This is the eighth volume of a projected nine-volume history of Marine Corps operations in the Vietnam War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories. This volume details the activities of Marine Corps units after the departure from Vietnam in 1971 of Ill Marine Amphibious Force, through to the 1973 ceasefire, and includes the return of Marine prisoners of war from North Vietnam. Written from diverse views and sources, the common thread in this narrative is the continued resistance of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, in particular the Vietnamese Marine Corps, to Communist aggression. This book is written from the perspective of the American Marines who assisted them in their efforts. Someday the former South Vietnamese Marines will be able to tell their own story. By July 1971, less than 500 U.S. Marines, mostly advisors, communicators, and supporting arms specialists remained in Vietnam. It was thought at the time that the success of "Vietnamization" of the war would lessen even this small number, as it was hoped that the South Vietnamese could continue fighting successfully. This hope vanished in spring 1972, dashed by a full-scale North Vietnamese Army invasion. The renewed combat saw the U.S. Marines return once more to Southeast Asia in a continuation of the war that now seemed to have no end. The fighting proceeded into the fall, and only ceased with the signing of peace accords in Paris in January 1973.

Among the many horrors of the Vietnam War, some of the most brutal and, until now, least documented were the experiences of the American prisoners of war, many of whom endured the longest wartime captivity, of any POWs in U.S. history. With this book, two of the most respected scholars in the field offer a comprehensive, balanced, and authoritative account of what happened to the nearly eight hundred Americans captured in Southeast Asia. The authors were granted unprecedented access to previously unreleased materials and interviewed over a hundred former POWs, enabling them to meticulously reconstruct the captivity record as well as produce an evocative narrative of a once sketchy and misunderstood, yet key chapter of the war. Powerful and moving in its portrayal of how men sought to cope with physical and psychological ordeals under the most adverse conditions, this landmark study separates fact from fiction. Its analysis of the shifting tactics and temperaments of captive and captor as the war evolved skillfully weaves domestic political developments and battlefield action with prison scenes that alternate between Hanoi's concrete cells, South Vietnam's jungle stockades, and mountain camps in Laos. Giving due praise but never shirking from criticism, the authors describe in gripping detail dozens of cases of individual courage and resistance from celebrated heroes like Jim Stockdale, Robinson Risner, Jeremiah Denton, Bud Day, and Nick Rowe to lesser known legends like Major Ray Schrump and Medal of Honor winner Donald Cook. Along with epic accounts of endurance under torture, breathtaking escape attempts, and remarkable prisoner communication efforts, they also reveal Code of Conduct lapses and instances of outright collaboration with the enemy. Published twenty-five years after Operation Homecoming, which brought home 591 POWs from Vietnam, this tour-de-force history is a compelling and important work that serves as a testament to tile courage, faith, and will of Americans in captivity, as well as a reminder of the sometimes impossible demands made on U.S. servicemen under the Code of Conduct in prisoner of war situations. It is vividly illustrated with maps, prisoners' renderings of camps and torture techniques, and dozens of photographs, many never before published. d and shameful conditions. It includes insightful analyses of the circumstances and conditions of captivity and its varying effects on the prisoners, the strategies and tactics of captors and captives, the differences between captivity in North and South Vietnam and between Laos and Vietnam, and analysis of the quality of the source materials for this and other works on the subject.

This is the sixth volume in a planned nine-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate functional series will complement the operational histories. This volume details the change in U.S. policy for the Vietnam War.

This is the second volume of nine chronological histories covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the III Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines.

The Adventures of Space and Hobo tells the story of Ken's vagabond life after Vietnam. It explores the on-the-ground confusion and chaos of the Vietnam War and its effects on a generation, and those who served. Named Space by a new friend, Hobo, Ken and his traveling companion hit the road to partake of all the possibilities of that generation in search of adventure and uncharted experiences. They did this by allowing fate to be their guide while navigating through the spiritual maze of the 1970's as they traveled by freight trains and hitchhiked through our nation's cities. By using their wits and street knowledge they were able to take advantage of the opportunities that came their way. As a couple of hippies travelling through our nation's cities as vagabonds or rolling stones they were looking for the next free ride to nowhere in particular while mooching off of whatever resources or people who happened to come their way. Ken writes in such a way that you are with him at every turn of this amazing journey. Because Ken writes from the perspective of the redeemed, this journey is rich with God's fingerprints at every step of the way. And at a deeper level, while the particulars are Ken's unique story, the journey he describes is one that each of us either has, or must, travel.

This book looks at the Air Force's support of the ground war in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. The book covers the period of time when the United States began moving from an advisory role to one of active involvement to just before the time when the United Stated gradually began disengaging from the war. The final scene is the successful air campaign conducted during the Communists siege of the Marine camp at Khe Sanh. While the actual siege lasted from late January to the middle of March 1968, enemy preparations for the encirclement were seen as early as October 1967.

In the early 1970s, as U.S. combat forces began to withdraw from Southeast Asia, South Vietnamese and Cambodian forces continued the fight against the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), more commonly known as the Viet Cong. Despite the evacuation of its ground troops, the United States promised to materially support its allies' struggle against communist aggression. Over time, however, the American government drastically reduced its funding of the conflict, placing immense strain on the Cambodian and South Vietnamese armed forces, which were fighting well-supplied enemies. In Losing Vietnam, Major General Ira A. Hunt Jr. chronicles the efforts of U.S. military and State Department officials who argued that severe congressional budget reductions ultimately would lead to the defeat of both Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hunt details the catastrophic effects of reduced funding and of conducting "wars by budget." As deputy commander of the United States Support Activities Group Headquarters (USAAG) in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, Hunt received all Southeast Asia operational reports, reconnaissance information, and electronic intercepts, placing him at the forefront of military intelligence and analysis in the area. He also met frequently with senior military leaders of Cambodia and South Vietnam, contacts who shared their insights and gave him personal accounts of the ground wars raging in the region. This detailed and fascinating work highlights how analytical studies provided to commanders and staff agencies improved decision making in military operations. By assessing allied capabilities and the strength of enemy operations, Hunt effectively demonstrates that America's lack of financial support and resolve doomed Cambodia and South Vietnam to defeat.

"Damn you Rolly, you succeeded in taking me back to Vinh Long and Advisory Team 68, after a more than 40 year absence. I thank you for honoring all who served, but especially patriots like Bob Olson and Walt Gutowski, Army guys... that I knew well. They were great men whose spirit and professionalism you captured well. I highly recommend the book..." Mike Paluda, Michigan COLONEL, USA, RET. "Rolly Kidder has delivered a brilliant chronicle of the Vietnam conflict with which many may not be familiar. Forty years later, he revisits Vietnam and tracks down the families of three men who had been killed... Kidder's recounting of his visits with the families of the three servicemen is a poignant reminder of the continuing grief and pride extant amongst many and is a fitting memorial to the Army and Riverine heroes and an honor to those who mourn them." Captain, M.B. Connolly, USN (retired) COMMANDER, RIVER ASSAULT DIVISION 132 RIVER ASSAULT SQUADRON 13, 1969-70

A secret mission sends the author to Vietnam's Mekong Delta, the bread basket of old Indo - China. He uncovers a sophisticated enemy supply network unknown to our military hierarchy.

Using intelligence data covertly gathered in Cambodia and analyzed at the Center for Naval Analyses in Arlington, Virginia they discover and destroy Vietcong forces and interdict VC supply lines with a mixture of intrigue and romance.

A U. S. Naval story never told, complete with declassified maps from the Office of Naval Intelligence, and illuminating pictures of Saigon and archaic areas of the Delta taken by the author forty - six years ago, a depiction of "old Saigon" and real relationships between North and South Vietnam are related.

Headquartered in Saigon, the true interaction between our Navy and Army ( MACV ) brass couched in the background of wartime Saigon, often referred to as the "Paris of the Orient," and Washington, D. C. is insightfully told.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1967 study. "The War in Vietnam - 1966" is a sequel to "The War in Vietnam - 1965." It summarizes and places in perspective, the Air Force mission in Southeast Asia (SEA). The strategy of airpower in this area of conflict, its offensive and defensive air and ground operations, and effectiveness of command and control are also discussed.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 study.Operation NIAGARA was a concentrated air effort executed by the 7th Air Force Commander in early 1968 to disrupt a potential major offensive in northwestern I Corps and the contiguous area of Laos An extensive enemy build-up in the western DMZ area in late 1967 and early 1968 indicated that a major offensive was developing, with the estimated objective of overrunning Khe Sanh and other friendly positions located astride Route 9--the most readily accessible infiltration route for North Vietnamese forces bypassing the DMZ into South Vietnam It was further estimated that the enemy would launch his offensive on or about 30 January-when the South Vietnamese would be observing the Lunar New Year Thus, at the direction of COMUSMACV, the 7th Air Force Commander and his operations and intelligence staff planned and directed SLAM-type operations in the NIAGARA area several days prior to the Tet Holidays. These operations were accorded the highest priority, and were applied on a sustained basis SLAM-type operations began in the NIAGARA area on 22 January, with 595 tactical strike sorties (including 7AF, USMC, and USN) and 49 B-52 sorties flown against enemy targets When Operation NIAGARA officially terminated on 31 March 1968, over 24,400 tactical strike sorties and 2,500 B-52 sorties had been flown This was the greatest sustained concentration of airpower in the Vietnam conflict to date The purpose of this report is to bring the statistical weight of effort into proper perspective through the narrative study and documentation of significant developments It addresses in particular those operational areas of 7th Air Force evaluative concern-i.e. operational problems and lessons learned, coordination and control, the development of targets and tactics, and the responsiveness of airpower to the tactical situation.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1969 study. The War in Southeast Asia in 1967 and 1968 comprised an astounding complexity of conventional and unconventional wars, political and geographic boundaries, Rules of Engagement, areas of operation, command responsibilities, wet and dry seasons, sanctuaries for both sides, and a terrain of mountains, jungles, and flood plains From the Red Chinese Border to the Mekong Delta, the enemy supply lines ran this tangled natural and man-made gauntlet--attacked the whole way by the air interdiction campaign. In North Vietnam, the railroads and bridges on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) target lists were the prime interdiction targets. Interdiction operations in Laos meant attacking the trucks rolling down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, closing the roads with air strikes, and bombing the supplies stockpiled off the Trail. Within South Vietnam, all airstrikes were nominally considered close air support for ground forces Seventh Air Force operations against in-country enemy roads only slowly became an interdiction campaign. The Cambodian government's refusal to sanction U.S. air strikes within its borders put U.S. activities there within the scope of unconventional warfare and outside the conventional interdiction efforts. Despite many natural and man-made variables, "air interdiction" had certain common characteristics, particular tactics, and specific munitions For instance, the Air Force experience in Korea was repeated in SEA when the enemy's heavy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) degraded accurate bombing of roads and railroads. Also, few efficient area denial weapons existed to prevent rapid enemy repair of the bomb cuts made on the roadbeds. This proved true against roads running through Laos into South Vietnam, as well as against railroads around Hanoi.

The quiet of the night was again shattered by the thunderous roll of incoming artillery shells, spaced five seconds apart, ripping the jungle to pieces, as huge chunks of earth and vegetation blew skyward under the brilliant flashes of orange and white explosions . . . The possibility of encountering more NVA troops moving through our area was high, as we had pushed a very great stick into their nest. But our demonstrated ability to find the enemy and wait for the most opportune time to hit him, while remaining totally undetected, gave us reason to be pleased. It also gave the NVA reason for concern.

In "Force Recon Diary, 1970," Bruce "Doc" Norton offers a harrowing sequel to his best-selling "Force Recon Diary, 1969," continuing the true story of a navy corpsman who became a Force Recon Team Leader behind enemy lines in the jungles of Vietnam. In the midst of a war set deep in the jungle, the Force Recon Marines often found themselves lacking food, drinkable water, explosives, or even enough radio batteries. Armed with only their own courage, skills, and loyalty to their brothers in arms, the Marines used stealth and cunning to survive in the harsh conditions of Vietnam, where one mistake could prove fatal not just for an individual Marine, but for the entire unit.

The classical counterinsurgency theorists emphasize that it is necessary for the government to gain and maintain control of the population in order to defeat the insurgency. They describe population and resource control measures as a means of doing so. However, some contemporary writers have questioned the legitimacy of such tactics and doubt that they can be employed effectively in modern campaigns. Four case studies from three different campaigns: the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq, examine how population and resource control measures can be employed effectively and legitimately by the counterinsurgent force. The case studies reveal that protecting and isolating the population is the most critical component of any such measures, without this condition the measures will not achieve their desired effect. The case studies also reveal that once the protection and isolation are in place, the government can focus on controlling the behavior of the population. That is, it can prevent behavior that supports the insurgency while enabling behavior that supports the government or is neutral. This denies the insurgency its means of support and facilitates the destruction of its armed and subversive elements by the counterinsurgent forces.

United States Army in Vietnam. Center of Military History publication number 91-14-1. Covers how the engineers grew from a few advisory detachments to a force of more than 10 percent of the Army troops serving in South Vietnam. The 35th Engineer Group began arriving in large numbers in June 1965 to begin transforming Cam Ranh Bay into a major port, airfield, and depot complex. Within a few years, the Army engineers had expanded to a command, two brigades, six groups, twenty-eight construction and combat battalions, and many smaller units. Photos. Maps. Illustrations.

Hog's Exit explores the mysterious death in 1982 of Jerry "Hog" Daniels, a former CIA case officer to legendary Hmong leader General Vang Pao during the U.S.'s "secret war" in Laos. Drawing on first-person reminiscences of Daniels's colorful life, Morrison also captures the drama and beauty of the Hmong spirit rituals, as well as the lamentations and suspicions that pervade this unusual funeral ceremony. Americans and Hmong, ranchers and refugees, State Department officials and smokejumpers, share their memories about Daniels: growing up; hunting and fishing in Montana; cheating death in Laos; and carousing in the bars and brothels of Thailand. Hog's Exit provides a fascinating view of a man and the two very different cultures in which he lived.

This is the last volume, although published out of chronological sequence, in the nine-volume operational history series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories. This book is the capstone volume of the entire series in that 1968, as the title indicates, was the defining year of the war. While originally designed to be two volumes, it was decided that unity and cohesion required one book. The year 1968 was the year of the Tet Offensive including Khe Sanh and Hue City. These were momentous events in the course of the war and they occurred in the first three month s of the year. This book, however, documents that 1968 was more than just the Tet Offensive. The bloodiest month of the war for the U.S. forces was not January, nor February 1968, but May 1968 when the Communists launched what was called their "Mini-Tet" offensive. This was followed by a second "Mini-Tet" offensive during the late summer which also was repulsed at heavy cost to both sides. By the end of the year, the U.S. forces in South Vietnam's I Corps, under the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), had regained the offensive. By December, enemy-initiated attacks had fallen to their lowest level in two years. Still, there was no talk of victory. The Communist forces remained a formidable foe and a limit had been drawn on the level of American participation in the war. Although largely written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps, the volume also treats the activities of Marines with the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, activities of Marine advisors to South Vietnamese forces, and other Marine involvement in the war. Separate chapters cover Marine aviation and the single manager controversy, artillery, logistics, manpower, and pacification. Like most of the volumes in this series, this has been a cumulative history.

This is the eighth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This particular volume details the gradual withdrawal in 1970-1971 of Marine combat forces from South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, as part of an overall American strategy of turning the ground war against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Marines in this period accomplished a number of difficult tasks. The III Marine Amphibious Force transferred most of its responsibilities in I Corps to the Army XXIV Corps, which became the senior U.S. command in that military region. III MAF continued a full range of military and pacification activities within Quang Nam Province, its remaining area of responsibility. Developing its combat and counterinsurgency techniques to their fullest extent, the force continued to protect the city of Da Nang, root out the enemy guerrillas and infrastructure from the country, and prevent enemy main forces from disrupting pacification. At the same time, its strength steadily diminished as Marine s redeployed in a series of increments until, in April 1971, the III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters itself departed and was replaced for the last month of Marine ground combat by the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade. During the redeployments, Marine logisticians successfully withdrew huge quantities of equipment and dismantled installation s or turned them over to the South Vietnamese. Yet this was also a time of troubles for Marines. The strains on the Armed Services of a lengthy, inconclusive war and the social and racial conflicts tormenting American society adversely affected Marine discipline and cohesion, posing complex, intractable problems of leadership and command. Marines departed Vietnam with a sense that they had done their duty, but also that they were leaving behind many problems unsolved and tasks not completed.

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps Gazette, has served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam War. It has both complemented and supplemented our official histories on Marine operations in Vietnam. Since its publication in 1974, however, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional significant articles in the three periodicals have made both the anthology and bibliography somewhat dated. This expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliography to 1984.

VFW Post 8195 in West Park, Florida, through the Stone of Hope Program, organized services and programs to help Vietnam and other military veterans and their families who had special needs. "The Vietnam War was physically, spiritually and emotionally exhausting for us," says post commander Bobby White. In this unique collection, he has brought together the words of 23 veterans who witnessed the war's cruelty and brutality. Through their testimonies, White reminds us that the war's impact has been long-lasting, with both negative and positive results. Readers will be riveted by their narratives of racism, hostile battlefields, ambush zones, fire fights, land mines, flashbacks, search-and-destroy missions, military police operations, working with K-9s, and finally addressing and putting the PTSD issues at ease.

The Tuesday Club tells the story of thousands of Vietnam Veterans who continue to fight a war that never ends. That war, the war within, is called Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Tuesday Club gives an insider's view of the therapy rooms of VA's across the United States. It tell the horror, the fear, the grief, and the compassion, of a war that alienated an entire generation of men and women from families, each other, and the nation. The Tuesday Club tells the story of the real heroes of Vietnam, those who survived, and daily carry the burden of the trauma of war. "The Tuesday Club, they call themselves, a group of valiant men, Their membership is quite unique, God help those who must attend." Marinell Miller, Ph.D. PTSD Clinical Team Hampton Veterans Affairs Medical Center Hampton, Virginia

Gripping and dramatic, Yellow Footprints reveals the extraordinary journey of becoming one of the proud...and one of the few. Set in 1969 during the height of the Vietnam War, Yellow Footprints details the grueling training of Platoon 3074 to prepare them for the mighty ranks of the U.S. Marine Corps. From the harrowing first few days to the camaraderie forged by the men who shared this ordeal, author Jack Shipman presents an unrestrained look at boot camp not often viewed by the public. Yellow footprints mark the entrance to the Receiving Barracks at the U.S. Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina, and San Diego, California. Along with the other new recruits, Jack Shipman took his first steps on those footprints to either become a proud U.S. Marine or wash out of the toughest military training in the world. Shipman's attention to detail and his frank assessment of his experiences offers a highly readable account for those seeking to learn the fundamentals of Marine Corps history.