This book examines the U. S. Army's presence in Germany after the Nazi regime's capitulation in May 1945. This presence required the pursuit of two stated missions: to secure German borders, and to establish an occupation government within the assigned U.S. zone and sector of Berlin. Both missions required logistics support, a critical aspect often understated in existing scholarship. The security mission, covered by the combat troops, declined between 1945 and 1948, but grew again with the Berlin Blockade/Airlift in 1948, and then again with the Korean crisis in 1950. The logistics mission grew exponentially to support this security mission, as the U.S. Army was the only U.S. Government agency possessing the ability and resources to initially support the occupation mission in Germany. The build-up of 'Little Americas' during the occupation years stood forward-deployed U.S. military forces in Europe in good stead over the ensuing decades.

How a new understanding of warfare can help the military fight today's conflicts more effectively The way wars are fought has changed starkly over the past sixty years. International military campaigns used to play out between armies at central fronts. Today's conflicts find major powers facing rebel insurgencies deploying elusive methods, from improvised explosives to terrorist attacks. Presenting a transformative understanding of these contemporary confrontations, Small Wars, Big Data shows that a revolution in the study of conflict yields new insights into terrorism, civil wars, and foreign interventions. Modern warfare is not about struggles over territory but over people; civilians-and the information they might provide-can turn the tide at critical junctures. Drawing lessons from conflicts in locations around the world, Small Wars, Big Data provides groundbreaking perspectives for how small wars can be better strategized and favorably won.

For centuries, the world has witnessed the development and use of increasingly complex and powerful military systems and technologies. In the process, the "art of war" has truly become the art of combined arms warfare, in which infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other key elements are all coordinated for maximum effect. Nowhere has this trend been more visible than in the history of twentieth-century warfare.

Originally published as an essential "in-house" study for U.S. Army officers during the 1980s, this much revised and expanded edition remains the most complete study available on the subject. Rewritten with a much wider readership in mind, it both retains its enormous practical utility for military professionals and provides a valuable and appealing introduction for scholars and general readers.

Jonathan House, author of the original work, brings the story of combined arms up to the present, covering among other things Desert Storm, the war in Chechnya, and the rise of "smart weapons" and related technologies. He traces the evolution of tactics, weapons, and organization in five major militaries -- American, British, German, Russian, and French -- over 100 years of warfare. Revealing both continuities and contrasts within and between these fighting forces, he also provides illuminating glimpses of Israeli and Japanese contributions to combined arms doctrine. Expanding his insightful analysis of the world wars and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, House also offers much new material focused on the post-Vietnam period. Throughout, he analyzes such issues as command-and-control, problems of highly centralized organizations, the development of special operationsforces, advances in weapons technology -- including ballistic and anti-ballistic missile systems -- the trade-offs involved in using "heavy" versus "light" armed forces, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation between air and land forces. (His strong critique of the "air superiority" propaganda that came out of the Gulf War is sure to spark some heated debates.)

Rigorously comparative, House's study addresses significant questions about how nations prepare for war, learn or don't learn its harsh lessons, and adapt to changing times and technologies. Unique in the annals of the literature on warfare, it will be the standard work on this subject for a long time to come.

This book assesses the ethical implications of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles ('hunter-killer drones') in contemporary conflicts. The American way of war is trending away from the heroic and towards the post-heroic, driven by a political preference for air-powered management of strategic risks and the reduction of physical risk to US personnel. The recent use of drones in the War on Terror has demonstrated the power of this technology to transcend time and space, but there has been relatively little debate in the United States and elsewhere over the embrace of what might be regarded as politically desirable and yet morally worrisome: risk-free killing. Arguably, the absence of a relationship of mutual risk between putative combatants poses a fundamental challenge to the status of war as something morally distinguishable from other forms of violence, and it also undermines the professional virtue of the warrior as a courageous risk-taker. This book considers the use of armed drones in the light of ethical principles that are intended to guard against unjust increases in the incidence and lethality of armed conflict. The evidence and arguments presented indicate that, in some respects, the use of armed drones is to be welcomed as an ethically superior mode of warfare. Over time, however, their continued and increased use is likely to generate more challenges than solutions, and perhaps do more harm than good. This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war, airpower, counter-terrorism, strategic studies and security studies in general.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

Defense of the Baltic has gained unprecedented prominence in the West in view of a post-2014 resurgent Russia. The West's East follows the principles of strategic analysis for a systematic introduction to defense of the three Baltic states within their own context of broader security vulnerabilities as well as the historical and current contexts of both allies and neighboring powers. This 800-year overview-from indigenous Baltic tribes to the post-Cold War period-provides a historical and strategic perspective on conditions in which independent states existed and flourished among predatory great powers. More recent historical events and personalities also form the basis for analogies which are often used, rightly or wrongly, by Western observers to understand Russia and its relationship to the West. Today's strategic balance in the Baltic region is characterized through general analysis of the individual actors' geopolitical outlook, strategic culture, military capabilities, and non-military security vulnerabilities. The dynamics of potential strategic interactions between NATO and Russia are anticipated in case of hypothetical conflict in the Baltic, premised upon the general theory of strategy and essential strategic logic. These potential interactions range from deterrence, through various considerations of strategy in war itself, and the thorniness of war termination. Finally, more technical and esoteric aspects of military strategy related to instrumentality, effect, adversary, and control are considered in relation to the ultimate question of how much defense for the Baltic is enough.

Despite the disasters of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and ever more visible evidence of the horrors of war, the concepts of 'Humanitarian Intervention' and 'Just War' enjoy widespread legitimacy and continue to exercise an unshakeable grip on our imaginations. Robin Dunford and Michael Neu provide a clear and comprehensive critique of both Just War Theory and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, deconstructing the philosophical, moral and political arguments that underpin them. In doing so, they show how proponents of Just War and R2P have tended to treat killing in a way which obscures the complex and often messy reality of war, and pays little heed to the human impact of such conflicts. Going further, they provide answers to such difficult questions as 'Surely it would have been just for us to intervene in the Rwandan genocide?' An essential guide to one of the most difficult moral and political issues of our age.

"Combat Modeling" is a systematic learning resource and reference text for the quantitative analysis of combat. After a brief overview, authors Washburn and Kress present individual chapters on shooting without feedback; shooting with feedback; target defense; attrition models; game theory and wargames; search; unmanned aerial vehicles; and terror and insurgency. Three appendices provide a review of basic probability concepts, probability distributions, and Markov models; an introduction to optimization models; and a discussion of Monte-Carlo simulations. Drawing on their many years of experience at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, Washburn and Kress have created a reference that will provide the tools and techniques for analysts involved in the underpinnings of combat decisions. This is a book that can be used as a military manual, reference book, and textbook for military courses on this vital subject.

After World War II, the United States military increasingly found itself involved in operations that have been described variously as limited wars, small wars, low intensity conflicts, operations other than war, support and stability operations, and the like. The name common for such operations throughout much of the 1990s was ""operations other than war"" (OOTW). During this period there was an explosion of doctrinal material on the subject, including an official field manual, FM 100-5, which appeared in 1993 and listed six principles of OOTW: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint and security. The author of the present work examines four successful OOTWs (the Greek Civil War, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua/Honduras) and four failed ones (Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Haiti) and concludes that there is a positive correlation between adherence to the principles and the operation's outcome. Furthermore, the author suggests that some of the principles serve as ""necessary conditions"" for others.

Vegetius' late Roman text became a well known and highly respected 'classic' in the Middle Ages, transformed by its readers into the authority on the waging of war. Christopher Allmand analyses the medieval afterlife of the De Re Militari, tracing the growing interest in the text from the Carolingian world to the late Middle Ages, suggesting how the written word may have influenced the development of military practice in that period. While emphasising that success depended on a commander's ability to outwit the enemy with a carefully selected, well trained and disciplined army, the De Re Militari inspired other unexpected developments, such as that of the 'national' army, and helped create a context in which the role of the soldier assumed greater social and political importance. Allmand explores the significance of the text and the changes it brought for those who accepted the implications of its central messages.

Military power needs to be financed and economic development is often shaped by military conflict, thus the interaction of military and economy, power and money is central to the modern world. This book provides an accessible introduction to the economics of the use of organized force, with a wide range of historical and current examples.

This collection of essays, inspired by the author s experience teaching ethics to Marine and Navy chaplains during the Iraq War, examines the moral and psychological dilemmas posed by war. The first section deals directly with Dr. Peter A. French s teaching experience and the specific challenges posed by teaching applied and theoretical ethics to men and women wrestling with the immediate and personal moral conflicts occasioned by the dissonance of their duties as military officers with their religious convictions. The following chapters grew out of philosophical discussions with these chaplains regarding specific ethical issues surrounding the Iraq War, including the nature of moral evil, forgiveness, mercy, retributive punishment, honor, torture, responsibility, and just war theory. This book represents a unique viewpoint on the philosophical problems of war, illuminating the devastating toll combat experiences take on both an individual s sense of identity and a society s professed moral code.

Eve of Destruction The Coming Age of Preventive War Thomas M. Nichols "Thomas Nichols transcends sterile debates about Iraq and the Bush Doctrine and points instead to the fundamental erosion in two long-standing international norms: the inviolability of state sovereignty and the unacceptability of preventive war. These profound changes are driven by the very real threat of mass casualty suicide terrorism as well as humanitarian disasters and the problem of failed states. This is a smart, incisive, and important book."--Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown University "Preventive war is here to stay. The question isn't whether but when and how force will be used preventively. That is the important message of this excellent book. Nichols provides the critical answers clearly and convincingly."--Ivo Daalder, Brookings Institution "Nichols provides a lively guide to the development of this issue after the Cold War."--"Foreign Affairs" In an age of new threats to international security, the old rules of war are rapidly being discarded. The great powers are moving toward norms less restrictive of intervention, preemption, and preventive war. This evolution is taking place not only in the United States but also in many of the world's most powerful nations, including Russia, France, and Japan, among others. As centuries of tradition and law are overturned, will preventive warfare push the world into chaos? "Eve of Destruction" is a provocative contribution to a growing international debate over the acceptance of preventive military action. In the first work to identify the trends that have led to a coming age of preventive war, Thomas M. Nichols uses historical analysis as well as interviews with military officials from around the world to trace the anticipatory use of force from the early 1990s--when the international community responded to a string of humanitarian crises in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo--to today's current and potential actions against rogue states and terrorists. He makes a case for a bold reform of U.S. foreign policy, and of the United Nations Security Council itself, in order to avert outright anarchy. Thomas M. Nichols is Professor of Strategy and Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy at the United States Naval War College. His previous books include "The Russian Presidency" and "Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War." 2008 192 pages 6 x 9 ISBN 978-0-8122-4066-5 Cloth $45.00s 29.50 ISBN 978-0-8122-0294-6 Ebook $45.00s 29.50 World Rights Political Science, Public Policy Short copy: In an age of new threats to international security, the old rules of war are rapidly being discarded by the great powers. This study explores how and why states will exercise the preventive use of force in the twenty-first century, and how this violence might be contained and controlled.

Originally formed in order to lend support to the FNLA and UNITA in the Angolan war, 32 Battalion quickly gained the reputation of being an unconventional, secretive, yet highly effective group.

Written by a man who was intimately involved with the unit and served as its Regimental Sergeant Major for two years, the book aims to explode the myths surrounding the legendary 32 and set the record straight. It records how and why 32 Battalion was formed, explores its unique identity forged by the men who fought in it, details the many operations in which they participated, and concludes with its eventual disbandment at the dawn of a new South Africa.

What they did, and how they did it, would earn this controversial group official recognition as the best fighting unit in the South African Army since World War II. This book’s unembellished, factual reporting will fill a big gap in the highly popular military genre.

For more than two thousand years, Sun-tzu's The Art of War has provided leaders with essential advice on battlefield tactics and management strategies. An elemental part of Chinese culture, it has also become a touchstone for the Western struggle for survival and success, whether in battle, in business, or in relationships. Now, in this crisp, accessible new translation, eminent scholar John Minford brings this seminal work to life for today's readers. Capturing the literary quality of the work, Minford presents the core text in two formats: first, the unadorned ancient words of wisdom ascribed to Sun-tzu; then, the same text with extensive running commentary from the canon of traditional Chinese commentators. A lively, learned introduction and other valuable apparatus round out this authoritative volume.

Military organizations around the world are normally huge producers and consumers of data. Accordingly, they stand to gain from the many benefits associated with data analytics. However, for leaders in defense organizations-either government or industry-accessible use cases are not always available. This book presents a diverse collection of cases that explore the realm of possibilities in military data analytics. These use cases explore such topics as: Context for maritime situation awareness Data analytics for electric power and energy applications Environmental data analytics in military operations Data analytics and training effectiveness evaluation Harnessing single board computers for military data analytics Analytics for military training in virtual reality environments A chapter on using single board computers explores their application in a variety of domains, including wireless sensor networks, unmanned vehicles, and cluster computing. The investigation into a process for extracting and codifying expert knowledge provides a practical and useful model for soldiers that can support diagnostics, decision making, analysis of alternatives, and myriad other analytical processes. Data analytics is seen as having a role in military learning, and a chapter in the book describes the ongoing work with the United States Army Research Laboratory to apply data analytics techniques to the design of courses, evaluation of individual and group performances, and the ability to tailor the learning experience to achieve optimal learning outcomes in a minimum amount of time. Another chapter discusses how virtual reality and analytics are transforming training of military personnel. Virtual reality and analytics are also transforming monitoring, decision making, readiness, and operations. Military Applications of Data Analytics brings together a collection of technical and application-oriented use cases. It enables decision makers and technologists to make connections between data analytics and such fields as virtual reality and cognitive science that are driving military organizations around the world forward.

Putting into question the conventional view that the military is detrimental to democratic development, Dolman provides a multifaceted examination of the institutional incentives of the military and its relations with civilian authorities. Drawing on classical political theory, a wide range of historical examples, and statistical findings, " The Warrior State" argues that the military can facilitate democracy as the result of specific norms and conditions that focus on individual action. Ironically, this may be best inculcated through a focus on the offensive, precisely the military doctrine commonly seen as most likely to result in international conflict. The paradox of offensive strategies possibly increasing international conflict while also enhancing democracy, which is supposed to decrease such conflict, form a core of this provocative book.

This book examines and explains the dialectic of war and peace between the outbreak of WWI and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. The theoretical inspiration is built upon Galtung's concept of negative and positive peace, Arons distinction between strategy and diplomacy, and Carrs theory of periodization. Here, the author compares globalization with the interwar period and examines how the first decades positive peace, diplomacy, and big hopes were replaced by negative peace, and explains the growing role of military strategy which culminated after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the following military incidents between NATO and Russia. This volume will be of interest to teachers, students, and researchers in the fields of modern history, international security and peace studies.

The idea that war is sometimes justified is deeply embedded in public consciousness. But it is only credible so long as we believe that the ethical standards of just war are in fact realizable in practice. In this engaging book, Christopher Finlay elucidates the assumptions underlying just war theory and defends them from a range of objections, arguing that it is a regrettable but necessary reflection of the moral realities of international politics. Using a range of historical and contemporary examples, he demonstrates the necessity of employing the theory on the basis of careful moral appraisal of real-life political landscapes and striking a balance between theoretical ideals and the practical realities of conflict. This book will be a crucial guide to the complexities of just war theory for all students and scholars of the ethics and political theory of war.

Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan has been the longest war in American history. Even after the drawdown of NATO/ISAF forces it has cast a shadow over Afghanistan's future and highlighted the U.S. failure to gradually wind down the conflict. Today, the resurgent Taliban hold more Afghan territory than before, the civilian toll is at a record high and Afghan military casualties are rising. From sanctuaries in Pakistan and from the Afghan areas they hold, the Taliban are carrying out increasingly daring attacks, including in the capital Kabul. In declaring war in Afghanistan,in 2001, after the world's worst terrorist attack in modern history, U.S. President George W. Bush had the sympathy and support of the world. Yet before he could accomplish his war objectives in Afghanistan, he invaded and occupied Iraq. The course of the war, in Afghanistan, is explained in great detail in this book. The changes of strategies, force levels and the circumstances which brought them about bear description as the U.S. searched for a viable strategy. President Barack Obama thought that he could end the war simply by declaring it over and by making the Afghan people responsible for their own security. The role of Pakistan in this conflict also merits a detailed explanation. The continuing conflict poses a threat to regional peace. This book will be of interest to military professionals as well as the lay reader. It describes an important era of the history of South Asia.

This definitive reference resource on cyber warfare covers all aspects of this headline topic, providing historical context of cyber warfare and an examination its rapid development into a potent technological weapon of the 21st century. Today, cyber warfare affects everyone-from governments that need to protect sensitive political and military information, to businesses small and large that stand to collectively lose trillions of dollars each year to cyber crime, to individuals whose privacy, assets, and identities are subject to intrusion and theft. The problem is monumental and growing exponentially. Encyclopedia of Cyber Warfare provides a complete overview of cyber warfare, which has been used with increasing frequency in recent years by such countries as China, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Russia, and the United States. Readers will gain an understanding of the origins and development of cyber warfare and of how it has become a major strategic element in warfare for countries throughout the world. The encyclopedia's entries cover all of the most significant cyber attacks to date, including the Stuxnet worm that successfully disabled centrifuges in Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility; the attack on Israel's internet infrastructure during its January 2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip; the worldwide "Red October" cyber attack that stole information from embassies, research firms, military installations, and nuclear and other energy infrastructures; and cyber attacks on private corporations like Sony. Provides comprehensive coverage of the major individuals, organizations, impacts, and issues related to cyber warfare that enables readers to better understanding of the impact of cyber warfare on modern conflicts Includes a detailed chronology that documents the evolution and use of cyber warfare over the past few decades Supplies further readings and a lengthy bibliography that offer a wealth of options to students conducting extensive research on the subject

Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. "Mars Learning" closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps' small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the "Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual" and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

Selected as a Financial Times Best Book of 2013 In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one's control. Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment-subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends-provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead feel their way through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the end point. A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David's use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.

The book aims to provide the reader with a state-of-the-art introduction to classic and modern military theory.

The text accounts for the most important theories within the field by developing and analyzing these theories, as well as problematizing both their normative and explanatory aims. While focusing on military theory, the book does not only reflect a single way of relating to knowledge of war and warfare, but furthers learning by introducing contrasting perspectives as well as constantly criticizing the theories.

There is a clear need for an introductory text for the entire field of military theory that focuses whole-heartedly on the theories not on their context or how they are expressed in practice during war. This book covers such questions as how we should understand the changing character of war, the utility of force and how the pursuit of political ends is achieved through military means. It draws upon and illustrates military thought through a wide-ranging number of examples from the Napoleonic Wars to the current war in Afghanistan.

This book will be of great interest for students of military theory, strategic studies, security studies and defence studies.

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