Bringing together distinguished Classicists, Koreanists, and Americanists, this book examines the cultural and political/institutional dimensions of war's impact on society by comparing the effects of prolonged war on ancient Athens during the war with Sparta, and on the United States and the two Koreas, North and South, during the Korean War. Despite the very circumstances of the two conflicts and the radically different way each was viewed in its own time, the contributors point to many underlying similarities between the two wars and put each in a fascinating and unique perspective.

Between 1940 and 1944, although large numbers of British troops battled around the littorals of the Mediterranean and Burma, most of the British Army bided its time at home. Between Dunkirk and D-Day, those troops lived in a grey area, neither fully at peace nor properly at war. While they trained under virtually peacetime conditions, their colleagues overseas were gaining up-to-date battle experience. The lessons from that experience should have made the troops who crossed the Channel in summer 1944 the most thoroughly prepared soldiers ever to go into their first battle. Sadly, the results in Normandy confounded any such expectations, as in battle after battle the combat effectiveness of British troops, particularly infantry and armour, proved weak.
In this study, Timothy Harrison Place traces the reasons for the British Army's tactical weakness in Normany to flaws in its training in Britain. The armour suffered from a failure fully to disseminate the lessons of experience in the Mediterranean theatres to troops training at home. Disagreements between General Montgomery and the War Office over basic doctrine for the employment of armour exacerbated matters. The infantry, meanwhile, failed to apply the lessons learned on the Western Front a generation before. They trained according to the habits of 1916, and, despite the efforts of some among their number, the British Army never fully recovered from that error.
This book paints a picture of an untried British Army working hard to learn its trade. Oblivious to the fact that it was always one step behind the enemy, this was an army cruelly let down by poor direction from the top.

"This brief, provocative, and accessible book offers snapshots of seven pernicious myths in military history that have been perpetrated on unsuspecting students, readers, moviegoers, game players, and politicians. It promotes awareness of how myths are created by 'the spurious misuse and ignorance of history' and how misleading ideas about a military problem, as in asymmetric warfare, can lead to misguided solutions. "Both scholarly and engaging, this book is an ideal addition to military history and historical methodology courses. In fact, it could be fruitfully used in any course that teaches critical thinking skills, including courses outside the discipline of history. Military history has a broad appeal to students, and there's something here for everyone. From the so-called 'Western Way of War' to its sister-myth, technological determinism, to the 'academic party game' of once-faddish 'Military Revolutions,' the book shows that while myths about history may be fun, myth busting is the most fun of all." -- Reina Pennington, Norwich University

What qualities make an ally useful in coalition warfare, and when is an ally more trouble than it's worth? Allies That Count analyzes the utility of junior partners in coalition warfare and reaches surprising conclusions. In this volume, Olivier Schmitt presents detailed case-study analysis of several US allies in the Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, the Iraq War, and the war in Afghanistan. He also includes a broader comparative analysis of 204 junior partners in various interventions since the end of the Cold War. This analysis bridges a gap in previous studies about coalition warfare, while also contributing to policy debates about a recurring defense dilemma. Previous works about coalition warfare have focused on explaining how coalitions are formed, but little attention has been given to the issue of their effectiveness. Simultaneously, policy debates, have framed the issue of junior partners in multinational military operations in terms of a trade-off between the legitimacy that is allegedly gained from a large number of coalition states vs. the decrease in military effectiveness associated with the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare. Schmitt determines which political and military variables are more likely to create utility, and he challenges the conventional wisdom about the supposed benefit of having as many states as possible in a coalition. Allies That Count will be of interest to students and scholars of security studies and international relations as well as military practitioners and policymakers.

This volume illuminates the moral views on violence, from the moral restraint of the just-war tradition through pragmatic nonviolence to principled variations of pacifism.

The words of the ancient Chinese sages are as timeless as they are wise. The words of ancient Chinese philosophers have influenced other thinkers across the world for more than 2,000 years, and continue to shape our ideas today. The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy includes translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War, Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, the teachings of the master sage Confucius, and the writings of Mencius. From insights on warfare and diplomacy to advice on how to deal with one's neighbors and colleagues, this collection of classical Eastern philosophy will provide readers with countless nuggets of wisdom. IBPA Benjamin Franklin Gold Award Winner 2017!

Will tomorrow's wars be dominated by autonomous drones, land robots and warriors wired into a cybernetic network which can read their thoughts? Will war be fought with greater or lesser humanity? Will it be played out in cyberspace and further afield in Low Earth Orbit? Or will it be fought more intensely still in the sprawling cities of the developing world, the grim black holes of social exclusion on our increasingly unequal planet? Will the Great Powers reinvent conflict between themselves or is war destined to become much 'smaller' both in terms of its actors and the beliefs for which they will be willing to kill? In this illuminating new book Christopher Coker takes us on an incredible journey into the future of warfare. Focusing on contemporary trends that are changing the nature and dynamics of armed conflict, he shows how conflict will continue to evolve in ways that are unlikely to render our century any less bloody than the last. With insights from philosophy, cutting-edge scientific research and popular culture, Future War is a compelling and thought-provoking meditation on the shape of war to come.

Larry May argues that the best way to understand war crimes is as crimes against humanness rather than as violations of justice. He shows that in a deeply pluralistic world, we need to understand the rules of war as the collective responsibility of states that send their citizens into harm's way, as the embodiment of humanity, and as the chief way for soldiers to retain a sense of honour on the battlefield. Throughout, May demonstrates that the principle of humanness is the cornerstone of international humanitarian law, and is itself the basis of the traditional principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality. He draws extensively on the older Just War tradition to assess recent cases from the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia as well as examples of atrocities from the archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Fully illustrated, this book casts light on the utility and role of the German and British cavalry in the early stages of World War I on the Western Front. In the early months of World War I, before the fighting degenerated into static trench warfare, there was a brief period of mobile combat as the German Army advanced through Belgium and northern France, forcing the French and British forces facing them to retreat. Both sides in the escalating conflict deployed substantial numbers of cavalry units to screen their infantry forces, conduct reconnaissance and harness their superior mobility to undertake aggressive combat operations. In the summer of 1914, the British cavalry had the difficult task of covering the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force and the German cavalry, the equally demanding task, after weeks of combat and forced marches, of maintaining contact with a rapidly retiring enemy. In this book a comparative assessment is made of each side's doctrine, organization, equipment and training, followed by a detailed analysis of their actual performance in three key encounter actions: Casteau/Soignies (22 August), Cerizy/Moy (28 August) and Le Montcel/Fretoy (7 September). This analysis is supported by carefully chosen photographs and specially commissioned full-colour artwork and maps.

Fully illustrated, this absorbing study assesses the warriors fighting on both sides during the Vikings' attacks on the Frankish realm in the 9th century, as raiding escalated into full-scale siege warfare. On the eve of the 9th century, Vikings first raided the Frankish Empire on the coast of what is now western France. Although this attack ended in disaster for the Scandinavians, Charlemagne reportedly wept, not in fear of his own life, but for the ensuing bloodshed brought upon his successors. Mobile parties of highly skilled Viking warriors would continue to raid Francia for decades; as these attacking contingents grew more numerous they began to assail powerful centres, besieging Paris in 845 and again in 885. To combat the Viking threat, Frankish kings mustered scores of infantrymen, then subsequently transitioned to cavalry-based forces in the 9th century. The dynamic nature of Viking activity in Francia meant that numbers and mobility would determine the fate of Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire. This study documents the evolving trial of strength between the Vikings and the Franks under Charlemagne and his successors. Through a careful synthesis of primary sources, expert analysis and the archaeological record, the author invites the reader to visualize the fighting men who fought one another in Francia, and offers a balanced assessment of their successes and failures over decades of warfare during the Viking Age.

This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged its revolutionary implications.
Utilizing primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible, and borrowing methods of analysis from political science, history, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, this book suggests a cultural explanation for this puzzling transformation in warfare.
"The Culture of Military Innovation" offers a systematic, thorough, and unique analytical approach that may well be applicable in other perplexing strategic situations. Though framed in the context of specific historical experience, the insights of this book reveal important implications related to conventional, subconventional, and nonconventional security issues. It is therefore an ideal reference work for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies.

Also published under the title of Principals of Social Reconstruction, and written in response to the devastation of World War I, Why Men Fight lays out Bertrand Russell's ideas on war, pacifism, reason, impulse, and personal liberty. He argues that the individualistic approach of traditional liberalism has reached its limits and that when individuals live passionately, they will have no desire for war or killing. Conversely, excessive restraint or reason causes us to live unnaturally and with hostility toward those who are unlike ourselves. This formidable work greatly contributed to Russell’s fame as a formidable social critic and anti-war activist.

Table of Contents

Introduction Preface 1. The Principle of Growth 2. The State 3. War as Institution 4. Property 5. Education 6. Marriage and the Population Question 7. Religion and the Churches 8. What can we Do Index

Based on extensive Japanese-language materials, this book is the first to examine the development of Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. It addresses: how the GSDF was able to emerge as the post-war successor of the Imperial Japanese Army despite Japan's anti-militarist constitution; how the GSDF, despite the public skepticism and even hostility that greeted its creation, built domestic and international legitimacy; and how the GSDF has responded to changes in international and domestic environments. This path-breaking study of the world's third-largest-economic power's ground army is timely for two reasons. First, the resurgence of tensions in Northeast Asia over territorial disputes, and the emphasis recent Japanese governments have placed on using the GSDF for defending Japan's outlying islands is driving media coverage and specialist interest in the GSDF. Second, the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami has focused global attention on the GSDF as Japan's lead disaster relief organization. This highly informative and thoroughly researched book provides insight for policy makers and academics interested in Japanese foreign and defense policies.

'Vivid, wholly convincing, compelling. One of the best memoirs for years about the experience of flying in war' Max Hastings, Sunday Telegraph Two months before the outbreak of WWII, seventeen-year-old Geoffrey Wellum becomes a fighter pilot with the RAF . . . Desperate to get in the air, he makes it through basic training to become the youngest Spitfire pilot in the prestigious 92 Squadron. Thrust into combat almost immediately, Wellum finds himself flying several sorties a day, caught up in terrifying dogfights with German Me 109s. Over the coming months he and his fellow pilots play a crucial role in the Battle of Britain. But of the friends that take to the air alongside Wellum, many never return. *** 'An intimate account . . . rich in detail' James Holland, Wall Street Journal, 'Five Best World War II Memoirs' 'An extraordinarily deeply moving and astonishingly evocative story. Reading it, you feel you are in the Spitfire with him, at 20,000ft, chased by a German Heinkel, with your ammunition gone' Independent 'A brilliantly fresh, achingly written memoir. Thrilling and frightening on virtually every page . . . Wellum takes you into battle with him. A book for all ages and generations, a treasure' Daily Express

Voltaire said, "Machiavelli taught Europe the art of war; it had long been practiced, without being known." For Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), war was war, and victory the supreme aim to which all other considerations must be subordinated. "The Art of War" is far from an anachronism--its pages outline fundamental questions that theorists of war continue to examine today, making it essential reading for any student of military history, strategy, or theory. Machiavelli believed "The Art of War" to be his most important work.

This book develops a framework for analysis, and a set of research strategies, to better understand the conditions and mechanisms involved in the considerable use of caveats by states contributing militarily to coalition operations. In the professional language of military servicemen, security analysts and decision-makers, "caveats" refers to the reservations on the use of force states put on their military contingents as a precondition to participate in particular multinational enforcement operations. Such understood caveats are an instrument of statecraft and foreign policy. However, caveats also are a potential threat to the integrity and military effectiveness of the coalition force in question, and, further down the road, an erosion on the fabric of security alliances. This volume is ideal for audiences interested in military and defence studies, security studies and coalition warfare.

This collection of counterfactual essays by noted historians analyzes incidents from military history spanning 3000 years to the end of the 20th-century. Broad speculative analysis is built from a wealth of detail, as some major turning points of military history are re-examined.

"Stephen Biddle's "Military Power" is one of the most important contributions to strategic studies in recent decades. Presenting a very powerful case for a very surprising argument on a very important question, it will be controversial in some quarters, but critics will be hard-pressed to refute the case."--Richard K. Betts, Columbia University, author of "Military Readiness"

"Fascinating, precisely written, indeed, brilliant, "Military Power" is among the most important books ever published on modern warfare. Stephen Biddle fundamentally rethinks the causes of victory and defeat in modern war and challenges almost the entire corpus of scholarship on assessing force capability and the role of offense and defense in determining war outcomes. Presenting his argument with power, balance, and subtlety, he synthesizes many partial historical explanations and provides a basis for understanding why so many 'rules of thumb' and other explanations are misleading. A landmark work."--Lynn Eden, Stanford University, author of "Whole World on Fire"

"Steve Biddle may be the best American defense analyst of his generation, and this book is quite possibly his career masterpiece to date. Few are as well qualified as Biddle to weave together vivid descriptions of the modern battlefield, clear explanations of historical lessons, a detailed understanding of defense technology, and a sophisticated use of military models and war games. Biddle does all these things, helping the reader understand modern warfare more than does any other book on the market. His argument about trends in warfare transcends the popular theory that a revolution in military affairs is now underway. He replaces this theory witha more convincing, more historical, and less technology-obsessed view of the modern battlefield."--Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution

War is a paradox. On the one hand, it destroys bodies and destroys communities. On the other hand, it is responsible for some of the strongest human bonds and has been the genesis of many of our most fundamental institutions. War and Society addresses these paradoxes while providing a sociological exploration of this enigmatic phenomenon which has played a central role in human history, wielded an incredible power over human lives, and commanded intellectual questioning for countless generations. The authors offer an analytical account of the origins of war, its historical development, and its consequences for individuals and societies, adopting a comparative approach throughout. It ends with an appraisal of the contemporary role of war, looking to the future of warfare and the fundamental changes in the nature of violent conflict which we are starting to witness. This short, readable and engaging book will be an ideal reading for upper-level students of political sociology, military sociology, and related subjects.

Over the last decade (and indeed ever since the Cold War), the rise of insurgents and non-state actors in war, and their readiness to use terror and other irregular methods of fighting, have led commentators to speak of 'new wars'. They have assumed that the 'old wars' were waged solely between states, and were accordingly fought between comparable and 'symmetrical' armed forces. Much of this commentary has lacked context or sophistication. It has been bounded by norms and theories more than the messiness of reality. Fed by the impact of the 9/11 attacks, it has privileged some wars and certain trends over others. Most obviously it has been historically unaware. But it has also failed to consider many of the other dimensions which help us to define what war is--legal, ethical, religious, and social.
The Changing Character of War, the fruit of a five-year interdisciplinary program at Oxford Univeresity of the same name, draws together all these themes, in order to distinguish between what is really changing about war and what only seems to be changing. Self-evidently, as the product of its own times, the character of each war is always changing. But if war's character is in flux, its underlying nature contains its own internal consistency. Each war is an adversarial business, capable of generating its own dynamic, and therefore of spiralling in directions that are never totally predictable. War is both utilitarian, the tool of policy, and dysfunctional. This book brings together scholars with world-wide reputations, drawn from a clutch of different disciplines, but united by a common intellectual goal: that of understanding a problem of extraordinary importance for our times.
This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Program on the Changing Character of War.

There could be no better homage to recently deceased sociologist Charles C. Moskos than dedicating to him this selection of the papers presented at RC01's international conference in Seoul (July 2008). It offers an up-to-date view of the panorama of social studies on armed forces and conflict resolution in a context of fast-moving change that renders many preceding theoretical previsions obsolete. Just to cite two aspects of this change, one can point first of all to how the presented studies move beyond the very concept of globalization, after which the conference had been named. It in fact emerged with clarity that the new dimensions of the context in which militaries and military policy must move are those of a constant, diffuse interaction of the 'local' and the 'global', so-called globalization. A second aspect, in the international area, is the shift towards a multipolar global order with the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Latin America, Japan and India all manoeuvring for position, a shift that has significant consequences on military action as well.

There could be no better homage to recently deceased sociologist Charles C. Moskos than dedicating to him this selection of the papers presented at RC01's international conference in Seoul (July 2008). It offers an up-to-date view of the panorama of social studies on armed forces and conflict resolution in a context of fast-moving change that renders many preceding theoretical previsions obsolete. Just to cite two aspects of this change, one can point first of all to how the presented studies move beyond the very concept of globalization, after which the conference had been named. It in fact emerged with clarity that the new dimensions of the context in which militaries and military policy must move are those of a constant, diffuse interaction of the 'local' and the 'global', so-called globalization. A second aspect, in the international area, is the shift towards a multipolar global order with the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Latin America, Japan and India all manoeuvring for position, a shift that has significant consequences on military action as well.

From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war-and Presidents' actions in nuclear crises-from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as "a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter," takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's "Tank" in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories-based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents-of how America's presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan's historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.

When is the use of force for humanitarian purposes legitimate? The book examines this question through one of the most controversial examples of humanitarian intervention in the post Cold War period: the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Justifying Violence applies a critical theoretical approach to an interrogation of the communicative practices which underpin claims to legitimacy for the use of force by actors in international politics. Drawing on the theory of communicative ethics, the book develops an innovative conceptual framework which contributes a critical communicative dimension to the question of legitimacy that extends beyond the moral and legal approaches so often applied to the intervention in Kosovo. The empirical application of communicative ethics offers a provocative and nuanced account which contests conventional interpretations of the legitimacy of NATO's intervention. -- .

The Practice of Strategy focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practiced over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles, but also to times of peace that were over-shadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation-state policies.
Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as 'the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means, ' these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present.
Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.