Since the end of the Cold War, competition among states has been waged along economic rather than ideological or military lines. In Canada, as elsewhere, this shift has forced a rethinking of the role of intelligence services in protecting and promoting national economic security. The scholars and practitioners featured here explore the aim, existing mandate, and practical applications of economic espionage from a Canadian and comparative perspective, and present a range of options for policy-makers. Economic Intelligence & National Security examines the laws in place to thwart economic spying, and the challenges and ethical problems faced by agencies working clandestinely to support their national private sectors.

Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must also take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.

How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In "Failing to Win," Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality.

To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.

John Spencer was a new second lieutenant in 2003 when he parachuted into Iraq leading a platoon of infantry soldiers into battle. During that combat tour, he learned how important unit cohesion was to surviving a war, both physically and mentally. He observed that this cohesion developed as the soldiers experienced the horrors of combat as a group, spending their downtime together and processing their shared experiences. When Spencer returned to Iraq five years later to take command of a troubled company, he found that his lessons on how to build unit cohesion were no longer as applicable. Rather than bonding and processing trauma as a group, soldiers now spent their downtime separately, on computers communicating with family back home. Spencer came to see the internet as a threat to unit cohesion, but when he returned home and his wife was deployed, the internet connected him and his children to his wife on a daily basis. In Connected Soldiers Spencer delivers lessons learned about effective methods for building teams in a way that overcomes the distractions of home and the outside world, without reducing the benefits gained from connections to family.

Raymond Aron made major investigations into the dialectic between war and peace, and also developed a sophisticated theory of international relations. Despite this, his body of work has been overlooked compared to that of his more famous contemporaries. This book shines a light on both the man and his work on ideological critique, the philosophy of history, international relations and political economy. The book also discusses Aron's political legacy and argues that a number of his critiques and theories can help us address many of the problems and conflicts of the 21st century.

What essential leadership lessons do we learn by distilling the actions and ideas of great military commanders such as George Washington, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Colin Powell? The Art of Command demonstrates that great leaders become great through a commitment not only to develop vital skills but also to surmount personal shortcomings. In the second edition of this classic resource, Harry S. Laver, Jeffrey J. Matthews, and the other contributing authors identify eleven core characteristics of highly effective leaders, such as integrity, determination, vision, and charisma, and eleven significant figures in American military history who embody those qualities. Featuring new chapters on transitional leadership, innovative leadership, and authentic leadership, this insightful book offers valuable perspectives on the art of military command in American history.

This broad-ranging new text introduces a wide range of theoretical perspectives with a central focus on their application to understanding key issues in global, state and human security in the contemporary world.

Warrior Geeks examines how technology is transforming the way we think about and fight war, taking three major changes that are driving this process: cybernetic technologies that are folding soldiers into a cybernetic system that will allow the military to read their thoughts and emotions and mould them accordingly; the coexistence of men and robots in the battle-spaces of tomorrow; and the extent to which we may be able to re-engineer warriors through pharmacological manipulation. By referring back to the Greeks who defined the contours of war for us, Coker shows how we are in danger of losing touch with our humanity - the name we give not only to a species but the virtues we deem it to embody. The journey from Greeks to Geeks may be a painful one. War can only be rendered more humane if we stay in touch with the ancestors, yet unfortunately we are planning to subcontract our ethical choices to machines. In revaluing technology, are we devaluing our humanity, or the post-human condition, changing our subjectivity and thus the existential dimension of war by changing our relationship with technology both functionally and performatively?

After World War II, the United States military increasingly found itself involved in operations that have been described variously as limited wars, small wars, low intensity conflicts, operations other than war, support and stability operations, and the like. The name common for such operations throughout much of the 1990s was ""operations other than war"" (OOTW). During this period there was an explosion of doctrinal material on the subject, including an official field manual, FM 100-5, which appeared in 1993 and listed six principles of OOTW: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security. The author of the present work examines four successful OOTWs (the Greek Civil War, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua/Honduras) and four failed ones (Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Haiti) and concludes that there is a positive correlation between adherence to the principles and the operation's outcome. Furthermore, the author suggests that some of the principles serve as ""necessary conditions"" for others.

From Angola and Liberia to Iraq and the Congo, wars have taken place in resource rich countries full of poor people. In Wars of Plunder Philippe Le Billon explores how resources have shaped recent conflicts, and what the international community has tried to do about it. Focusing on key resources-oil, diamonds, and timber-he argues that resources and wars are linked in three main ways. First, resource revenues finance belligerents, a trend that has become all the more conspicuous since the withdrawal of Cold War foreign sponsorship in the late 1980s. Although the 'War on Terror' has redefined military assistance and the internationalisation of war, many belligerents continue to rely on and profit from 'conflict resources'. Second, resource exploitation generates conflict. As global demand for raw materials has sharply increased, competition over critical resources such as oil has resulted in a flurry of 'resource conflicts', from local community struggles against mining multinationals to regional and international tensions. Third, economic shocks and poor governance sharply increase the risk of war (the 'resource curse'). While today's resource boom is a major economic opportunity for resource rich but poor countries, reliance on resource exports often implies sharp economic downturns. Not all resources are the same, however, and effective responses are at hand. Sanctions, military interventions and wealth sharing have helped bring an end to conflicts, yet only deeper domestic and international reforms in resource governance can stop the plunder.

Colin Gray presents an inventive treatise on the nature of strategy, war, and peace, organized around forty maxims. This collection of mini essays will forearm politicians, soldiers, and the attentive general public against many-probably most- fallacies that abound in contemporary debates about war, peace, and security. While one can never guarantee strategic success, which depends on policy, military prowess, and the quality of the dialogue between the two, a strategic education led by the judgments in these maxims increases the chances that one's errors will be small rather than catastrophic. The maxims are grouped according to five clusters."War and Peace" tackles the larger issues of strategic history that drive the demand for the services of strategic thought and practice. "Strategy" presses further, into the realm of strategic behavior, and serves as a bridge between the political focus of part one and the military concerns that follow. "Military Power and Warfare" turns to the pragmatic business of military performance: operations, tactics, and logistics. Part four, "Security and Insecurity," examines why strategy is important, including a discussion of the nature, dynamic character, and functioning of world politics. Finally, "History and the Future" is meant to help strategists better understand the processes of historical change.

Will international wars where energy resources play a central role continue to hold sway over life and death for industrialized nations, or is this a transient phase in the evolution of industrial societies? This book answers this question by tracing the history of energy and conflict from antiquity, through the epic hot and cold wars of the twentieth century, to expected outcome of the war in Iraq. It points the way to the end of wars over control of fossil fuels, and demonstrates why these may be the last major international wars over other resources as well.This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the future of energy use or international conflict. Readers will find in it an illuminating overview of the sweep of historical events. The book further provides a compelling explanation of how a thorough understanding of the evolutionary direction of these events challenges the conventional wisdom that resource wars are endemic to the nature of industrial society, thus offering a fresh view on one of the most important challenges of our time.

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted unprecedented public interest in the ethics of war, a debate that has raged furiously in the media, in politics and in the public consciousness ever since. In this fascinating and informative book, Nicholas Fotion, an expert on the ethics of military action, explores the notion of developing an ethical theory that guides the behaviour of those who are at war. Fotion gives a clear account of just war theory, presenting it as a useful device in helping us make decisions about what we should do when war appears on the horizon. Examining conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Israel, the Falklands and Afghanistan, the book interrogates the roles of the various parties involved in military action - the military, government officials, and the side-line judges (journalists, citizens, scholars, neutral nations) - and the role just war theory should play as a direct guide to behaviour. Articulate, provocative and stimulating, War and Ethics is an ideal introduction to this hugely important debate.

On the major European and Russian fronts throughout World War II, the challenge of crossing rivers under fire was absolutely central to any advance. The Panzers that crossed the Meuse at Sedan in May 1940 cut the French Army in two. The Wehrmacht's ability to cross the great rivers of the western USSR was vital to the lightning advances of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and in 1943-45 the Red Army had to drive the Germans back from a succession of river lines during their advance to the Reich, culminating in the Vistula and Oder lines. With World War II armies dependent on heavy mechanized equipment, the function which rivers played became essential for soldiers in all sides of the war. World War II River Assault Tactics details the methods, means and analysis of specific successes and failures. Featuring a wealth of wartime photos, particularly from German sources, and full-colour plates illustrating tactical scenarios, the subject is brought to life.

In the post 9/11 world, the emotionally charged concepts of identity and ideology, enmity and political violence have once again become household words. Contrary to the serene assumptions of the early 1990s, history did not end. Civilisations are busy clashing against one another, and the self-proclaimed pacified humanity is once again showing its barbaric roots.Religion mixes with politics to produce governments that abuse even their own citizens, and victorious insurgents too often fail to carry out the promised reforms. Terrorists blow up unsuspecting pedestrians, and allegedly democratic nations threaten to bomb allegedly less democratic ones back to the Stone Age. Mass demonstrations materialise like flash mobs out of nowhere, prepared to hold their ground until the bitter end.Where does all this passionate intensity come from? To better understand how the ideological enmity of today is moulded, spread and managed, this book investigates the propaganda operations of the past. Its topics range from the ruthless portrayal of female enemy soldiers in an early-20th-century civil war setting to the multiple enemy images cherished by Adolf Hitler, and onwards, to the WWII Soviet Russians as a subtype of a more ancient notion of the Eastern Hordes. Of more recent events, the book covers the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the still ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. The closing chapter on cyber warfare introduces the reader to the invisible enemies of the future.