Military rule and the martial tradition of the samurai dominated Japanese culture for more than eight hundred years. According to Thomas Cleary--translator of more than thirty-five classics of Asian philosophy--the Japanese people have been so steeped in the way of the warrior that some of the manners and mentality of this outlook remain embedded in their individual and collective consciousness. Cleary shows how well-known attributes such as the reserve and mystery of formal Japanese behavior are deeply rooted in the ancient strategies of the traditional arts of war. Citing original Japanese sources that are popular among Japanese readers today, he reveals the hidden forces behind Japanese attitudes and conduct in political, business, social, and personal life.

With armed conflict in the Persian Gulf now upon us, Harvard archaeologist Steven LeBlanc takes a long-term view of the nature and roots of war, presenting a controversial thesis: The notion of the "noble savage" living in peace with one another and in harmony with nature is a fantasy. In "Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage," LeBlanc contends that warfare and violent conflict have existed throughout human history, and that humans have never lived in ecological balance with nature.
The start of the second major U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf, combined with regular headlines about spiraling environmental destruction, would tempt anyone to conclude that humankind is fast approaching a catastrophic end. But as LeBlanc brilliantly argues, the archaeological record shows that the warfare and ecological destruction we find today fit into patterns of human behavior that have gone on for millions of years.
"Constant Battles" surveys human history in terms of social organization-from hunter gatherers, to tribal agriculturalists, to more complex societies. LeBlanc takes the reader on his own digs around the world -- from New Guinea to the Southwestern U.S. to Turkey -- to show how he has come to discover warfare everywhere at every time. His own fieldwork combined with his archaeological, ethnographic, and historical research, presents a riveting account of how, throughout human history, people always have outgrown the carrying capacity of their environment, which has led to war.
Ultimately, though, LeBlanc's point of view is reassuring and optimistic. As he explains the roots of warfare in human history, he also demonstrates that warfare today has far less impact than it did in the past. He also argues that, as awareness of these patterns and the advantages of modern technology increase, so does our ability to avoid war in the future.

Military conflicts, particularly land combat, possess all of the key attributes of complex adaptive systems: combat forces are composed of many nonlinearly interacting parts and are organized in a dynamic command-and-control hierarchy; local action, which often appears disordered, self-organizes into long-range order; military conflicts, by their nature, proceed far from equilibrium; military forces adapt to a changing combat environment; and there is no master "voice" that dictates the actions of every soldier (i.e., battlefield action is decentralized). Nonetheless, most modern "state of the art" military simulations ignore the self-organizing properties of combat. This book develops the proposition that combat is more like an interpenetration of two living, coevolving fluids rather than an elastic collision between two hard billiard balls. Artificial-life techniques--specifically, multiagent-based models coupled with evolutionary learning algorithms--provide a powerful new approach to understanding the fundamental processes of war. The book introduces an artificial-life model of combat called EINSTein. Recently developed at the Center for Naval Analyses, USA by the author, EINSTein is one of the first systematic attempts to simulate combat on a small-to-medium scale by using autonomous agents to model individual behaviors and personalities rather than hardware. EINSTein shows that many aspects of land combat may be understood as self-organized, emergent phenomena resulting from the dynamic web of interactions among coevolving agents. Thus, its bottom-up, synthesist approach to modeling combat stands in vivid contrast to the current top-down, reductionist approach taken byconventional models. EINSTein is the first step toward a complex-systems-theoretic toolbox for identifying, exploring, and exploiting self-organized emergent patterns of behavior on the real battlefield.

Why do military commanders, most of them usually quite capable, fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer one a historian, the other an educational psychologist study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler s invasion of Russia. While the authors recognize the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously take a number of psycho-historical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war. The other battles and commanders studied here are Napoleon in Russia, George B. McClellan s Peninsular Campaign, Robert E. Lee and Pickett s Charge at Gettysburg, John Bell Hood at the Battle of Franklin, Douglas Haig and the British command during World War I, "Bomber" Harris and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, and Stalingrad."

The first modern critical edition (based on a comprehensive investigation of over 200 surviving manuscripts) of the fullest ancient manual of Roman warfare. Few secular authors of antiquity were as popular in the Middle Ages as Vegetius (AD 379-95). In addition to the Latin text and apparatus there is also a wide-ranging introduction in English.

The impact of China's defence modernisation on India's national security would be profound and direct. Are India and China natural rivals?

A dramatic tale of how the ambition and greed of a select few people can have powerful and long-lasting negative results while goodness can also prevail in spite of temptations and pressures to go against one's convictions.

The Maori economy is often defined simply by the contributions of Maori in New Zealand in the areas of farming, fisheries and forestry. This book explores the ways that Maori in the privatised military industry contribute in monetary and non-monetary ways to the Maori economy. Workers in the privatised military industry very rarely, if ever, give interviews about their work or details about their pay. However, this book includes five interviews with Maori who have worked or are still working in the privatised military industry and explores how they articulate themselves as Maori in the industry, giving a glimpse at this secret world and how Maori operate in it.

"An astute military historian's appraisal of what separates the sheep from the wolves in the great game of war."—Kirkus Reviews

If a key to military victory is to "get there first with the most," the true test of the great general is to decide where "there" is—the enemy's Achilles heel. Here is a narrative account of decisive engagements that succeeded by brilliant strategy more than by direct force. The reader accompanies those who fought, from Roman legionaries and Mongol horsemen to Napoleonic soldiery, American Civil War Rebels and Yankees, World War I Tommies, Lawrence of Arabia's bedouins, Chinese revolutionaries, British Desert Rats, Rommel's Afrika Korps, and Douglas MacArthur's Inchon invaders.

However varied their weapons, the soldiers of all these eras followed a commander who faced the same obstacles and demonstrated the strategic and tactical genius essential for victory. "All warfare is based on deception," wrote Sun Tzu in The Art of War in 400 BCE. Bevin Alexander shows how great generals have interpreted this advice, and why it still holds true today. Maps, illustrations.

The end of the Cold War has brought about significant changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural structure of the international system. Absent a distinct enemy and the threat of global thermonuclear war, the United States today faces a host of new security challenges that require policymakers to make difficult decisions with significant domestic and international implications. The range of conflicting goals, expectations, and capabilities demands fresh solutions to international conflicts and civil unrest, new strategies for conducting peace support operations, and the preparation of America's forces for completing operational assignments under increasingly uncertain conditions.

The case studies and exercises constructed for this book examine some of the most pertinent management, leadership, and accountability issues related to U.S. national security. Each case places readers at the center of difficult decisions, illustrates more general policy dilemmas, and is designed to stimulate discussion of those issues beyond the classroom. Cases highlight dilemmas at two levels: pertaining specifically to the case and pertaining to its larger policy implications. The absence of a one-sided argument, specific policy recommendations, or logical conclusions, enables readers to recognize the importance of the issues at hand and their greater policy implications and to discern lessons that might apply more generally to public policy, administration, and management. Particularly useful in courses dealing with national security, international relations, public/policy administration, civil-military relations, and organizational management. An instructor's manual is available upon request.

Over recent decades, John W. Dower, one of America's preeminent historians, has addressed the roots and consequences of war from multiple perspectives. In War Without Mercy (1986), winner of the National Book Critics Circle Award, he described and analyzed the brutality that attended World War II in the Pacific, as seen from both the Japanese and the American sides. Embracing Defeat (1999), winner of numerous honors including the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award, dealt with Japan's struggle to start over in a shattered land in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, when the defeated country was occupied by the U.S.-led Allied powers. Turning to an even larger canvas, Dower now examines the cultures of war revealed by four powerful events-Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, and the invasion of Iraq in the name of a war on terror. The list of issues examined and themes explored is wide-ranging: failures of intelligence and imagination, wars of choice and "strategic imbecilities," faith-based secular thinking as well as more overtly holy wars, the targeting of noncombatants, and the almost irresistible logic-and allure-of mass destruction. Dower's new work also sets the U.S. occupations of Japan and Iraq side by side in strikingly original ways. One of the most important books of this decade, Cultures of War offers comparative insights into individual and institutional behavior and pathologies that transcend "cultures" in the more traditional sense, and that ultimately go beyond war-making alone.

When is the use of military force by a nation morally justified? Why has the long accepted moral requirement to protect civilians from intentional attack eroded in recent years? How can the tendency toward unrestrained warfare between parties with major cultural differences be controlled? In this thought-provoking book, James Turner Johnson refocuses the moral analysis of war on the real problems of today's armed conflicts. Moral debates about nuclear war and annihilation fail to address the problems of actual contemporary uses of military force, Johnson argues. We must address the type of armed conflict that has emerged at the end of the twentieth century: local wars--often inflamed by historical, ethnic, or religious animosities and usually fought with conventional weapons that can be carried by individual fighters. Johnson sets out a moral basis for understanding when armed force can be justified. He analyzes specific problems posed by contemporary warfare: the question of military intervention to ameliorate or end conflicts, the question of warfare against noncombatants, the problem of cultural differences inflaming conflict, and the tension between those who would punish war crimes and those hoping to reconcile adversaries. The author concludes with a discussion of how to reshape and renew an international consensus on the proper purposes and limits to war.

In the capstone work of his career, distinguished military historian Jay Luvaas brings together in one volume the military genius of Napoleon.

Unlike Sun Tzu or Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon never wrote a unified essay on his military philosophy. Yet, as one of the world's great strategists and tacticians, he sprinkled wisdom throughout his many and varied writings. Jay Luvaas spent over three decades poring through the thirty-two volumes of Napoleon's correspondence, carefully translating and editing all of his writings on the art of war, and arranging them into seamless essays. The resulting book captures the brilliant commander's thoughts on everything from the preparation of his forces to the organization, planning, and execution of his battles -- all buttressing Napoleon's view that "in war there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it." Napoleon on the Art of War will be essential reading for military buffs, students of history, and any business leader looking for timeless insights on strategy.

Full title: 'Historical Records of the 14th Regiment Now The Prince of Wales Own (West Yorkshire Regiment) from Its Formation in 1689 to 1892'.

This book treats the critical theory of religion of Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, J rgen Habermas and other critical theorists who tried to make sense out of the senseless war experience by exploring the writings of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich W.J. Schelling, Georg W.F. Hegel, Artur Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud.

Well-researched and welcome work on the German efforts to train the Chilean army during the Parliamentary Regime (1891-1924). Argues convincingly that what appeared outwardly to be a Prussian-style military was in reality an ill-fed, poorly equipped military force rife with corruption and low on morale. Many of the German trainers, themselves, contributed to the malaise by seeking profits from weapons sales and land deals. Oddly, perhaps, the Chilean army continues to display the influences of the German era"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

For many years, scholars and non-scholars have debated the ethics of dropping the atomic bomb, but have rarely studied American plans to invade Japan - the alternative to using the bomb to end World War II. Widely held beliefs about Japanese forces and the projected loss of American lives have been invoked to justify the decision to drop the bomb. This examination argues that the invasion plan, code-named ""Operation Downfall"", has not until now been sufficiently studied to allow such a justification.

Warfare is the most dangerous threat faced by modern humanity. It is also one of the key influences that has shaped the politics, economics, and society of the modern period. But what do we mean by modern war? What causes modern wars to begin? Why do people fight in them, why do they end, and what have they achieved? In this accessible and compelling Very Short Introduction, Richard English explores the assumptions we make about modern warfare and considers them against the backdrop of their historical reality. Drawing on the wide literature available, including direct accounts of the experience of war, English provides an authoritative account of modern war: its origins, evolution, dynamics, and current trends. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

The history of American military operations in the post-Vietnam era has been marked by failure and near-disaster. Since 1970, American forces have been committed in five operations--in Sontay to rescue prisoners, in Cambodia on behalf of the crew of the "Mayaguez," in Iran to rescue the American hostages, in Beirut, and in Grenada--and in each case they have failed. Gabriel tells how and why each was crippled by faulty intelligence, clumsy execution, or poor planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much of his information is still classified by the Pentagon and is revealed here for the first time. Finally, Gabriel offers a prescription for reform based on his twenty-one years of military experience.

A social history of the ordinary British soldier during World War II "Reflects impressively wide reading, and commands respect for its shrewd judgments and lack of sentimentality."-Max Hastings, New York Review of Books "The stories of these brave but bewildered civilians in uniform are as illuminating as searchlights in a dark age of traumatic war."-Iain Finlayson, Times (London) More than three million men served in the British Army during the Second World War, the vast majority of them civilians who had never expected to become soldiers and had little idea what military life, with all its strange rituals, discomforts, and dangers, was going to be like. Alan Allport's rich and luminous social history examines the experience of the greatest and most terrible war in history from the perspective of these ordinary, extraordinary men, who were plucked from their peacetime families and workplaces and sent to fight for King and Country. Allport chronicles the huge diversity of their wartime trajectories, tracing how soldiers responded to and were shaped by their years with the British Army, and how that army, however reluctantly, had to accommodate itself to them. Touching on issues of class, sex, crime, trauma, and national identity, through a colorful multitude of fresh individual perspectives, the book provides an enlightening, deeply moving perspective on how a generation of very modern-minded young men responded to the challenges of a brutal and disorienting conflict.

There are strong moral and legal pressures against harming civilians in times of conflict, yet neither just war theory nor international law is clear about what responsibilities belligerents have to correct harm once it has been inflicted. In this book, Marcus Schulzke argues that military powers have a duty to provide assistance to the civilians they attack during wars, and that this duty is entailed by civilians' right to life. Schulzke develops new just war principles requiring belligerents to provide medical treatment and financial compensation to civilian victims, and then shows how these principles can be implemented in governmental, military, and international practice. He calls for a more individual-focused conception of international law and post-war justice for victims - as opposed to current state- or group-based reconstruction and reparation programs - which will provide a framework for protecting civilian rights.