The prohibition of the use of force in international law is one of the major achievements of international law in the past century. The attempt to outlaw war as a means of national policy and to establish a system of collective security after both World Wars resulted in the creation of the United Nations Charter, which remains a principal point of reference for the law on the use of force to this day. There have, however, been considerable challenges to the law on the prohibition ofThe prohibition of the use of force in international law is one of the major achievements of international law in the past century. The attempt to outlaw war as a means of national policy and to establish a system of collective security after both World Wars resulted in the creation of the United Nations Charter, which remains a principal point of reference for the law on the use of force to this day. There have, however, been considerable challenges to the law on the prohibition of the use of force over the past two decades. This Oxford Handbook is a comprehensive and authoritative study of the modern law on the use of force. Over seventy experts in the field offer a detailed analysis, and to an extent a restatement, of the law in this area. The Handbook reviews the status of the law on the use of force, and assesses what changes, if any, have occurred in consequence to recent developments. It offers cutting-edge and up-to-date scholarship on all major aspects of the prohibition of the use of force. The work is set in context by an extensive introductory section, reviewing the history of the subject, recent challenges, and addressing major conceptual approaches. Its second part addresses collective security, in particular the law and practice of the United Nations organs, and of regional organizations and arrangements. It then considers the substance of the prohibition of the use of force, and of the right to self-defence and associated doctrines. The next section is devoted to armed action undertaken on behalf of peoples and populations. This includes self-determination conflicts, resistance to armed occupation, and forcible humanitarian and pro-democratic action. The possibility of the revival of classical, expansive justifications for the use of force is then addressed. This is matched by a final section considering new security challenges and the emerging law in relation to them. Finally, the key arguments developed in the book are tied together in a substantive conclusion. The Handbook will be essential reading for scholars and students of international law and the use of force, and legal advisers to both government and NGOs.

A new translation for the 21st century. The Art of War by Sun Tzu is one of the most influential political and business books of our era. This gateway edition for the 21st century reader rediscovers the essential clarity of the ancient masterpiece, cited by generals from a dozen Chinese dynasties, international business leaders, and modern military field manuals. This edition also contains a full commentary on Sun Tzu, the man and his ideas, contemporary of Confucius and Buddha; and a critical guide to further reading. This is the perfect introduction to one of the world's best-known classics.

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.

Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.

The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

Contemporary Western war is represented as enacting the West's ability and responsibility to help make the world a better place for others, in particular to protect them from oppression and serious human rights abuses. That is, war has become permissible again, indeed even required, as ethical war. At the same time, however, Western war kills and destroys. This creates a paradox: Western war risks killing those it proposes to protect. This book examines how we have responded to this dilemma and challenges the vision of ethical war itself, exploring how the commitment to ethics shapes the practice of war and indeed how practices come, in turn, to shape what is considered ethical in war. The book closely examines particular practices of warfare, such as targeting, the use of cultural knowledge, and ethics training for soldiers. What emerges is that instead of constraining violence, the commitment to ethics enables and enhances it. The book argues that the production of ethical war relies on an impossible but obscured separation between ethics and politics, that is, the problematic politics of ethics, and reflects on the need to make decisions at the limit of ethics.

EVERYTHING YOU THINK YOU KNOW ABOUT WAR IS WRONG. We are living in an age of conflict: Russia's resurgence and China's rise, global terrorism, international criminal empires, climate change and dwindling natural resources. But while the West has been playing the same old war games, the enemy has a new strategy. The rules have changed, and we are dangerously unprepared. Former paratrooper Sean McFate has been on the front lines of conflict, and seen first-hand the horrors of battle. As a Professor of Strategy, he understands the complexity of the current military situation. In this new age of war: * Plausible deniability is more potent than firepower * Russia has become a disinformation superpower, twisting the West's perception of reality * Sanctions are blunt instruments that starve only the masses, not the elite * Victory will belong to the cunning, not the strong * New types of world powers will rule Learn how to triumph in the coming age of conflict in ten new rules. Adapt and we can prevail. Fail, and size and strength won't protect us. This is The Art of War for the 21st century. __________ 'Some of what he says makes more sense than much of what comes out of the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence' Max Hastings, Sunday Times 'Thought-provoking' Johnathon Evans, Former Head of MI5 'Fascinating and disturbing' Economist

This volume offers a set of concise and accessible introductions to the seminal figures in the historical development of the just war tradition. In what, if any, circumstances are political communities justified in going to war? And what limits should apply to the conduct of any such war? The just war tradition is a body of thought that helps us think through these very questions. Its core ideas have been subject to fierce debate for over 2,000 years. Yet they continue to play a prominent role in how political and military leaders address the challenges posed by the use of force in international society. Until now there has been no text that offers concise and accessible introductions to the key figures associated with the tradition. Stepping into this breach, Just War Thinkers provides a set of clear but detailed essays by leading experts on nineteen seminal thinkers, from Cicero to Jeff McMahan. This volume challenges the reader to think about how traditions are constituted-who is included and excluded, and how that is determined-and how they serve to enable, constrain, and indeed channel subsequent thought, debate, and exchange. This book will be of much interest to students of just war tradition and theory, ethics and war, philosophy, security studies and IR.

With the ending of the strategic certainties of the Cold War, the need for moral clarity over when, where and how to start, conduct and conclude war has never been greater. There has been a recent revival of interest in the just war tradition. But can a medieval theory help us answer twenty-first century security concerns? David Fisher explores how just war thinking can and should be developed to provide such guidance. His in-depth study examines philosophical challenges to just war thinking, including those posed by moral scepticism and relativism. It explores the nature and grounds of moral reasoning; the relation between public and private morality; and how just war teaching needs to be refashioned to provide practical guidance not just to politicians and generals but to ordinary service people. The complexity and difficulty of moral decision-making requires a new ethical approach - here characterised as virtuous consequentialism - that recognises the importance of both the internal quality and external effects of agency; and of the moral principles and virtues needed to enact them. Having reinforced the key tenets of just war thinking, Fisher uses these to address contemporary security issues, including the changing nature of war, military pre-emption and torture, the morality of the Iraq war, and humanitarian intervention. He concludes that the just war tradition provides not only a robust but an indispensable guide to resolve the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Thirty years after its enactment, Congress has undertaken a review of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) as well as the broader organisation and structure of the contemporary Department of Defense (DOD) more broadly. Most observers agree that in principle a comprehensive review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is warranted at this juncture. Further, a broad consensus appears to exist among observers that DOD must become considerably more agile while retaining its strength in order to enable the United States to meet a variety of critical emerging national security challenges. Agreement seemingly ends there. There appears to be little consensus on what should be changed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to take. Discussions have begun to coalesce around a number of proposals, including reforming defense acquisition processes, further strengthening the Joint Staff, reducing Pentagon staffs, and better empowering the services in the joint arena. Ideas vary, however, on how, specifically, to achieve those outcomes. Disagreement also exists as to whether or not reorganising DOD alone will be sufficient. Some observers maintain that a reform of the broader interagency system on national security matters is needed. This book is intended to assist Congress as it evaluates the variety of reform proposals currently under discussion around Washington.

Hunt the Devil explains the origins and processes of the repetitive American reflex to demonize and then wage war against perceived opponents as well as ways to break the cycle. Hunt the Devil is a timely and illuminating exploration of demonic imagery in US war culture. In it, authors Robert L. Ivie and Oscar Giner examine the origins of the Devil figure in the national psyche and review numerous examples from US history of the demonization of America's perceived opponents. Their analysis demonstrates that American military deployments are often part of a cycle of mythical projection wherein the Devil repeatedly appears anew and must be exorcised through redemptive acts of war, even at the cost of curtail ing democratic values. Meticulously researched, documented, and argued, Hunt the Devil opens with contemporary images of the US's global war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11. In five chapters devoted to the demonization of evildoers, witches, Indians, dictators, and Reds by American writers, in presidential rhetoric, and in popular culture, Ivie and Giner show how the use of demonization in the war on terror is only the most recent manifestation of a process that has recurred throughout American history. In a sixth chapter, the authors introduce the archetype of the Trickster. Though not opposed to the Devil per se, the Trickster's democratic impulses have often provided a corrective antidote to the corrosive and distorting effects of demonization. Invoking the framework of Carl Jung's shadow aspect, Hunt the Devil offers the Trickster as a figure who can break the cycle of demonization and war. The role of the mythic Devil in the American psyche has profound implications, not just for American diplomacy and the use of American arms in the world, but for the possibility of domestic peace within an increasingly diverse society. Hunt the Devil provides much of interest to readers and scholars in the fields of war, rhetorical studies, American Studies, US political culture, Jungian psychology, and mythography.

"After we had exchanged the requisite formalities over tea in his camp on the southern edge of Kabul's outer defense perimeter, the Afghan field commander told me that two of his bravest mujahideen were martyred because he did not have a pickup truck to take them to a Peshawar hospital. They had succumbed to their battle wounds. He asked me to tell his party's bureaucrats across the border that he needed such a vehicle desperately. I double-checked with my interpreter that he was indeed making this request. I wasn't puzzled because the request appeared unreasonable but because he was asking me, a twenty-year-old employee of a humanitarian organization, to intercede on his behalf with his own organization's bureaucracy. I understood on this dry summer day in Khurd Kabul that not all militant and political organizations are alike." from Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond

While popular accounts of warfare, particularly of nontraditional conflicts such as guerrilla wars and insurgencies, favor the roles of leaders or ideology, social-scientific analyses of these wars focus on aggregate categories such as ethnic groups, religious affiliations, socioeconomic classes, or civilizations. Challenging these constructions, Abdulkader H. Sinno closely examines the fortunes of the various factions in Afghanistan, including the mujahideen and the Taliban, that have been fighting each other and foreign armies since the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Focusing on the organization of the combatants, Sinno offers a new understanding of the course and outcome of such conflicts. Employing a wide range of sources, including his own fieldwork in Afghanistan and statistical data on conflicts across the region, Sinno contends that in Afghanistan, the groups that have outperformed and outlasted their opponents have done so because of their successful organization. Each organization's ability to mobilize effectively, execute strategy, coordinate efforts, manage disunity, and process information depends on how well its structure matches its ability to keep its rivals at bay. Centralized organizations, Sinno finds, are generally more effective than noncentralized ones, but noncentralized ones are more resilient absent a safe haven.

Sinno's organizational theory explains otherwise puzzling behavior found in group conflicts: the longevity of unpopular regimes, the demise of popular movements, and efforts of those who share a common cause to undermine their ideological or ethnic kin. The author argues that the organizational theory applies not only to Afghanistan-where he doubts the effectiveness of American state-building efforts but also to other ethnic, revolutionary, independence, and secessionist conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond."

In the past 15 years, UK anti-militarist activists have auctioned off a tank outside an arms fair, superglued themselves to Lockheed Martin's central London offices and stopped a battleship with a canoe. They have also challenged militarism in many other everyday ways. This book explores why anti-militarists resist, considers the politics of different tactics and examines the tensions and debates within the movement. As it explores the multifaceted, imaginative and highly subversive world of anti-militarism, the book also makes two overarching arguments. First, that anti-militarists can help us to understand militarism in new and useful ways. And secondly, that the methods and ideas used by anti-militarists can be a potent force for radical political change.

Turkish Intelligence and the Cold War examines the hitherto unexplored history of secret intelligence cooperation between three asymmetric partners - specifically the UK, US and Turkey - from the end of the Second World War until the Turkey's first military coup d'etat on 27 May 1960. The book shows that our understanding of the Cold War as a binary rivalry between the two blocs is too simple an approach and obscures important characteristics of intelligence cooperation among allies. Egemen Bezci shows that a pragmatic approach offers states new opportunities to protect national interests, by conducting ''intelligence diplomacy' to influence crucial areas such as nuclear weapons and to exploit cooperation in support of their own strategic imperatives. This study not only reveals previously-unexplored origins of secret intelligence cooperation between Turkey and West, but also contributes to wider academic debates on the nature of the Cold War by highlighting the potential agency of weaker states in the Western Alliance.

A new edition of von Clausewitz's classic treatise on military strategy, reinterpreted by Graham Harman through the philosophy of speculative realism.

Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that War is the continuation of politics by other means . But what does Clausewitz mean to a world where economic, political and cultural conflicts are increasingly framed as wars? Written after the Napoleonic Wars but left unfinished at the author s death and not published until 1832, On War is one of the most influential and important works on military strategy ever written.

This new edition presents this classic text with a new introduction by Graham Harman, who reads Clausewitz s ideas about war, politics and military strategy through the lens of speculative realism.

This book develops a new approach in explaining how a nation's Grand Strategy is constituted, how to assess its merits, and how grand strategies may be comparatively evaluated within a broader framework. The volume responds to three key problems common to both academia and policymaking. First, the literature on the concept of grand strategy generally focuses on the United States, offering no framework for comparative analysis. Indeed, many proponents of US grand strategy suggest that the concept can only be applied, at most, to a very few great powers such as China and Russia. Second, characteristically it remains prescriptive rather than explanatory, ignoring the central conundrum of why differing countries respond in contrasting ways to similar pressures. Third, it often understates the significance of domestic politics and policymaking in the formulation of grand strategies - emphasizing mainly systemic pressures. This book addresses these problems. It seeks to analyze and explain grand strategies through the intersection of domestic and international politics in ten countries grouped distinctively as great powers (The G5), regional powers (Brazil and India) and pivotal powers hostile to each other who are able to destabilize the global system (Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). The book thus employs a comparative framework that describes and explains why and how domestic actors and mechanisms, coupled with external pressures, create specific national strategies. Overall, the book aims to fashion a valid, cross-contextual framework for an emerging research program on grand strategic analysis.

A compelling new history of a crucial turning point in the Second World War which also provides a detailed picture of the British Army at a critical stage in its fight against Hitler's Germany. In late June 1942, the dispirited and defeated British Eighth Army was pouring back towards the tiny railway halt of El Alamein in the western desert of Egypt. Tobruk had fallen and Eighth Army had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika. Yet just five months later, the famous bombardment opened the Eighth Army's own offensive which destroyed the Axis threat to Egypt. Explanations for the remarkable change of fortune have generally been sought in the abrasive personality of the new army commander Lieutenant-General Bernard Law Montgomery. But as Niall Barr shows in this new interpretation, based on extensive original research, the long running controversies surrounding the commanders of Eighth Army - Generals Auchinleck and Montgomery - and that of their legendary opponent, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, have often been allowed to obscure the true nature of the Alamein campaign. This book is the story of how an army learnt from its mistakes. the Eighth Army transform itself from a tactically inept collection of units into a battle-winning force. Pendulum of War explores how the Eighth Army learnt from bitter experience to develop tactical and operational methods that eventually mastered the veterans of Rommel's Afrika Korps and provides a vivid and fresh perspective on the fighting at El Alamein from the early desperate days of July to the final costly victory in November.

Conflict: How Soldiers Make Impossible Decisions is about making hard choices-where all outcomes are potentially negative. The authors draw on interviews conducted with soldiers about the situations they faced and the decisions they made at war. These are vivid and sometimes distressing stories. They form the data from which the authors explore the cognitive processes associated with choice, commitment to action and (sometimes) error, as well as goal directed thinking, innovation and courage. By referring to real cases, Conflict invites readers to consider their own responses under extreme circumstances and ask themselves how they would choose between difficult options. In doing so this book will go some way to helping readers understand what it feels like when choosing between least-worst decisions.

In the U.S. Navy, "Wheel Books" were once found in the uniform pockets of every junior and many senior petty officers. Each small notebook was unique to the Sailor carrying it, but all had in common a collection of data and wisdom that the individual deemed useful in the effective execution of his or her duties. Often used as a substitute for experience among neophytes and as a portable library of reference information for more experienced personnel, those weathered pages contained everything from the time of the next tide, to leadership hints from a respected chief petty officer, to the color coding of the phone-and-distance line used in underway replenishments.

In that same tradition, the new "Naval Institute Wheel Books" will provide supplemental information, pragmatic advice, and cogent analysis on topics important to all naval professionals. Drawn from the U.S. Naval Institute's vast archives, the series will combine articles from the Institute's flagship publication "Proceedings," selections from the oral history collection and from Naval Institute Press books to create unique guides on a wide array of fundamental professional subjects.

Leadership is vital to any highly functioning organization. The Naval Institute has devoted countless pages of its publications to the subject of naval leadership, providing start-up guidance to neophytes, giving voice to the accumulated wisdom and experience of those who have led, and serving as a forum in search of answers to the many questions that have always been a part of this vital but sometimes elusive practice. In the pages of this book are some of the most outstanding examples of this wealth of knowledge, gathered for use by both would-be and seasoned leaders in the never-ending quest for strong and effective leadership.

Fresh from successful flights before royalty in Europe, and soon after thrilling hundreds of thousands of people by flying around the Statue of Liberty, in the fall of 1909 Wilbur and Orville Wright decided the time was right to begin manufacturing their airplanes for sale. Backed by Wall Street tycoons, including August Belmont, Cornelius Vanderbilt III, and Andrew Freedman, the brothers formed the Wright Company. The Wright Company trained hundreds of early aviators at its flight schools, including Roy Brown, the Canadian pilot credited with shooting down Manfred von Richtofen - the \u201cRed Baron\u201d- during the First World War; and Hap Arnold, the commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces during the Second World War. Pilots with the company's exhibition department thrilled crowds at events from Winnipeg to Boston, Corpus Christi to Colorado Springs. Cal Rodgers flew a Wright Company airplane in pursuit of the $50,000 Hearst Aviation Prize in 1911. But all was not well in Dayton, a city that hummed with industry, producing cash registers, railroad cars, and many other products. The brothers found it hard to transition from running their own bicycle business to being corporate executives responsible for other people's money. Their dogged pursuit of enforcement of their 1906 patent - especially against Glenn Curtiss and his company - helped hold back the development of the U.S. aviation industry. When Orville Wright sold the company in 1915, more than three years after his brother's death, he was a comfortable man - but his company had built only 120 airplanes at its Dayton factory and Wright Company products were not in the U.S. arsenal as war continued in Europe. Edward Roach provides a fascinating window into the legendary Wright Company, its place in Dayton, its management struggles, and its effects on early U.S. aviation.

Since the late 1970s, anglophone and German military literature has been fascinated by the Wehrmacht's command system, especially the practice of Auftragstaktik. There have been many descriptions of the doctrine, and examinations of its historical origins, as well as unflattering comparisons with the approaches of the British and American armies prior to their adoption of Mission Command in the late 1980s. Almost none of these, however, have sought to understand the different approaches to command in the context of a fundamental characteristic of warfare - friction. This would be like trying to understand flight, without any reference to aerodynamics. Inherently flawed, yet this is the norm in the military literature. This book seeks to address that gap. First, the nature of friction, and the potential command responses to it, are considered. This allows the development of a typology of eight command approaches, each approach then being tested to identify its relative effectiveness and requirements for success. Second, the British and German armies' doctrines of command during the period are examined, in order to reveal similarities and differences in relation to their perspective on the nature of warfare and the most appropriate responses. The experience of Erwin Rommel, both as a young subaltern fighting the Italians in 1917, and then as a newly-appointed divisional commander against the French in 1940, is used to test the expression of the German doctrine in practice. Third, the interaction of these different command doctrines is explored in case studies of two key armoured battles, Amiens in August 1918 and Arras in May 1940, allowing the strengths and weaknesses of each to be highlighted and the typology to be tested. The result is intended to offer a new and deeper understanding of both the nature of command as a response to friction, and the factors that need to be in place in order to allow a given command approach to achieve success. The book therefore in two ways represents a sequel to my earlier work, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Cass, 1995), in that it both takes the conceptual model of command developed there to a deeper level, and also takes the story from the climax of 1918 up to the end of the first phase of the Second World War.

There are strong moral and legal pressures against harming civilians in times of conflict, yet neither just war theory nor international law is clear about what responsibilities belligerents have to correct harm once it has been inflicted. In this book, Marcus Schulzke argues that military powers have a duty to provide assistance to the civilians they attack during wars, and that this duty is entailed by civilians' right to life. Schulzke develops new just war principles requiring belligerents to provide medical treatment and financial compensation to civilian victims, and then shows how these principles can be implemented in governmental, military, and international practice. He calls for a more individual-focused conception of international law and post-war justice for victims - as opposed to current state- or group-based reconstruction and reparation programs - which will provide a framework for protecting civilian rights.

Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs focuses on the problematic relationship between legality and legitimacy when a nation (or nations) intervene in the work of other nations. Edited by Mark Juergensmeyer, Richard Falk, and Vesselin Popovski, this volume brings together a wide range of contributors with a broad set of cases that consider when such intervention is legitimate even if it isn't legal--and vice versa. Chapters cover humanitarian intervention, nuclear nonproliferation, military intervention, international criminal tribunals, interventions driven by environmental concerns, and the export of democracy. The book argues that while some interventions may not be technically legal, they may well be legitimate (e.g. Kosovo), and also concentrates on establishing the grounds for legitimate intervention. Some cases, like Iraq, fail the test. Transnational intervention by states and international institutions has increased since the globalization wave of the of the 1990's and especially since 9/11. This book, by focusing on a diverse array of cases, establishes a clear framework for judging the legitimacy of such actions.

Against the backdrop of the British-American law-making and war-making of the first decade of the millennium, Fighting Monsters considers: how the way we think about law affects the way we make war and how the way we think about war affects the way we make law. The discussion is founded upon four of the martial phenomena that unsettle our complacent and flabby understandings of what law is to a liberal democracy: aggressive or 'pre-emptive' war, targeted killings, torture, and arbitrary detention. The book argues, first, that force is a quintessential - albeit ambivalent - element of any realistic, serviceable, and intellectually coherent concept of law. Second, reappraising the classic question at the intersection of martial doctrine and political philosophy in its contemporary context, the book asserts that we need not, in fighting monsters, become monstrous ourselves; that fighting partisans does not entail our own partisanship; and that we can indeed govern without dirtying our hands. Seeking to ground a total, essentialist, and practical theory of legality's sordid relationship with brutality, this broad, coherent, and original book encompasses: language and image * war and crime * liberty, security, and rationality * amity, enmity, and identity * sex, terror, and perversion * temporality, spirituality, and sublimity * economy and hegemony * parliaments, the press, and the public man.