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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Theory of warfare & military science
As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and
articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than
four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book,
Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation
of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This
approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the
utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US
strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the
apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative
concept of pre-emption. The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be to knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.
Widely recognized as one of the most important theorists of warfare, important strands of Carl von Clausewitz's thinking on the subject are not widely known. In the English-speaking world, few are familiar with anything other than his major, though unfinished and posthumously published, opus On War, which is available in numerous translations. Although the corpus of Clausewitz's writings on the topic of warfare is far greater, most of these texts have never been translated. In Clausewitz on Small War, Christopher Daase and James W. Davis begin to redress this unfortunate state of affairs. In this volume they have assembled and translated Clausewitz's most important texts devoted to the analysis of asymmetric, unconventional, guerrilla, and small unit warfare, including Clausewitz's Lectures on Small War, held at the Prussian War Academy in 1810 and 1811. Augmenting our understanding of Clausewitz with his early writings on Small War leads to the conclusion that asymmetric warfare is not an historical development that can be termed pre- or post-Clausewitzian as many contemporary scholars of war and military strategy argue. Rather, Clausewitz himself emerges as an early theorist of insurgency and asymmetric warfare with insights that are relevant today. The book is a must read for soldiers, military strategists, historians of war, and students of international security.
The law that regulates armed conflicts is one of the oldest branches of international law, and yet continues to be one of the most dynamic areas of law today. This book provides an accessible, scholarly, and up-to-date examination of international humanitarian law, offering a comprehensive and logical discussion and analysis of the law. The book contains detailed examples, extracts from relevant cases, useful discussion questions, and a recommended reading list for every chapter. Emerging trends in theory and practice of international humanitarian law are also explored, allowing for readers to build on their knowledge, and grapple with some of the biggest challenges facing the law of armed conflict in the twenty-first century. This second edition offers new sections on issues like detention in non-international armed conflict, characterisation of non-international armed conflicts, expanded chapters on occupation and the protection of civilians, means and methods of warfare, and implementation, enforcement and accountability.
No modern intervention is intended to endure indefinitely; indeed some fashion of exit is always envisioned from the outset. This commitment to an exit is normally informed by an exit strategy. Whilst strategies of closure have been scrutinised recently, not least in light of charges of defective intentions and planning, the relations between the strategies, operations and tactics of exit have not been contextualised. Focus on the local, specific and bottom-up manifestations of transitions offers significant enhances to historical, theoretical and applied understandings. This book is an introduction not just to the issues of transition, handover and withdrawal, but to exit as a package of theoretical concepts and how these have been understood, shaped and employed in historic and contemporary perspective. Drawing on a wide range of post-1945 examples derived from a variety of regions and periods, At the End of Military Intervention provides researchers and practitioners with a source book on what forms a crucial and often overlooked element of past and present interventions.
For the last fifty years, most popular and scholarly works have agreed that prehistoric warfare was rare, harmless, and unimportant. According to this view, it was little more than a ritualized game, where casualties were limited and the effects of aggression relatively mild. Lawrence Keeley's groundbreaking War Before Civilization offers a devastating rebuttal to such comfortable myths and debunks the notion that warfare was introduced to primitive societies through contact with civilization. Building on much fascinating archeological and historical research and offering an astute comparison of warfare in civilized and prehistoric societies, from modern European states to the Plains Indians of North America, Keeley convincingly demonstrates that prehistoric warfare was in fact more deadly, more frequent, and more ruthless than modern war. He cites evidence of ancient massacres in many areas of the world, and surveys the prevalence of looting, destruction, and trophy-taking in all kinds of warfare, again finding little moral distinction between ancient warriors and civilized armies. Finally, and perhaps most controversially, he examines the evidence of cannibalism among some preliterate peoples. But Keeley goes beyond grisly facts to address the larger moral and philosophical issues raised by his work. What are the causes of war? Are human beings inherently violent? How can we ensure peace in our own time? Challenging some of our most dearly held beliefs, Keeley's conclusions are bound to stir controversy.
Raymond Aron made major investigations into the dialectic between war and peace, and also developed a sophisticated theory of international relations. Despite this, his body of work has been overlooked compared to that of his more famous contemporaries. This book shines a light on both the man and his work on ideological critique, the philosophy of history, international relations and political economy. The book also discusses Aron's political legacy and argues that a number of his critiques and theories can help us address many of the problems and conflicts of the 21st century.
Compiled during the Warring States period of 475-221 B.C.E., "The Art of War" has had an enormous impact on the development of Chinese military strategy over the past two thousand years and occupies an important place in East Asian intellectual history. It is the first known attempt to formulate a rational basis for the planning and conduct of military operations, and while numerous editions of the work exist, Victor Mair's translation is the first to remain true to the original structure and essential style of the text. Mair's fidelity to the original, along with his insightful commentary and reliance on archaeologically recovered manuscripts, breaks new ground in solving "The Art of War"'s difficult textual and contextual problems. He confronts complex questions concerning the authorship of the work, asserting that Sun Wu, a supposed strategist of the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.E.) to whom the text is traditionally attributed, never existed. Instead, Mair claims that "The Art of War" coalesced over a period of around seventy-five years, from the middle of the fourth century to the first quarter of the third century B.C.E. Mair also reveals the way "The Art of War" reflects historical developments in technological and military strategy in civilizations throughout Eurasia, especially in regards to iron metallurgy. He demonstrates the close link between the philosophy in "The Art of War" and Taoism and discusses the reception of the text from the classical period to today. Finally, Mair highlights previously unaddressed stylistic and statistical aspects and includes philological annotations that present new ways of approaching the intellectual and social background of the work. A phenomenal achievement, Mair's comprehensive translation is an indispensable resource for today's students, strategists, and scholars.
In September 2018, the 73rd General Assembly of the United Nations acknowledged that international instability is increasing and that improving global security is among the most important tasks facing the world today. The Assembly concluded that it is extremely important to develop new, effective frameworks and technologies to understand and confront increasingly complex networks of actors, interests, and contexts. Leading international security expert Peter Sapaty meets this challenge head-on and introduces a new, high-level distributed processing and control approach capable of finding real-time solutions for irregularities, crises, and security problems emerging any time and in any part of the world. Drawing upon the principles of Gestalt psychology, this book develops a radically new model of technology, Spatial Grasp Technology (SGT), a self-navigating, self-replicating, self-modifying spatial pattern technology expressed in a special high-level recursive language. Through rigorous theoretical argument and many practical examples, Sapaty shows how SGT can account for millions to billions of nodes distributed worldwide without vulnerable central resources; explains why SGT is hundreds of times shorter, simpler, and faster than other models and languages; and shows that SGT's technology basics are so simple that they can be effectively implemented even in a short time by a small group of system programmers within traditional university environments. Perhaps most importantly, Sapaty demonstrates how SGT is capable of implementing security scenarios not only at run time, but also conceivably ahead of it, allowing in some cases for the prediction and even prevention of local or global crises. For the novelty, simplicity, and wide applicability of its approach, Complexity in International Security is essential reading for system scientists, application programmers, industry managers, security and defence personnel, and university students interested in advanced MSc and PhD projects in the area of holistic and distributed management.
Many regions of the world whose histories include war and violent conflict have or once had strong ties to Orthodox Christianity. Yet policy makers, religious leaders, and scholars often neglect Orthodoxy’s resources when they reflect on the challenges of war. Through essays written by prominent Orthodox scholars in the fields of biblical studies, church history, Byzantine studies, theology, patristics, political science, ethics, and biology, Orthodox Christian Perspectives on War presents and examines the Orthodox tradition’s nuanced and unique insights on the meaning and challenges of war with an eye toward their contemporary relevance. This volume is structured in three parts: “Confronting the Present Day Reality,” “Reengaging Orthodoxy’s Tradition,” and “Constructive Directions in Orthodox Theology and Ethics.” Each exemplifies the value of interdisciplinary reflection on “war” and the potential for the Eastern Orthodox tradition to enhance ecumenical and interfaith discussions surrounding war in both domestic and international contexts. The contributors do not advance a single account of “the meaning of war” or a comprehensive and normative stance purporting to be “the Orthodox Christian teaching on war.” Instead, this collection presents the breadth and depth of Orthodox Christian thought in a way that engages Orthodox and non-Orthodox readers alike. In addition to offering fresh resources for all people of good will to understand, prevent, and respond faithfully to war, this book will appeal to Christian theologians who specialize in ethics, to libraries of academic institutions, and to scholars of war/peace studies, international relations, and Orthodox thought. Contributors: Peter C. Bouteneff, George Demacopoulos, John Fotopoulos, Brandon Gallaher, Perry T. Hamalis, Valerie A. Karras, Alexandros K. Kyrou, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Nicolae Roddy, James C. Skedros, Andrew Walsh, and Gayle E. Woloschak.
ISIS, IS, the Islamic State. The name is chilling. The images are horrific. This is a group that beheads journalists--and yet one, the German Jurgen Todenhofer, went out of his way to get an invitation to visit ISIS fighters in Mosul in 2014 to ask them to explain their beliefs. This book is the result of his conversation. My Journey into the Heart of Terror: Ten Days in the Islamic State shows how the organization grew from its al-Qaeda roots and takes a harsh look at the West's role in its past and today. Along the way, Todenhofer offers startling insights into what ISIS thinks, what it wants--and what must change if it is to be defeated. Only by understanding, Todenhofer believes, can we move forward and combat ISIS's radical, violent interpretation of Islam and the terror and destruction it brings.
Just War theory - as it was developed by the Catholic theologians of medieval Europe and the jurists of the Renaissance - is a framework for the moral and legal evaluation of armed conflicts. To this day, Just War theory informs the judgments of ethicists, government officials, international lawyers, religious scholars, news coverage, and perhaps most importantly, the public as a whole. The influence of Just War theory is as vast as it is subtle - we have been socialized into evaluating wars largely according to the principles of this medieval theory, which, according to the eminent philosopher David Rodin, is "one of the few basic fixtures of medieval philosophy to remain substantially unchallenged in the modern world". Some of the most basic assumptions of Just War Theory have been dismantled in a barrage of criticism and analysis in the first dozen years of the 21st century. "The Ethics of War" continues and pushes past this trend. This anthology is an authoritative treatment of the ethics and law of war by both the eminent scholars who first challenged the orthodoxy of Just War theory, as well as by new thinkers. The twelve original essays span both foundational and topical issues in the ethics of war, including an investigation of: whether there is a "greater-good" obligation that parallels the canonical lesser-evil justification in war; the conditions under which citizens can wage war against their own government; whether there is a limit to the number of combatants on the unjust side who can be permissibly killed; whether the justice of the cause for which combatants fight affects the moral permissibility of fighting; whether duress ever justifies killing in war; the role that collective liability plays in the ethics of war; whether targeted killing is morally and legally permissible; the morality of legal prohibitions on the use of indiscriminate weapons; the justification for the legal distinction between directly and indirectly harming civilians; whether human rights of unjust combatants are more prohibitive than have been thought; the moral repair of combatants suffering from PTSD; and the moral categories and criteria needed to understand the proper justification for ending war.
Lars Schoultz proposes a way for all those interested in U.S. foreign policy fully to appreciate the terms of the present debate. To understand U.S. policy in Latin America, he contends, one must critically examine the deeply held beliefs of U.S. policy makers about what Latin America means to U.S. national security. Originally published in 1987. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The risks of arms control and disarmament, how they can be reduced or eliminated, and the political implications of drastic disarmament are analyzed by eleven experts. Emphasis is placed on the development of techniques for disarming that are politically feasible and give reasonable assurance to each side that the other is not violating its obligations for any serious reason. Three major aspects of the problem are considered: how to get the disarmament process started, and once started to continue it how to retain the freedom of diplomatic action that might be needed to defend national interests; and how to approach the problems of political security in a fully disarmed world. Originally published in 1965. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
These essays from the journal International Security cover aspects of past and present naval technologies and explore current disputes over American naval doctrine. Four of the contributions--those by Linton Brooks, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Joshua Epstein--describe the case for and against the Reagan administration's controversial Maritime Strategy, which has formed the basis for the administration's buildup to a six-hundred-ship navy. Other articles describe Soviet naval doctrine, assess the risk of nuclear war at sea, and outline the evolution of major naval technologies and doctrines. Part I: Naval Strategy Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom R. James Woolsey Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy Linton F. Brooks A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe John J. Mearsheimer Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme Joshua M. Epstein Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy Michael MccGwire Part II: Naval Technology Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare Karl Lautenschlager Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable? Richard L. Garwin The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901=2001 Karl Lautenschlager Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat Harold A. Feiveson and John Duffield Part III: Naval Operations--Controlling the Risks Nuclear War at Sea Desmond Ball Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank Barry R. Posen A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea Sean M. Lynn-Jones Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This volume examines the social and political role of the armed forces in the emergent countries of Latin America, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. The contributors include such distinguished historians and political scientists as Belmont Brice, James S. Coleman, and Lucian W. Pye. They offer here some searching observations on the political structure of the new states, on the relationship between the needs of internal order and those of external defense, and on the curious fact that military regimes, while they have promoted national development, social change, and free political practices in some countries, have hampered similar growth in others. Originally published in 1962. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Rapid turnover of ROTC officers, the decline in ROTC enrollment, inadequate training for the specialized techniques of modem warfare, and the quick obsolescence of technical training have created an acute problem in the development of a body of highly-trained professional career officers. This book takes a fresh view of this vital problem and provides a starting point for a revision of our methods for providing the military leadership that our nation requires. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
In this closely reasoned analysis of the various elements which constitute the latent military strength of nations the author takes up economic capacity, "the will to fight," and the administrative skill of government, and shows how they may be developed and evaluated in the contemporary setting. He has drawn on a wealth of historical material for various countries and relevant research in political science, economics, sociology, and psychology. Originally published in 1956. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This book is about the most elite unit in the Israeli army, Talpiot. Instead of only being trained to fight the soldiers brought into this unit are taught how to think. The book details how this unit which specialises in teaching young cadets the military applications for computer science, physics and maths (properties needed for research and development) was conceived and developed in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, how the program came of age and how it surpassed even air force pilot training in terms of priority for the IDF. Instead of signing up for three years like most Israeli soldiers, if you are selected for Talpiot you must sign up for ten years. Graduates of this tiny unit, sometimes as few as 20 people a year are invited to enlist, have had a huge influence on the weapons Israel has developed through research and development and through the businesses they have founded after leaving the army, often using many of the technologies they developed in the IDF. The book contains dozens of interviews with Talpiot graduates and some of the early founders of the program. It explains Talpiot's ultra-successful methods of recruiting and it explains many of the secrets of the program's success. The book also profiles some of the most successful businesses founded by Talpiot graduates including Compugen, CheckPoint Software, Anobit which was recently bought by Apple and XIV recently bought by IBM. The soldiers of this unit are truly unsung heroes. No other military unit has had more of an impact on the State of Israel.
We know that a revolution's success largely depends on the army's response to it. But can we predict the military's reaction to an uprising? How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why argues that it is possible to make a highly educated guess--and in some cases even a confident prediction--about the generals' response to a domestic revolt if we know enough about the army, the state it is supposed to serve, the society in which it exists, and the external environment that affects its actions. Through concise case studies of modern uprisings in Iran, China, Eastern Europe, Burma, and the Arab world, Zoltan Barany looks at the reasons for and the logic behind the variety of choices soldiers ultimately make. Barany offers tools--in the form of questions to be asked and answered--that enable analysts to provide the most informed assessment possible regarding an army's likely response to a revolution and, ultimately, the probable fate of the revolution itself. He examines such factors as the military's internal cohesion, the regime's treatment of its armed forces, and the size, composition, and nature of the demonstrations. How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why explains how generals decide to support or suppress domestic uprisings.
Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in "Overconfidence and War," states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.
Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must also take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state's ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.
With the ending of the strategic certainties of the Cold War, the need for moral clarity over when, where and how to start, conduct and conclude war has never been greater. There has been a recent revival of interest in the just war tradition. But can a medieval theory help us answer twenty-first century security concerns? David Fisher explores how just war thinking can and should be developed to provide such guidance. His in-depth study examines philosophical challenges to just war thinking, including those posed by moral scepticism and relativism. It explores the nature and grounds of moral reasoning; the relation between public and private morality; and how just war teaching needs to be refashioned to provide practical guidance not just to politicians and generals but to ordinary service people. The complexity and difficulty of moral decision-making requires a new ethical approach - here characterised as virtuous consequentialism - that recognises the importance of both the internal quality and external effects of agency; and of the moral principles and virtues needed to enact them. Having reinforced the key tenets of just war thinking, Fisher uses these to address contemporary security issues, including the changing nature of war, military pre-emption and torture, the morality of the Iraq war, and humanitarian intervention. He concludes that the just war tradition provides not only a robust but an indispensable guide to resolve the security challenges of the twenty-first century.
France ranks as the world's third largest arms exporter and supplies arms and military technology to over a hundred countries. This book exposes the compelling aims and interests--national independence, security, economic welfare, foreign influence, grandeur--that explain the nation's successes in arms production and transfers. Originally published in 1987. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Lars Schoultz proposes a way for all those interested in U.S. foreign policy fully to appreciate the terms of the present debate. To understand U.S. policy in Latin America, he contends, one must critically examine the deeply held beliefs of U.S. policy makers about what Latin America means to U.S. national security. Originally published in 1987. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Peace is Everybody's Business is about conflict prevention, hope and peace for the oppressed and alienated, and the imaginative use of soft-power to win back estranged communities into the social and political mainstream. Past strategies in managing alienated societies have been derived from two extreme ideological positions-imprisoning those who take up arms against the stage, or ultra-liberalism, which is denounced as impractical. The author suggests an alternative strategy to reconcile these two extreme positions-a three-pronged strategy to achieve success by preventing conflict by addressing human security through human development, pursuing a policy of atonement and forgiveness, and eliminating trust deficit between the State and the marginalized. The central focus of this strategy, which the author in his capacity as a General successfully executed in Operation Sadhbhavna, is the people. The author believes that killing is counterproductive and the army must change its role from 'winning wars' to 'preventing wars'. |
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