The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of "political realism" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn. Holmes's positions are compellingly presented and will provoke discussion both among convinced pacifists and among those whom he calls "militarists." "Militarists," we realize after reading this book, include the majority of us who live a friendly and peaceful personal life while supporting a system which, if Holmes is correct, guarantees war and risks eventual human extinction. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this volume, a sequel to Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War, James Turner Johnson continues his reconstruction of the history of just war tradition by analyzing significant individual thinkers, concepts, and events that influenced its development from the mid-eighteenth century to the present. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Founded in 1927, the Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation- Chemical Construction, or "Osoaviakhim," became the largest mass voluntary association in the Soviet Union before World War II. Conceived in Bolshevik rhetoric about the creativity of the toiling masses, this novel organizational scheme gradually acquired bureaucratic substance and played a significant role in making the civilian masses administratively accessible for elementary programs in military training and chemical and aviation technology. William E. Odom's study of Osoaviakhim in its first decade seeks not only to recount the history of its development, but, more importantly, to demonstrate that the Soviet experience can be analyzed using the language and concepts of Western social science. In particular, the author argues that concepts from organization theory offer promising opportunities to relate Soviet area studies to the broader concerns of comparative politics, and that middle range generalizations about politics within bureaucracies may prove very helpful in explaining "who gets what, when, and how" in the Soviet polity. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Professor Peterson examines these questions in relation to Hitler's government with its reputedly unlimited internal power; he traces the flow of power throughout the Nazi state from 1933 to 1945, from Hitler to his ministers to provincial governments. Through a detailed analysis of the province of Bavaria the author shows that Hitler did not have the absolute power often assumed; that power in a totalitarian state is far more complex than many historians have conjectured; that Hitler dealt with a vast bureaucratic structure complicated by constant internecine fighting, and that only rarely did he command complete obedience. Originally published in 1969. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This volume examines the social and political role of the armed forces in the emergent countries of Latin America, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. The contributors include such distinguished historians and political scientists as Belmont Brice, James S. Coleman, and Lucian W. Pye. They offer here some searching observations on the political structure of the new states, on the relationship between the needs of internal order and those of external defense, and on the curious fact that military regimes, while they have promoted national development, social change, and free political practices in some countries, have hampered similar growth in others. Originally published in 1962. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Professor Knorr examines bends in the values which nations derive in their international relationships from the possession and use of both nuclear and non-nuclear military forces, and suggests that territorial conquest and the furtherance of economic benefits by military means have generally diminished in appeal. He inquires into the costs and disadvantages of military power-the greatly reduced security obtainable even by the major nuclear powers and the noticeable diminution in the legitimacy of international violence in its several forms. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Rapid turnover of ROTC officers, the decline in ROTC enrollment, inadequate training for the specialized techniques of modem warfare, and the quick obsolescence of technical training have created an acute problem in the development of a body of highly-trained professional career officers. This book takes a fresh view of this vital problem and provides a starting point for a revision of our methods for providing the military leadership that our nation requires. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this closely reasoned analysis of the various elements which constitute the latent military strength of nations the author takes up economic capacity, "the will to fight," and the administrative skill of government, and shows how they may be developed and evaluated in the contemporary setting. He has drawn on a wealth of historical material for various countries and relevant research in political science, economics, sociology, and psychology. Originally published in 1956. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This book is about the most elite unit in the Israeli army, Talpiot. Instead of only being trained to fight the soldiers brought into this unit are taught how to think. The book details how this unit which specialises in teaching young cadets the military applications for computer science, physics and maths (properties needed for research and development) was conceived and developed in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, how the program came of age and how it surpassed even air force pilot training in terms of priority for the IDF. Instead of signing up for three years like most Israeli soldiers, if you are selected for Talpiot you must sign up for ten years. Graduates of this tiny unit, sometimes as few as 20 people a year are invited to enlist, have had a huge influence on the weapons Israel has developed through research and development and through the businesses they have founded after leaving the army, often using many of the technologies they developed in the IDF. The book contains dozens of interviews with Talpiot graduates and some of the early founders of the program. It explains Talpiot's ultra-successful methods of recruiting and it explains many of the secrets of the program's success. The book also profiles some of the most successful businesses founded by Talpiot graduates including Compugen, CheckPoint Software, Anobit which was recently bought by Apple and XIV recently bought by IBM. The soldiers of this unit are truly unsung heroes. No other military unit has had more of an impact on the State of Israel.

Written over two thousand years ago, The Art of War contains penetrating insights into the nature of power, inter-state rivalry, realpolitik and military success, relevant to any age. It was first translated into English in the early 20th century. Sun Tzu's short lines of argument and pithy aphorisms are highly accessible to modern readers, and his text has almost achieved cult status. He is quoted everywhere 'from divorce courts to Facebook', and has something to offer anyone interested in honing leadership skills and achieving in any competitive environment 'from the boardroom to the bedroom'. Sun Tzu's advice is shrewd and pragmatic - he does not glory in slaughter and prefers to win battles off the battlefield if possible; he is a strong supporter of the use of deception, of varying your shots and above all, of doing your research: knowing your enemy is key; but of little use if you do not also 'know yourself'. Features a brilliant new translation by Peter Harris. The iconic text in its original 13 short chapters printed unencumbered by notes The text repeated, this time interspersed with selected extracts from the canon of traditional Chinese commentators who have explained Sun Tzu's wisdom over the centuries; each chapter ending with an explanatory note from Peter Harris

From the ideas of Clausewitz to contemporary doctrines of containment and cold war, this is a definitive history of modern military thought. A one-volume collection of Azar Gat's classic trilogy, it explores conceptions of war, strategy, and military theory and relates them to their cultural and historical contexts.

This is the book on war that Napoleon never had the time or the will to complete. In exile on the island of Saint-Helena, the deposed Emperor of the French mused about a great treatise on the art of war, but in the end changed his mind and ordered the destruction of the materials he had collected for the volume. Thus was lost what would have been one of the most interesting and important books on the art of war ever written, by one of the most famous and successful military leaders of all time. In the two centuries since, several attempts have been made to gather together some of Napoleon's 'military maxims', with varying degrees of success. But not until now has there been a systematic attempt to put Napoleon's thinking on war and strategy into a single authoritative volume, reflecting both the full spectrum of his thinking on these matters as well as the almost unparalleled range of his military experience, from heavy cavalry charges in the plains of Russia or Saxony to counter-insurgency operations in Egypt or Spain. To gather the material for this book, military historian Bruno Colson spent years researching Napoleon's correspondence and other writings, including a painstaking examination of perhaps the single most interesting source for his thinking about war: the copy-book of General Bertrand, the Emperor's most trusted companion on Saint-Helena, in which he unearthed a Napoleonic definition of strategy which is published here for the first time. The huge amount of material brought together for this ground-breaking volume has been carefully organized to follow the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War, allowing a fascinating comparison between Napoleon's ideas and those of his great Prussian interpreter and adversary, and highlighting the intriguing similarities between these two founders of modern strategic thinking.

Red teaming. It is a practice as old as the Devil's Advocate, the eleventh-century Vatican official charged with discrediting candidates for sainthood. Today, red teams,comprised primarily of fearless skeptics and those assuming the role of saboteurs who seek to better understand the interests, intentions, and capabilities of institutions or potential competitors,are used widely in both the public and private sector. Red teaming, including simulations, vulnerability probes, and alternative analyses, helps institutions in competitive environments to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses, challenge assumptions, and anticipate potential threats ahead of the next special operations raid, malicious cyberattack, or corporate merger. But not all red teams are created equal indeed, some cause more damage than they prevent. In Red Team , national security expert Micah Zenko provides an in-depth investigation into the work of red teams, revealing the best practices, most common pitfalls, and most effective applications of these modern-day Devil's Advocates. The best practices of red teaming can be applied to the CIA, NYPD, or a pharmaceutical company, and executed correctly they can yield impressive results: red teams give businesses an edge over their competition, poke holes in vital intelligence estimates, and troubleshoot dangerous military missions long before boots are on the ground. But red teams are only as good as leaders allow them to be, and Zenko shows not only how to create and empower red teams, but also what to do with the information they produce.Essential reading for business leaders and policymakers alike, Red Team will revolutionize the way organizations think about, exploit, compensate for, and correct their institutional strengths and weaknesses. Drawing on little-known case studies and unprecedented access to elite red teamers in the United States and abroad, Zenko shows how any group,from military units to friendly hackers,can win by thinking like the enemy.

The relationship between drugs and today s wars has grown more noticeable since the end of the Cold War and will likely gather strength in this era of increased globalization. Many violent groups and governments have recently turned to illicit narcotics in their entrepreneurial quests to stay viable in the post Cold War world. It is no coincidence that many of the most violent and ongoing conflicts, from the Balkans to the Hindu Kush, from the Andes to the Golden Triangle, occur in areas of widespread drug production and well-traveled distribution routes.Interdisciplinary in its approach, "Drugs and Contemporary Warfare" investigates the convergence of drugs and modern warfare, the violent actors involved in the drug trade, the drugs they produce and distribute, and how these drugs enter into battlefield conflicts and give rise to combat narcosis. Paul Rexton Kan then examines counternarcotics operations and suggests solutions to curb the drug trade s effects on contemporary conflict. He offers several broad strategies that refine assessments, policies, and operations to promote improvement in social, economic, and political conditions. The hope is that these strategies will help citizens create sustainable societies and robust governments in war-afflicted countries struggling under the drug trade s shadow. In a world searching for peace, the answer may not solely be on the battlefield but also on the front line against illegal narcotics. With a foreword by Moises Naim, editor in chief of "Foreign Policy" magazine and the author of "Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy."

No modern intervention is intended to endure indefinitely; indeed some fashion of exit is always envisioned from the outset. This commitment to an exit is normally informed by an exit strategy. Whilst strategies of closure have been scrutinised recently, not least in light of charges of defective intentions and planning, the relations between the strategies, operations and tactics of exit have not been contextualised. Focus on the local, specific and bottom-up manifestations of transitions offers significant enhances to historical, theoretical and applied understandings. This book is an introduction not just to the issues of transition, handover and withdrawal, but to exit as a package of theoretical concepts and how these have been understood, shaped and employed in historic and contemporary perspective. Drawing on a wide range of post-1945 examples derived from a variety of regions and periods, At the End of Military Intervention provides researchers and practitioners with a source book on what forms a crucial and often overlooked element of past and present interventions.

John A. Vasquez explains the processes that cause the spread of interstate war by looking at how contagion worked to bring countries into the First World War. Analysing all the key states that declared war, the book is comprised of three parts. Part I lays out six models of contagion: alliances, contiguity, territorial rivalry, opportunity, 'brute force' and economic dependence. Part II then analyses in detail the decision making of every state that entered the war from Austria-Hungary in 1914 to the United States and Greece in 1917. Part III has two chapters - the first considers the neutral countries, and the second concludes the book with an overarching theoretical analysis, including major lessons of the war and new hypotheses about contagion. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, conflict studies and international history, especially those interested in the spread of conflict, or the First World War.

The most important conflicts in the founding of the English colonies and the American republic were fought against enemies either totally outside of their society or within it: barbarians or brothers. In this work, Wayne E. Lee presents a searching exploration of early modern English and American warfare, looking at the sixteenth-century wars in Ireland, the English Civil War, the colonial Anglo-Indian wars, the American Revolution, and the American Civil War. Crucial to the level of violence in each of these conflicts was the perception of the enemy as either a brother (a fellow countryman) or a barbarian. But Lee goes beyond issues of ethnicity and race to explore how culture, strategy, and logistics also determined the nature of the fighting. Each conflict contributed to the development of American attitudes toward war. The brutal nature of English warfare in Ireland helped shape the military methods the English employed in North America, just as the legacy of the English Civil War cautioned American colonists about the need to restrain soldiers' behavior. Nonetheless, Anglo-Americans waged war against Indians with terrifying violence, in part because Native Americans' system of restraints on warfare diverged from European traditions. The Americans then struggled during the Revolution to reconcile these two different trends of restraint and violence when fighting various enemies. Through compelling campaign narratives, Lee explores the lives and fears of soldiers, as well as the strategies of their commanders, while showing how their collective choices determined the nature of wartime violence. In the end, the repeated experience of wars with barbarians or brothers created an American culture of war that demanded absolute solutions: enemies were either to be incorporated or rejected. And that determination played a major role in defining the violence used against them.

Military conflicts, particularly land combat, possess all of the key attributes of complex adaptive systems: combat forces are composed of many nonlinearly interacting parts and are organized in a dynamic command-and-control hierarchy; local action, which often appears disordered, self-organizes into long-range order; military conflicts, by their nature, proceed far from equilibrium; military forces adapt to a changing combat environment; and there is no master "voice" that dictates the actions of every soldier (i.e., battlefield action is decentralized). Nonetheless, most modern "state of the art" military simulations ignore the self-organizing properties of combat. This book develops the proposition that combat is more like an interpenetration of two living, coevolving fluids rather than an elastic collision between two hard billiard balls. Artificial-life techniques--specifically, multiagent-based models coupled with evolutionary learning algorithms--provide a powerful new approach to understanding the fundamental processes of war. The book introduces an artificial-life model of combat called EINSTein. Recently developed at the Center for Naval Analyses, USA by the author, EINSTein is one of the first systematic attempts to simulate combat on a small-to-medium scale by using autonomous agents to model individual behaviors and personalities rather than hardware. EINSTein shows that many aspects of land combat may be understood as self-organized, emergent phenomena resulting from the dynamic web of interactions among coevolving agents. Thus, its bottom-up, synthesist approach to modeling combat stands in vivid contrast to the current top-down, reductionist approach taken byconventional models. EINSTein is the first step toward a complex-systems-theoretic toolbox for identifying, exploring, and exploiting self-organized emergent patterns of behavior on the real battlefield.

Why do military commanders, most of them usually quite capable, fail at crucial moments of their careers? Robert Pois and Philip Langer one a historian, the other an educational psychologist study seven cases of military command failures, from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Hitler s invasion of Russia. While the authors recognize the value of psychological theorizing, they do not believe that one method can cover all the individuals, battles, or campaigns under examination. Instead, they judiciously take a number of psycho-historical approaches in hope of shedding light on the behaviors of commanders during war. The other battles and commanders studied here are Napoleon in Russia, George B. McClellan s Peninsular Campaign, Robert E. Lee and Pickett s Charge at Gettysburg, John Bell Hood at the Battle of Franklin, Douglas Haig and the British command during World War I, "Bomber" Harris and the Strategic Bombing of Germany, and Stalingrad."

ISIS, IS, the Islamic State. The name is chilling. The images are horrific. This is a group that beheads journalists--and yet one, the German Jurgen Todenhofer, went out of his way to get an invitation to visit ISIS fighters in Mosul in 2014 to ask them to explain their beliefs. This book is the result of his conversation. My Journey into the Heart of Terror: Ten Days in the Islamic State shows how the organization grew from its al-Qaeda roots and takes a harsh look at the West's role in its past and today. Along the way, Todenhofer offers startling insights into what ISIS thinks, what it wants--and what must change if it is to be defeated. Only by understanding, Todenhofer believes, can we move forward and combat ISIS's radical, violent interpretation of Islam and the terror and destruction it brings.

EVERYTHING YOU THINK YOU KNOW ABOUT WAR IS WRONG. We are living in an age of conflict: Russia's resurgence and China's rise, global terrorism, international criminal empires, climate change and dwindling natural resources. But while the West has been playing the same old war games, the enemy has a new strategy. The rules have changed, and we are dangerously unprepared. Former paratrooper Sean McFate has been on the front lines of conflict, and seen first-hand the horrors of battle. As a Professor of Strategy, he understands the complexity of the current military situation. In this new age of war: * Plausible deniability is more potent than firepower * Russia has become a disinformation superpower, twisting the West's perception of reality * Sanctions are blunt instruments that starve only the masses, not the elite * Victory will belong to the cunning, not the strong * New types of world powers will rule Learn how to triumph in the coming age of conflict in ten new rules. Adapt and we can prevail. Fail, and size and strength won't protect us. This is The Art of War for the 21st century. __________ 'Some of what he says makes more sense than much of what comes out of the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence' Max Hastings, Sunday Times 'Thought-provoking' Johnathon Evans, Former Head of MI5 'Fascinating and disturbing' Economist

On today's complex, fragmented, fast-moving battlefield, where combatants adapt constantly to exploit one-another's weaknesses, there is a demonstrable requirement for military commanders to devolve a high level of autonomy of decision-making and action to leaders on the ground. An effective model for doing this has existed for some time in the form of "mission command" and has been utilized by the U.S., Israeli, and British Armies--but with mixed success.
This book examines in depth the experiences of the armed forces of each of these countries in implementing mission command, and reveals the key factors that have determined the success or failure of the implementation--factors such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the spread of low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war, and differences in how military cultures interpret, articulate, and exercise the command function. It has significant implications for both the development of military doctrine and the training and education of tomorrow's military leaders.

What makes a war just? What makes a specific weapon, strategy, or decision in war just? The tradition of Just War Theory has provided answers to these questions since at least 400 AD, yet each shift in the weapons and strategies of war poses significant challenges to Just War Theory. This book assembles renowned scholars from around the world to reflect on the most pressing problems and questions in Just War Theory, and engages with all three stages of war: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Providing detailed historical context as well as addressing modern controversies and topics including drones, Islamic jihad, and humanitarian intervention, the volume will be highly important for students and scholars of the philosophy of war as well as for others interested in contemporary global military and ethical issues.

Laura Sjoberg positions gender and gender subordination as key factors in the making and fighting of global conflict. Through the lens ofgender, she examines the meaning, causes, practices, and experiences of war, building a more inclusive approach to the analysis of violent conflict between states.

Considering war at the international, state, substate, and individual levels, Sjoberg's feminist perspective elevates a number of causal variables in war decision-making. These include structural gender inequality, cycles of gendered violence, state masculine posturing, the often overlooked role of emotion in political interactions, gendered understandings of power, and states' mistaken perception of their own autonomy and unitary nature. "Gendering Global Conflict" also calls attention to understudied spaces that can be sites of war, such as the workplace, the household, and even the bedroom. Her findings show gender to be a linchpin of even the most tedious and seemingly bland tactical and logistical decisions in violent conflict. Armed with that information, Sjoberg undertakes the task of redefining and reintroducing critical readings of war's political, economic, and humanitarian dimensions, developing the beginnings of a feminist theory of war.

"The collapse of the Red Army was one of the most spectacular in human history, and also one of the most mysterious. Neither Soviet nor Russian armed forces suffered catastrophic losses on the battlefield, while Russian soldiers became more involved, not less, in politics in post-Soviet Russia. Through a sophisticated application of institutional theory to a rich collection of data, Zoltan Barany unravels this mystery in a compelling and masterful way. This book will become a classic on Russian civil-military relations, while also adding much to our understanding of Russian politics more generally."--Michael McFaul, Stanford University

"Zoltan Barany is one of the most wide-ranging and thoughtful scholars writing on postcommunist politics today. Here, he provides a fascinating look at one of the most important issues in contemporary Russia. The link Barany makes between the condition of the military and the character of the postcommunist political regime is especially interesting. This book will appeal to policymakers and observers of Russian politics both inside and outside academia."--M. Steven Fish, University of California, Berkeley, and author of "Democracy Derailed in Russia"

"This book marks a new approach to the study of civil-military relations in Russia. It does something no one has done to date--it explains why Russian civil-military relations are not only not democratic, but are moving in the opposite direction. It also highlights the incredibly important roles that Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin have played in the evolution of such relations."--Dale Herspring, Kansas State University

"This is political science at its best: a lucid explanation of an important puzzle, systematically approached but mindful of the crucial role of human interaction. Barany makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Russian military, the state of Russian democracy, and to the larger issue of civil-military relations and democracy in general."--Thomas Nichols, United States Naval War College