On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

Russian strategy today is often framed in terms of ‘hybridity’, an approach characterised by interference in domestic politics through cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns. Such asymmetric measures are seen as part of a shift away from armed violence towards political subversion and other non-military tools. Moving beyond the concept of hybridity, this book looks more broadly at Russian thinking about warfare. Drawing directly on Russian sources, it reflects on a series of questions that are generally overlooked in the existing Euro-Atlantic literature about Russia, notably: what is the military leadership’s distinctive idea of twenty-first-century blitzkrieg? How does it understand holistic territorial defence? And how does it manage the shifting balance between the offensive and defensive? Exploring key concepts and terms used in Russian military thinking and action, Blitzkrieg and the art of Russian war contributes to an active and lively debate about Russia’s resurgent role in international affairs and the challenge the country poses to the international order. -- .

Transforming NATO: New Allies, Missions, and Capabilities, by Ivan Dinev Ivanov, examines the three dimensions of NATO s transformation since the end of the Cold War: the addition of a dozen new allies; the undertaking of new missions such as peacekeeping, crisis response, and stabilization; and the development of new capabilities to implement these missions. The book explains these processes through two mutually reinforcing frameworks: club goods theory and the concept of complementarities. NATO can be viewed as a diverse, heterogeneous club of nations providing collective defense to its members, who, in turn, combine their military resources in a way that enables them to optimize the Alliance s capabilities needed for overseas operations. Transforming NATO makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, it offers new insights into understanding how heterogeneous clubs operate. Second, it introduces a novel concept, that of complementarities. Finally, it re-evaluates the relevance of club goods theory as a framework for studying contemporary international security. These conceptual foundations apply to areas well beyond NATO. They provide useful insights into understanding the operation of transatlantic relations, alliance politics, and a broader set of international coalitions and partnerships. This update in April 2013 covers new developments related to NATO s transformation after this book was originally published: http: //homepages.uc.edu/ ivanovid/pdfs/book_update.pdf"

"Values and Weapons" looks at the determinants of legitimacy for using military force in the US and Europe. The non-intervention norm is weakened by the advent of terror groups in failed states as well as by so-called humanitarian intervention. The development of a norm that calls for a 'duty to protect' has paved the way for intervention also into so-called 'failed' states. Sovereignty has been redefined to be conditional on democratic government, and this makes it much easier to intervene into non-democratic states.

In the five hundred years covered by this volume there was scarcely a year which passed without either war or some open demonstration of hostility between the many sovereign powers which governed Europe. This volume in the Origins of the Modern State in Europe series focuses on the crucial role of war in the formation of state systems.

This broad-ranging new text introduces a wide range of theoretical perspectives with a central focus on their application to understanding key issues in global, state and human security in the contemporary world.

America has been at war for most of the 20th and 21st centuries and during that time has progressively moved towards a vicarious form of warfare, where key tasks are delegated to proxies, the military's exposure to danger is limited, and special forces and covert instruments are on the increase. Important strategic decisions are taken with minimal scrutiny or public engagement. This compelling account charts the historical emergence of this distinctive tradition of war and explains the factors driving its contemporary prominence. It contrasts the tactical advantages of vicarious warfare with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.

There is now a major new interest in ethical issues about warfare emerging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflict in Syria and Libya, the war on terror, and the introduction of new weapon systems, such as unmanned drones. In this re-written version of the author's classic text, Waging War, Ian Clark asks probing questions about how we think about war, the changes it is undergoing, and what exactly it is we wage when we wage war. Waging War argues that much of what passes for ethical debate is actually a set of disagreements about what counts as war or not. This philosophical introduction provides a critical review of the various different ways in which the ethical debates are already framed, the questions that arise from these debates, and seeks to bring greater clarity and precision to the important moral arguments about political violence.

The name Robert Mugabe has become synonymous with failed leadership in Africa. One of the first atrocities of his shocking reign took place in the 1980s and became known as the "Gukurahundi" - a series of politically motivated killings. Thousands of civilians were murdered in Matabeleland, a region in the southeast of the country. In March of 1997, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation first commissioned Gukurahandi in Zimbabwe, a book that brought the tragedy in Matabeleland to light. Now in its second edition, Gukurahandi in Zimbabwe is more relevant than ever as Mugabe's erratic and autocratic rule pushes Zimbabwe, once the prosperous hope of Africa, into decline.

This new edition includes an introduction by Elinor Sisulu and a foreword by Archbishop Pius Ncube of Bulawayo. Sisulu is an acclaimed writer, academic, and journalist who reflects on her own and others' failure to speak out at the time of the killings, which coincided with the celebration of a newly independent Zimbabwe. Well known for being an outspoken critic, Archbishop Ncube expresses his strong opposition to the ongoing human rights violations committed by the government of Zimbabwe.

This book is a clarion call for the world to wake up to the crisis in Zimbabwe and campaign for justice and an end to the egregious acts of cruelty against its citizens.

Antulio J. Echevarria II reveals how successive generations of American strategic theorists have thought about war. Analyzing the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy Mitchell, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Henry Eccles, Joseph Wiley, Harry Summers, John Boyd, William Lind, and John Warden, he uncovers the logic that underpinned each theorist's critical concepts, core principles, and basic assumptions about the nature and character of war. In so doing, he identifies four paradigms of war's nature - traditional, modern, political, and materialist - that have shaped American strategic thought. If war's logic is political, as Carl von Clausewitz said, then so too is thinking about war.

In 2010, David Bates presented the Ford Lectures in British History at the University of Oxford, and The Normans and Empire is the book which was born from these lectures. It provides an interpretative analysis of the history of the cross-Channel empire created by William the Conqueror in 1066 to its end in 1204 when the duchy of Normandy was conquered by the French king, Philip Augustus, the so-called 'Loss of Normandy'. This volume emphasizes the cross-Channel and Continental dimensions of the subject, and uses modern approaches to suggest new interpretations. Bates proposes that historians of the Normans can learn from the methods of social scientists and historians of other periods of history - such as making use of such tools as life-stories and biographies - and he employs such methods to offer an interpretative history of the Normans, as well as a broader history of England, the British Isles, and Northern France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

With the U.S. armed forces playing an ever increasing central role in American foreign policy, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the role of regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) in both implementing and shaping relations with various countries. Wielding tremendous power and substantial resources, both military and economic, these officers are also diplomats, advisors, and intermediaries between other countries and the Washington policy process. This book explores the role these military commanders play in contemporary U.S. foreign policy.

Jus Post bellum: Restraint, Stabilisation and Peace seeks to answer the question "is restraint in war essential for a just and lasting peace"? With a foreword by Professor Brian Orend who asserts this as "a most commendable subject" in extending Just War Theory, the book contains chapters on the ethics of war-fighting since the end of the Cold War and a look into the future of conflict. From the causes of war, with physical restraint and reconciliation in combat and political settlement, further chapters written by expert academics and military participants cover international humanitarian law, practicalities of the use of force and some of the failures in achieving safe and lasting peace in modern-day theatres of conflict.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

This book explains Arab military responses to the social uprisings which began in 2011. Through a comparative case study analysis of Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan, and Syrian militaries, it explains why militaries fractured, supported the regime in power, or removed their presidents.

From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war-and Presidents' actions in nuclear crises-from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as "a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter," takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's "Tank" in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories-based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents-of how America's presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan's historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.

This pioneering book, now thoroughly updated to incorporate important research, explains the causes of war through a sustained combination of theoretical insights and detailed case studies. Cashman and Robinson find that while all wars have multiple causes, certain factors typically combine in identifiable "dangerous patterns." Through their examination of World War I, World War II in the Pacific, the Six-Day War, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Iran-Iraq War, and the US invasion of Iraq, the authors lay out the complex multilevel processes by which disputes between countries erupt into bloody conflicts. Ideal for a range of courses in international relations at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, this focused text clearly explains theory and applies it to concrete case-study examples in a way that allows students to fully understand the origins of war.

The twentieth century was dominated by war and by preparations for war in a way that is unparalleled in history. Originally published in 1988, this textbook highlights key themes of warfare throughout the world and emphasizes the gulf between the theory of war and its practice. The contributors are professional historians and strategists who consider the impact of war upon society, theories of insurgency and counter-insurgency and nuclear strategy, as well as more ‘traditional topics’ such as tactics and strategy on land, the role of sea power, the evolution of strategic bombing, colonial and revolutionary warfare. Each chapter discusses recent research on the topic and provides guides to further reading. Together they give a clear up-to-date overview of the conflicts which dominated the twentieth century. This textbook is useful reading for all students and teachers of strategic and war studies, military history and international relations and for all those concerned with the study of major conflicts in the twentieth century.

This second part of a two-volume series examines in detail the financing of America's major wars from the Spanish-American War to the Vietnam War. It interweaves analyses of political policy, military strategy and operations, and war finance and economic mobilization with examinations of the events of America's major armed conflicts, offering useful case studies for students of military history and spending policy, policymakers, military comptrollers, and officers in training.

Coup d'Etat astonished readers when it first appeared in 1968 because it showed, step by step, how governments could be overthrown. Translated into sixteen languages, it has inspired anti-coup precautions by regimes around the world. In addition to these detailed instructions, Edward Luttwak's revised handbook offers an altogether new way of looking at political power-one that considers, for example, the vulnerability to coups of even the most stable democracies in the event of prolonged economic distress. The world has changed dramatically in the past half century, but not the essence of the coup d'etat. It still requires the secret recruitment of military officers who command the loyalty of units well placed to seize important headquarters and key hubs in the capital city. The support of the armed forces as a whole is needed only in the aftermath, to avoid countercoups. And mass support is largely irrelevant, although passive acceptance is essential. To ensure it, violence must be kept to a minimum. The ideal coup is swift and bloodless. Very violent coups rarely succeed, and if they trigger a bloody civil war they fail utterly. Luttwak identifies conditions that make countries vulnerable to a coup, and he outlines the necessary stages of planning, from recruitment of coconspirators to postcoup promises of progress and stability. But much more broadly, his investigation of coups-updated for the twenty-first century-uncovers important truths about the nature of political power.

When is it right to go to war? The most persuasive answer to this question has always been 'in self-defense'. In a penetrating new analysis, bringing together moral philosophy, political science, and law, David Rodin shows what's wrong with this answer. He proposes a comprehensive new theory of the right of self-defense which resolves many of the perplexing questions that have dogged both jurists and philosophers.

**SHORTLISTED FOR THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER MEDAL FOR MILITARY LITERATURE** **SHORTLISTED FOR BRITISH ARMY BOOK OF THE YEAR** In the wars in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan and in recent conflicts more generally, liberal powers have blurred the line between military and political activity. Operationally, such blurring is highly effective: it works on the ground. Conversely, in strategic terms, it erases the distinction between war and peace. This, Simpson contends, is undesirable: how can policy control armed force, if armed force is a direct extension of policy? As the information revolution reinforces the politicisation of combat, this is likely to be an irreversible trend. The question this book seeks to answer is not whether the West should engage in such practices, but how to manage, gain advantage from, and mitigate the associated risks. Liberal powers need to win conflicts on the ground, and yet preserve a healthy distinction between war and peace. Failure to preserve that distinction will result in those powers being caught in endless conflicts for which they are operationally ill-equipped. War From The Ground Up offers a distinctive perspective in its consideration of the concept of contemporary warfare. While most accounts of conflict survey the battlefield from an academic perspective, or across it as a personal combat narrative, Simpson looks up from the front line to consider the concepts that put him there, and how they played out.