inaccurate as to be almost valueless as a summary of events. If the full details of his actions on the day had been known at the time, he could have been dismissed for incompetence. He might even have been court-martialled. How each of the three generals perceived the role of the artillery under their command is also explored, from the point of view of their previous military experience. The origins of the poor use of artillery by the British Army later in the war can be traced back; partly to the professional army structure of 1914 and the qualities that would be lost as their casualties mounted; and partly to cavalry generals winning out over infantry generals in the direction of future campaigns of the British army. The Battle of Mons was a dress-rehearsal for the war on the Western Front. It was of disproportionate importance in determining how the British army was handled in the future. It deserves to be better understood by students of the period.

With the defeat and destruction of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad all but certain at the end of 1942, the war on the Eastern Front took a definitive turn as the Germans struggled to erect a new defensive front to halt the Soviet juggernaut driving west. Operation Don's Main Attack is the first detailed study of the dramatic clash of armies that followed, unfolding inexorably over the course of two months across an expanse of more than 1,600 kilometers. Using recently released Russian archival material never before available to researchers, David M. Glantz provides a close-up account, from both sides, of the planning and conduct of Operation Don- the Soviet offensive by the Red Army's Southern front that aimed to capture Rostov in January-February 1943. His book includes a full array of plans, candid daily reports, situation maps, and strength and casualty reports prepared for the forces that participated in the offensive at every level. Drawing on an unprecedented and comprehensive range of documents, the book delves into many hitherto forbidden topics, such as unit strengths and losses and the foibles and attitudes of command cadre. Glantz's work also presents rare insights into the military strategy, combat tactics, and operational art of such figures as Generals Eremenko and Malinovsky and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. A uniquely informed study of a critical but virtually forgotten Soviet military operation, Operation Don's Main Attack offers a fresh perspective on the nature of the twentieth century's most terrible of wars.

The post-9/11 world has witnessed a rebirth of irregular and asymmetrical warfare, which, in turn, has led to an increase in conflicts between conventional armies and non-state armed groups. In their haste to respond to the threat from insurgencies, nations often fail to plan effectively not only for combat operations but also for withdrawal, which is inevitable, win or lose. In order to answer the question of how to withdraw from engagement with an insurgency, Gleis examines how insurgencies are conducted and what, if anything, is unique about an Islamist insurgency. He then proposes ways to combat these groups successfully and to disentangle one’s military forces from the war once strategic objectives have been met—or once it is clear that they cannot be. Because this type of warfare is dynamic and ever-changing, this book is not meant to suggest a set of cookie-cutter solutions for how to withdraw from insurgencies. Rather, the author analyzes six counterinsurgency operations that have taken place in the past, with the intention of gleaning from them as many lessons as possible to better prepare for future withdrawals.The literature on how wars end has failed to explore irregular warfare.This much needed reexamination serves as an indispensable starting point.

Civilians and military personnel do not have a clear view of each other in the United States today. Conspiring against such understanding are the norms and traditions of the two cultures. On the one hand, the military is considered to like its secrecy and think of itself as morally superior to the civilians it is meant to serve. On the other hand, civilians praise or blame the armed forces based on political exigencies and generally without true comprehension of their culture. And their mutual misperceptions seem greater now than in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the Vietnam War.Yet, as U.S. Naval Academy professor Bruce Fleming points out, the military is linked to the civilian world so fundamentally that all of us pay the price if they do not develop an appreciation of one another but that is achievable only if each side also strives to see itself clearly. As the military fulfills its mission of protecting Americans and their way of life, civilians must also do their part and support the military through budget allocations, legislation, and enlistment. Without this shared commitment, American interests suffer as a whole.Fleming shows how to close a military-civilian gap that yawns so large in twenty-first-century America that it potentially threatens national security and essential freedoms.

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

There are numerous "order of battle" books on the market. So what makes this series so special? Why should one decide on this particular book? For one thing, most orders of battle usually deal with only the armies of the country/countries; and then only at the division and corps level. Most higher echelons of commands are not covered. This book deals with all the branches of a country's military, giving a breakdown of all the major echelons of command, from theatre down to division. Under each major component, in the book (army group, armies, corps and divisions), the equivalent commands of the other military branches of the country's armed forces are included.
Second, it attempts to give an overall command structure of the country's military showing the central headquarters command structure. The command structure for military theatres, army groups, naval commands, armies, fleets, corps and/or equivalent command is also listed.
Third, most order of battle list the commanders and their dates of tenure. This one includes those, but, also lists their next duty assignment, where they went after leaving this post. One can literally trace a general officer's career through the upper echelons of command with this book. This makes it completely different from all other books on the market.
Fourth, this book lists all the major warships of the country's navy. each major warship of carrier, battleship and cruiser is listed plus a list of the ship's commanders.
Fifth, military unit and/or ship insignia, crest, emblem, or patch is pictured next to the unit/ship, whenever it was found.
This is the second book in a series that I plan to write covering all the nations who wereinvolved in this world conflict.

Elephants have fought in human armies for more than three thousand years. Asian armies boasted of their pachyderm power, while the Romans fielded elephants alongside their legendary legions but were perhaps too proud to admit that mere animals contributed to victory. "War Elephants" is the story of their largely forgotten role in the history of warfare. Generals throughout recorded history used elephants as tanks, bulldozers, and cargo trucks long before such vehicles existed. Until gunpowder began to reduce the utility of elephants in battle during the seventeenth century, these beasts built roads, swung swords, or simply terrified opposing forces. Although some believe that elephants were mere gimmicks of warfare, John M. Kistler discredits that notion. "War Elephants" shows that elephants deserve respect for the sacrifices they have made in the service of many cultures. Elephants have long fought for and served human masters, but it is now the elephants themselves that must be protected.

This scarce antiquarian book is included in our special Legacy Reprint Series. In the interest of creating a more extensive selection of rare historical book reprints, we have chosen to reproduce this title even though it may possibly have occasional imperfections such as missing and blurred pages, missing text, poor pictures, markings, dark backgrounds and other reproduction issues beyond our control. Because this work is culturally important, we have made it available as a part of our commitment to protecting, preserving and promoting the world's literature.

"In 1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf drove Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait using several specific strategies. Schwarzkopf established a temporary supply base in the Saudi Arabian desert to form a base of operations for the U.S. Seventh Corps and then used Marine and Arab coalition allies in a pinning operation against Iraqi troops in Kuwait while the Seventh Corps made a turning movement into the Iraqi rear. Having captured its limited, geographic objective, the coalition called a halt to the war. Schwarzkopf's strategies came straight from Antoine-Henri Jomini's The Art of War, which is the foundation of professional military education in the Western world." - from the new introduction....Antoine Henri de Jomini's The Art of War is considered by many to be the definitive work on military strategy and tactics. His impact on professional military thinking, doctrine and vocabulary is unparalleled by any other military theoretician. Though authors like Clausewitz may be better known to some, few can match the breadth of practical advice offered by the man who served both Napoleon and the Russian Tsar....This edition faithfully reproduces Jomini's seminal work, beautifully reformatted and typeset and includes a new introduction and brief chapter by chapter commentary.

In "Preemption" one of our nation s foremost legal scholars puts forward a controversial new theory on crime and punishment in the postmodern world. Using the American government s 2003 invasion of Iraq as a starting point, Alan M. Dershowitz tracks our society s increasing reliance on preemptive action. In "Preemption," which Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals calls lucid, sober, courageous, and historically informed, Dershowitz has brought together all of his diverse and considerable talents and experiences to confront the idea of preemptive action as it applies to some of our most urgent political and moral dilemmas."

After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq is premised on the judgment that the United States is not succeeding in Iraq and that Iraq itself is more divided and violent than ever. It concludes that the administration's decision to increase U.S. force levels will fail to prevent further deterioration in the situationand that there is no alternative policy with the potential to turn things around.

In recent years, the nature of conflict has changed. Through asymmetric warfare radical groups and weak state actors are using unexpected means to deal stunning blows to more powerful opponents in the West. From terrorism to information warfare, the Wests air power, sea power and land power are open to attack from clever, but much weaker, enemies.

In this clear and engaging introduction, Rod Thornton unpacks the meaning and significance of asymmetric warfare, in both civilian and military realms, and examines why it has become such an important subject for study. He seeks to provide answers to key questions, such as how weaker opponents apply asymmetric techniques against the Western world, and shows how the Wests military superiority can be seriously undermined by asymmetric threats. The book concludes by looking at the ways in which the US, the state most vulnerable to asymmetric attack, is attempting to cope with some new battlefield realities.

This is an indispensable guide to one of the key topics in security studies today.

Originally published in 1927. Contents Include Foreword Diary-July 11, 1871, to July 17, 1871 Preface Text Appendix Index "The Daily Impressions Received during the Campaign of 1870, 1871 and only Cursorily Jotted down in my Diary under Stress of Military Duties I have Supplemented and Completed since my Subsequent return Home by Extracts from the Correspondence Regularly Maintained between my Wife and Myself. On Principle, however, I was Firmly Resolved to Set down only my Actual, Personal Experiences and Feelings from Day to Day Consequently no Improvement or Alteration has been made under the Influence of Later Events. Thus my Diary is a Contribution to the History of that Great and Memorable War, Containing also much Information, Hardly to be found elsewhere, Throwing Light on the Events of which the outside World takes a View Differing Widely from the Reality. Similarly, the Character of Prominent Personages will often wear another aspect than that in which the Present Age and History represent it. But Revelations of this kind are not for Contemporaries to know I therefore direct that no one else but my Wife and my Grown-up Children is to examine my Diary till the year 1922 is ended. After that there is nothing to Hinder it's Publication." Illustrated with photographs. Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. Home Farm Books are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

What is Israel hoping to achieve with its recent pull-out from Gaza? Journalist Jonathan Cook, who spent five years reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, presents a lucid account of the motivations and implications behind the Gaza withdrawal and the building of Israel's 700km fence-cum-wall around the West Bank. At the heart of the issue, he argues, is demography. The wars of 1948 and 1967 brought hundreds of thousands of Palestinians under Israeli rule. The biggest obstacle to a two-state solution comes not from Palestinians living under occupation, but from Israel's own Palestinian citizens - one in five of the population. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, they have been campaigning for democratic reforms to transform Israel from a Jewish state into a state of all its citizens. predicament over the course of the Intifada: its lethal military repression of Palestinian dissent on both sides; its claims that Palestinian citizens and the Palestinian Authority have been secretly conspiring to subvert the Jewish state from within; its banning of marriages between Palestinian citizens and Palestinians living under occupation to prevent a right of return through the back door; its plans to redraw the Green Line to exclude the heartlands of its Palestinian citizens from Israel; and the nascent alliance between Israel's secular leadership and its zealous settlers against the country's Palestinian minority. The path of unilateral separation will lead to more and greater abuses of the rights of Israel's Palestinian citizens. And ultimately, argues the author, it will lead to a third, far deadlier Intifada.

4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And we have done so three times - in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the USSR in Afghanistan...As the only Goliath left in the world, we should be worried that the world's Davids have found a sling and stone that work." - Chapter 1, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. The War in Iraq. The War on Terror. These types of "asymmetrical" warfare are the conflicts of the 21st century - and show how difficult it is for the world's remaining superpower to battle insurgents and terrorists who will fight unconventionally in the face of superior military power. This change in military conflict may seem sudden.

The last days of World War Two in Europe is on one level the story of great statesmen and supreme commanders vying for power and fighting for what each felt was the correct resolution. Whiting sets the final stage of the war against the background of the struggle between Churchill and Truman, and between Marshall and Eisenhower. But while statesmen exchanged telegrams, others kept up the exchange of fire. Mr Whiting vividly portrays the final collapse of the German army, which had fallen into the hands of the aged and the very young, their manic dread of the Russians, and the dissolution of the German High Command. 'Hitler's Defeat' is high drama, but also gives the reader an understanding of the Grand Strategy which led to the reshaping of Europe in 1945. CHARLES WHITING, the author, is Britain's most prolific military writer with over 250 books to his credit. He saw active service in the Second World War, serving in an armoured reconnaissance regiment attached to both the US and British Armies. He is therefore able to write with the insight and authority of someone who, as a combat soldier, actually experienced the horrors of World War II.

This series focuses on the soldiers and warriors of specific historic conflicts. The in-depth text and illustrations will not fail to inspire modelers, historians, re-enactors and enthusiasts alike. Each volume features 20-22 detailed colour plates of fighting men in realistic settings, produced by world class artists. As the seemingly unstoppable German juggernaut tore through the heart of Europe, battled on the sands of Africa, and flooded across the steppes of Russia, much of the world girdled itself to resist the Blitzkrieg - the Lightning War. There was no secret to the initial German successes. The newly developed combined arms force - Panzer, artillery, infantry and Luftwaffe - coupled with well planned operations from an effective command and control system, lead to the success of the German Army during the early years of World War II. Gordon Rottman brings us twenty scenarios during the Blitzkrieg years, 1939 to 1941, with a background of history and description of uniform and equipment in each scenario. Among the battles covered are Warsaw, Narvik, Somme, Crete, Sidi Rezegh, Sollum, Smolensk and Leningrad.

My Way of strategy is the sure method to win when fighting for your life one man against five or ten. There is nothing wrong with the principle "one man can beat ten, so a thousand men can beat ten thousand." You must research this. Of course you cannot assemble a thousand or ten thousand men for everyday training. But you can become a master of strategy by training alone with a sword, so that you can understand the enemy's stratagems, his strength and resources, and come to appreciate how to apply strategy to beat ten thousand enemies.

In this concise and penetrating study, Roger Barnett illuminates the effect of operational, organisational, legal, and moral constraints on the ability of the U.S. to use military force. As the tragic events of September 11 demonstrated, potential adversaries can take advantage of these limitations, thus spawning "asymmetrical warfare." Barnett defines asymmetrical warfare as not simply a case of pitting one's strength against another's weakness but rather of taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against, certain actions. For instance, launching chemical, biological, or suicide attacks; taking indiscriminate actions against critical infrastructure; using hostages or human shields; deliberately destroying the environment; and targeting non-combatants all constitute possible asymmetrical warfare scenarios. Against these acts, the U.S. has not prepared any response in kind. Indeed it either cannot or will not undertake such responses, thus making these attacks especially difficult to counter. This refusal to retaliate in an "eye for an eye" fashion complicates the dilemma of American policy makers who seek to wield power and influence on the world stage while simultaneously projecting a peaceful and benign image. Barnett concludes that the U.S. must create a formal system of selectively eliminating the constraints that dictate their response to certain situations or scenarios. Failure to make such changes will only increase paralysis and, when the use of force is required, contribute to the already heightened risks.

The Allied victory at Omaha Beach was a costly one. A direct infantry assault against a defense that was years in the making, undertaken in daylight following a mere thirty-minute bombardment, the attack had neither the advantage of tactical surprise nor that of overwhelming firepower. American forces were forced to improvise under enemy fire, and although they were ultimately victorious, they suffered devastating casualties. Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were. Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat. |A soldier-scholar reveals the flaws in the Allied invasion at Omaha Beach. Reanalyzing military records and battle plans, Adrian Lewis traces the evolution of combined operations (more than one nation) and joint operations (more than one service) to explain how the plan for swift victory at Omaha Beach went terribly wrong and turned into the bloodiest of the Allied invasions.