This monograph is an exciting and moving account of how all our Services, as well as several civilian agencies, pulled together to pull off the largest aerial evacuation in history - what many have referred to as the modern day Dunkirk. The authors have carefully pieced together an amazing story of courage, determination and American ingenuity. Above all, it is a story about saving lives, one that is seldom told in times of war.

This volume has value for both the general reader and the aviation specialist. For the latter there are lessons regarding command and control and combined-unit operations that need to be learned to achieve battlefield success. For the former there is a straightforward narrative about American aviators of all four services struggling in the most difficult of conditions to try to rescue more than 1,500 American and Vietnamese military and civilians. Not all Americans moving through the events recounted in this monograph acted heroically, but most did, and it was that heroism that gave the evacuation the success it had. This volume is fully documents so that the reader wishing to look deeper into this incident may do so. Those who study the battle will see that it was something of a microcosm of the entire Vietnam War in the relationship of airpower to tactical ground efforts. Kham Duc sat at the bottom of a small green mountain bowl, and during most of 12 May 1968 the sky was full of helicopters, forward air controller aircraft, transports, and fighters, all striving to succeed and to avoid running into each other in what were most trying circumstances. In the end they carried the day, though by the narrowest of margins and heavy losses. Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force.

The Air Force presents this volume, a truly monumental effort at recounting the myriad of widely separate but not unrelated events and operations that took place during the spring invasion of Vietnam in 1972. The authors present an illuminating story of people and machines that fought so gallantly during this major enemy offensive.

Throughout the War in Southeast Asia, Communist forces form North Vietnam infiltrated the isolated, neutral state of Laos. Men and supplies crossed the mountain passes and travelled along an intricate web of roads and jungle paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam. American involvement in Laos began which a photo-reconnaissance missions and, as the war in Vietnam intensified, expanded to a series of air-ground operations from bases in Vietnam and Thailand against fixed targets and infiltration routes in southern Laos. This volume examines this complex operational environment. United States Air Force. Center for Air Force History.

The U.S. Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Van Staaveren wrote this book near the end of his distinguished government service. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought.

The war in Vietnam, spanning more than twenty years, was one of the most divisive conflicts ever to envelop the United States, and its complexity and consequences did not end with the fall of Saigon in 1975. As Peter Sills demonstrates in "Toxic War," veterans faced a new enemy beyond post-traumatic stress disorder or debilitating battle injuries. Many of them faced a new, more pernicious, slow-killing enemy: the cancerous effects of Agent Orange.

Originally introduced by Dow and other chemical companies as a herbicide in the United States and adopted by the military as a method of deforesting the war zone of Vietnam, in order to deny the enemy cover, Agent Orange also found its way into the systems of numerous active-duty soldiers. Sills argues that manufacturers understood the dangers of this compound and did nothing to protect American soldiers.

"Toxic War" takes the reader behind the scenes into the halls of political power and industry, where the debates about the use of Agent Orange and its potential side effects raged. In the end, the only way these veterans could seek justice was in the court of law and public opinion. Unprecedented in its access to legal, medical, and government documentation, as well as to the personal testimonies of veterans, "Toxic War" endeavors to explore all sides of this epic battle.

The assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on November 1, 1963, left a leadership void in Saigon that was never filled. Heads of state went through Saigon like a revolving door, yet none of them were able to successfully lead and govern the people of South Vietnam. On the other side of the globe, President of the United States John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. While the U.S. had a line of succession, President Johnson was relatively new to the Vietnam situation. Even though Johnson was new, he still had Kennedy's cabinet and advisers to aid his decisions. Despite this, by early 1964 two new leaders, Nguyen Khanh and Lyndon Johnson sought a solution to the decades long struggle in Vietnam. President Johnson inherited a three-front war in Vietnam. One front was North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong (VC) insurgency in South Vietnam, and Johnson had to stop this support in order to defeat the VC. The insurgency itself constituted another front that had to be defeated in order to maintain a free and independent South Vietnam. The third overarching front was the creation of a stable and legitimate government in Saigon capable of governing the people of South Vietnam. The question for his administration was on which of these aspects to focus. Before Johnson could make that decision, he first had to decide if the U.S. should continue to aid Saigon; therefore, he had three options: leave Vietnam, continue in an advisory role, or escalate U.S. involvement. The political and military situations in Vietnam deteriorated to such a point through 1964-1965 that by February 1965 there were no good choices left from which President Johnson could choose. Johnson desired for there to be a stable South Vietnamese government before he committed U.S. forces to its defense; however, no such government emerged. The administration was unwilling to risk U.S. prestige, resources, and lives unless they were confident South Vietnam could succeed without U.S. support. Because of the instability in South Vietnam as well as the perceived risk of communist aggression, President Johnson decided that escalatory military actions would be limited and gradual. Therefore, President Johnson made the least bad decision he could in February 1965 by initiating Operation ROLLING THUNDER and committing the United States to the Vietnam War.

An oral history of American Support Troops, our hidden army, during the Vietnam War.

After relatively successful military interventions in Iraq in 1992 and Yugoslavia in 1998, many American strategists believed that airpower and remote technology were the future of U.S. military action. But America's most recent wars in the Middle East have reinforced the importance of counterinsurgency, with its imperative to "win hearts and minds" on the ground in foreign lands. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has studied and experimented with the combined action platoon (CAP) concept used from 1965 to 1971 by the Marine Corps in Vietnam.

Consisting of twelve Marines, a medic, and dozens of inexperienced local militiamen, the American contingent of CAPs lived in South Vietnamese villages where they provided twenty-four-hour security and daily medical support for civilians, and fostered social interaction through civic action projects, such as building schools, offices, and wells. Defend and Befriend is the first comprehensive study of the evolution of these platoons, emphasizing how and why the U.S. Marine Corps attempted to overcome the inherent military, social, and cultural obstacles on the ground in Vietnam. Basing his analysis on Marine records and numerous interviews with CAP veterans, author John Southard illustrates how thousands of soldiers tasked with counterinsurgency duties came to perceive the Vietnamese people and their mission.

This unique study counters prevailing stereotypes and provides a new perspective on the American infantryman in the Vietnam War. Illuminating the fear felt by many Americans as they served among groups of understandably suspicious civilians, Defend and Befriend offers important insights into the future development of counterinsurgency doctrine.

VFW Post 8195 in West Park, Florida, through the Stone of Hope Program, organized services and programs to help Vietnam and other military veterans and their families who had special needs. "The Vietnam War was physically, spiritually and emotionally exhausting for us," says post commander Bobby White. In this unique collection, he has brought together the words of 23 veterans who witnessed the war's cruelty and brutality. Through their testimonies, White reminds us that the war's impact has been long-lasting, with both negative and positive results. Readers will be riveted by their narratives of racism, hostile battlefields, ambush zones, fire fights, land mines, flashbacks, search-and-destroy missions, military police operations, working with K-9s, and finally addressing and putting the PTSD issues at ease.

James V. Weatherill served as an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968. His memoir, THE BLADES CARRY ME: INSIDE THE HELICOPTER WAR IN VIETNAM, takes the reader into the CH-47 Chinook helicopter cockpit and the daily life of a 22-year-old pilot. The young man must reconcile his ideals of patriotism, courage, and honor with the reality and politics of a war where victory is measured by body-count ratios instead of territory gained or lost. When it's time to go home, he realizes he'll leave more than war behind. On the home front, the pilot's wife, Annie, provides a counterpoint as a pregnant college senior and military spouse during an unpopular war. With letters and tape recordings their sole means of communication, how will they grow up without growing apart?

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1975 study. The Air Staff tasked Project CHECO to write continuing reports on counterinsurgency in Thailand. Normally, the first work in a continuing report series describes the overall situation, and subsequent reports provide annual or biannual updates. Underlying details about the Thai insurgency, however, have slowly been coming to light over the past few years, therefore, counterinsurgency has necessarily continued to evolve and past CHECO works on counterinsurgency have been limited to reporting the specific end events of force and counter force. This study attempts to delimit the background to the Thai insurgency and counterinsurgency. Preliminary surveys of the literature and data available indicated that insurgency and counterinsurgency in Thailand have been well documented but that pertinent information is scattered throughout a multitude of separate reports and studies by many agencies. Consequently, one must read numerous publications to become enlightened on all but the most narrowly focused insurgency/counterinsurgency topics. This report attempts to integrate in one volume for the staff officer a broad background and wide perspective of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Thailand. It extracts from many of the completed works and indicates where more detail can be found. It avoids duplicating lengthy explanations already published, avoids citing detailed statistics on armed conflict which are all too often misleading indicators, and avoids discussing personalities which have been important but are left to more exhaustive studies. Due to the nature of its comprehensive approach, this report only indicates the complexities of the Thai insurgency/counterinsurgency and sketches in broadest terms the cultural heritage of the Thai.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. A study requested by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 showed that "when national interests are involved and tactical forces are deployed without a declaration of national emergency or war, a quick-reacting, heavy repair force, organic to the Air Force, is essential." Between June and September 1965, a study group from the Directorate of Civil Engineering at Headquarters USAF had analyzed the problem and obtained Air Staff approval to form such a force. On 23 September 1965, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given responsibility for organizing, training, procuring equipment and supplies, and administering the formation of the first two Red Horse Squadrons (the 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons). By 18 October 1965, Hq TAC at Langley Field, Virginia, completed and distributed a comprehensive programming plan covering the objectives, timetable of actions, reporting procedures, staffing requirements, and the naming of primary and subordinate unit project officers. The mission and capabilities of the squadrons, their limitations, and material requirements were also recorded. Thus, in the fall of 1965, responding to the changing military and political situation in Southeast Asia and the projected need for a rapid increase of U.S. military forces in that part of the world, Project RED HORSE was initiated. The rapidity of planning, organizing, and executing which characterized these early beginnings, was to become a permanent part of RED HORSE activities.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study.The primary mission of Ranch Hand was defoliation and crop destruction. Defoliation was directed against enemy strongholds, roadsides, power lines, railroads, and other lines of communication. The objectives were to increase visibility for Forward Air Controller (FAC) and tactical aircraft and to make it more difficult for the enemy to ambush ground forces. Two herbicides were used for. defoliation: Orange, a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chlorophenoxy acids; and White, a mixture of 2,4-D and picloram. Crop destruction was directed at food plots of enemy troops, the objective being to increase their logistics problem. The herbicide used for crop denial missions was Agent Blue, a sodium salt of cacodylic acid. Proposed targets were carefully screened at all echelons. Requests for defoliation and crop destruction were originated by army commanders at or below the province level. The request, when approved by the Province Chief, was sent to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). With their approval, it went to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) which reviewed specific target areas and operational requirements. A coordination meeting was then held at the province where the final plan was agreed upon. Following this, an operations order was published by the JGS and an execution order issued by MACV. It required approximately six months from the time the request for defoliation was first submitted until the final plan was agreed upon by all levels of command. A second mission of the Ranch was that of conducting airlift operations as directed by higher authority. This was accomplished by removing the spray tanks and spray booms from the aircraft and installing the conveyors and other essential equipment for airlift operations. The conversion, when required, was accomplished in less than 24 hours.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 eport. "The War in Vietnam--July - December 1967" summarizes and provides an overall look at the Air Force role in North and South Vietnam for the semi- annual period. It is a continuation of the summary of Air Force operations first detailed in "The War in Vietnam - 1965." ROLLING THUNDER gradually increased the weight of effort against a broadening, but still limited, target complex. The high incidence of radar-directed guns and SA-2s in the extended battle area also required changes in tactics by strike and reconnaissance forces. Close air support was instrumental in breaking the enemy attacks on Dak To, Loc Ninh, and Bo Duc, often by putting ordnance within 20 feet of prepared Allied positions. Airlift units retained their basic organizational structure and successfully supported the Allied requirements at Loc Ninh and Dak To. Flying safety was the paramount problem confronting the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and by August, aircraft losses due to pilot error exceeded combat losses, until finally an intensive instrument training program was initiated. The denial of crops through herbicide destruction often placed a severe strain on the enemy supply system, forcing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) out of their normal operating areas. Enemy attacks against air bases with a steadily improving rocket capability continued to present formidable problems. Successful efforts were made during the period to substantially increase the B-52 monthly sortie rate to keep pressure on the enemy's supply and infiltration system, while at the same time blocking his efforts to mass along the DMZ.