One of the greatest sources of America's troubles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and New Orleans was the inability of our government's many parts to work well together. Often called interagency operations, applying everything that official Washington can do to keep Americans safe, free, and prosperous, is no easy task. The Pentagon, State Department, Homeland Security, Treasury, FBI, CIA, and other agencies have different capabilities, budgets, cultures, operational styles, Congressional oversight committees, and even operate under different laws. Getting them all organized on battlefields, after disasters, and during other times of crisis is often equated with herding cats. The history of getting government agencies to cooperate is replete with stories of courage, heart-breaking tragedy, and blundering incompetence. To meet the dangers of the 21st century, interagency operations will be more important than ever, yet few Americans understand the troubling history of Washington's failures and the pressing needs for reform. One of the greatest sources of America's troubles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and New Orleans was the inability of our government's many parts to work well together. Often called interagency operations, the coordination of everything official Washington can do to keep Americans safe, free, and prosperous, is no easy task. The Pentagon, State Department, Homeland Security, Treasury, FBI, CIA, and other agencies have different capabilities, budgets, cultures, operational styles, Congressional oversight committees, and even operate under different laws. Getting them all organized on battlefields, after disasters, and during other times of crisis is often equated with herding cats. The history of getting government agencies to cooperate is replete with stories of courage, heart-breaking tragedy, and blundering incompetence. To meet the dangers of the 21st century, interagency operations will be more important than ever, yet few Americans understand the troubling history of Washington's failures and the pressing needs for reform. This book is the first comprehensive history and sober analysis of one of the most pressing national security challenges of the century. The goal is to make a serious and unappreciated subject accessible to a wide audience through a series of engaging and informative historical case studies. The case studies span American history from the turn of the 20th century to today. They cover a variety of subjects from dealing with the great flu epidemic of 1918, to responding to natural disasters at home and abroad, to fighting wars and rebuilding countries after war. Each engaging chapter is a single case study written by a distinguished scholar who covers the historical context, the key players, actions, incidents, and, perhaps most important, lessons learned.

Buddhism has played a significant role in the current global rise in religious nationalism and violence, but the violent aspects of Buddhist tradition have been neglected in the outpouring of academic analyses and case studies of this disturbing trend. This book offers eight essays examining the dark side of a tradition often regarded as the religion of peace. The authors note the conflict between the Buddhist norms of non-violence and the prohibition of the killing of sentient beings and acts of state violence supported by the Buddhist community (sangha), acts of civil violence in which monks participate, and Buddhist intersectarian violence. They consider contemporary and historical cases of Buddhist warfare from a wide range of traditions - Tibetan, Mongolian, Japanese, Chinese, Sri Lankan, and Thai - critically examining both Buddhist textual sources justifying violence and Buddhist actors currently engaged in violence. They draw not only on archival material but interviews with those living and involved in war zones around the world. The book enriches our understanding both of the complexities of the Buddhist tradition and of the violence that is found in virtually all of the world's religious traditions.

Current trends suggest that the fog of war continues to make strategy an opaque enterprise notwithstanding enormous U.S. investments in high-tech weapons, intelligence capabilities, and homeland defense. This edited volume includes essays originally presented at the IISS Global Strategic Review, which was held in Geneva on September 7-9, 2007.

Examines the recent rise in the United States' use of preventive force More so than in the past, the US is now embracing the logic of preventive force: using military force to counter potential threats around the globe before they have fully materialized. While popular with individuals who seek to avoid too many "boots on the ground," preventive force is controversial because of its potential for unnecessary collateral damage. Who decides what threats are 'imminent'? Is there an international legal basis to kill or harm individuals who have a connection to that threat? Do the benefits of preventive force justify the costs? And, perhaps most importantly, is the US setting a dangerous international precedent? In Preventive Force, editors Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer Ramos bring together legal scholars, political scientists, international relations scholars, and prominent defense specialists to examine these questions, whether in the context of full-scale preventive war or preventive drone strikes. In particular, the volume highlights preventive drones strikes, as they mark a complete transformation of how the US understands international norms regarding the use of force, and could potentially lead to a 'slippery slope' for the US and other nations in terms of engaging in preventive warfare as a matter of course. A comprehensive resource that speaks to the contours of preventive force as a security strategy as well as to the practical, legal, and ethical considerations of its implementation, Preventive Force is a useful guide for political scientists, international relations scholars, and policymakers who seek a thorough and current overview of this essential topic.

There are many histories of how wars have begun, but very few which discuss how they have ended. This book fills that gap. Beginning with the Stone Age and ending with globalized terrorism, it addresses the specific issue of surrender, rather than the subsequent establishment of peace. At its heart is the individual warrior or soldier, and his or her decision to lay down arms. In the ancient world surrender led in most cases to slavery, but a slave still lived rather than died. In the modern world international law gives the soldiers rights as prisoners of war, and those rights include the prospect of their eventual return home. But individuals can surrender at any point in a war, and without having such an effect that they end the war. The termination of hostilities depends on a collective act for its consequences to be decisive. It also requires the enemy to accept the offer to surrender in the midst of combat. In other words, like so much else in war, surrender depends on reciprocity - on the readiness of one side to stop fighting and of the other to accept that readiness. This volume argues that surrender is the single biggest contributor to the containment of violence in warfare, offering the vanquished the opportunity to survive and the victor the chance to show moderation and magnanimity. Since the rules of surrender have developed over time, they form a key element in understanding the cultural history of warfare.

As Rynning shows, armed forces have a natural interest in shaping military doctrine according to their resources, doctrinal traditions, as well as their assessment of the international environment. However, armed forces are also the instrument of policy-makers who are in charge of national security. Using civil-military relations in France from 1958 to the present as a case study, he shows when policy-makers are capable of controlling military doctrine as well as the means armed forces rely on to influence doctrine.

Some scholars argue that policy-makers can control military doctrine only when the international environment is threatening--a situation granting them added decision-making authority. Others argue that such control ultimately depends on the degree of domestic political disagreement/consensus. With access to most of the leading military personnel and policy-makers of the era, Rynning provides an analysis that will be instructive to scholars as well as policy-makers and military leaders concerned with contemporary civil-military relations.

The horror of war and its profound impact on children are presented dramatically in the DEGREESIEncyclopedia of Youth and War. DEGREESR This unique encyclopedia offers behind-the-scenes accounts of how young people were both victims of and participants in wars of the 20th century and before.

Blending detailed contextual analysis with issues in modern-day international relations this book provides a major new analysis of the theory of Clausewitz and its relevance to contemporary society. This book argues that Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon's method of waging war, a theory, which is still relevant in light of contemporary conflict. This new interpretation is the result of reflecting on Clausewitz's theory in light of the new developments and lays down the foundation of a general theory of war by concentrating on Clausewitz's historical analyses of war campaigns. For the first time analysis of three paradigmatic military campaigns is placed at the centre of understanding surrounding Clausewitz's 'On War': The author argues that the limitations of Napoleon's strategy, as revealed in Russia and in his final defeat, enabled Clausewitz to develop a general theory of war. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

The end of the Cold War has brought about significant changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural structure of the international system. Absent a distinct enemy and the threat of global thermonuclear war, the United States today faces a host of new security challenges that require policymakers to make difficult decisions with significant domestic and international implications. The range of conflicting goals, expectations, and capabilities demands fresh solutions to international conflicts and civil unrest, new strategies for conducting peace support operations, and the preparation of America's forces for completing operational assignments under increasingly uncertain conditions. The case studies and exercises constructed for this book examine some of the most pertinent management, leadership, and accountability issues related to U.S. national security. Each case places readers at the center of difficult decisions, illustrates more general policy dilemmas, and is designed to stimulate discussion of those issues beyond the classroom. Cases highlight dilemmas at two levels: pertaining specifically to the case and pertaining to its larger policy implications. The absence of a one-sided argument, specific policy recommendations, or "logical" conclusions, enables readers to recognize the importance of the issues at hand and their greater policy implications and to discern lessons that might apply more generally to public policy, administration, and management. Particularly useful in courses dealing with national security, international relations, public/policy administration, civil-military relations, and organizational management. An instructor's manual is available uponrequest.

The Samurai warrior is one of the most famous types of soldier, with his intricate armour, longbow and distinctive katana sword, as well as his strict martial code. But samurai warfare and military culture is much misunderstood in the modern era. In Samurai Weapons & Fighting Techniques, Thomas D. Conlan traces the history and development of samurai warfare over seven centuries, beginning with the historic dominance of the mounted, bow-armed samurai, moving through the introduction of naginata-wielding ashigaru (skirmishers) and pike formations, and finishing with the revolutionary introduction of firearms and cannon. Conlan analyses the success of particular samurai dynasties, such as the Ashikaga, Uesugi and Tokugawa clans, and examines the role of many of the great battlefield commanders - such as Oda Nobunaga, Takeda Shingen and Tokugawa Ieyasu - at key battles like Kawanakajima (1561), Nagashino (1575) and the siege of Osaka (1615). The book is illustrated throughout with more than 300 detailed line drawings and colour photographs showing the weapons, equipment, techniques and tactics of the samurai. Types of armour - such as o-yoroi, haramaki and paper armour - and weapons - such as the tachi long sword, wakizashi short sword and yari (pike) - are depicted in detail. Expertly written, Samurai Weapons & Fighting Techniques is a highly illustrated, accessible introduction to samurai warfare for both the military enthusiast and general reader.

For centuries, the world has witnessed the development and use of increasingly complex and powerful military systems and technologies. In the process, the "art of war" has truly become the art of combined arms warfare, in which infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other key elements are all coordinated for maximum effect. Nowhere has this trend been more visible than in the history of twentieth-century warfare.

Originally published as an essential "in-house" study for U.S. Army officers during the 1980s, this much revised and expanded edition remains the most complete study available on the subject. Rewritten with a much wider readership in mind, it both retains its enormous practical utility for military professionals and provides a valuable and appealing introduction for scholars and general readers.

Jonathan House, author of the original work, brings the story of combined arms up to the present, covering among other things Desert Storm, the war in Chechnya, and the rise of "smart weapons" and related technologies. He traces the evolution of tactics, weapons, and organization in five major militaries -- American, British, German, Russian, and French -- over 100 years of warfare. Revealing both continuities and contrasts within and between these fighting forces, he also provides illuminating glimpses of Israeli and Japanese contributions to combined arms doctrine. Expanding his insightful analysis of the world wars and the wars in Korea and Vietnam, House also offers much new material focused on the post-Vietnam period. Throughout, he analyzes such issues as command-and-control, problems of highly centralized organizations, the development of special operationsforces, advances in weapons technology -- including ballistic and anti-ballistic missile systems -- the trade-offs involved in using "heavy" versus "light" armed forces, and the enduring obstacles to effective cooperation between air and land forces. (His strong critique of the "air superiority" propaganda that came out of the Gulf War is sure to spark some heated debates.)

Rigorously comparative, House's study addresses significant questions about how nations prepare for war, learn or don't learn its harsh lessons, and adapt to changing times and technologies. Unique in the annals of the literature on warfare, it will be the standard work on this subject for a long time to come.

Chatting with notorious war criminal Charles Taylor on the lawn of his presidential mansion as ostriches and armed teenagers strut in the background. Landing in snow-covered Afghanistan weeks after the fall of the Taliban and trying to make sense of a country shattered by years of war. Being held at gunpoint by young soldiers amid the tragedy of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Standing in the middle of a violent riot in the streets of Kathmandu. Having hushed conversations with the widows of Europe's largest massacre since World War II. These are all scenes from The Disaster Gypsies, a compelling personal memoir by a relief worker and conflict specialist who has worked on the ground in a host of war-torn countries. Initially deployed as part of a humanitarian relief team in Rwanda almost by accident, Norris has experienced the tragedies of Rwanda, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Liberia over a span of ten years. Rich with poignant human stories, The Disaster Gypsies captures the reality of modern war with an immediacy and compassion that puts the reader in the front seat for some of the most wrenching events of our times. Norris approaches his story with a unique and dynamic perspective, having worked both in the upper echelons of the U.S. government and in some of the world's most dangerous places. Moving from face-to-face encounters with powerful warlords to quiet moments with the victims of horrific violence, Norris gives readers a behind-the-scenes tour of a world most of them can barely imagine. He makes a compelling argument that these nasty civil wars were often dismissed as tribal, ethnic, or regional disputes by most Americans, when in reality such violence is fundamentallypart of the human condition. That may sound simple or even self-evident, but Norris contends that most people in the United States and Europe continue to view war as something that is outside of themselves and profoundly foreign in its nature, even as their own troops continue to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Has any war in history gone according to plan? Monarchs, autocrats and elected leaders alike have a dismal record on launching and prosecuting wars. From pursuing over- ambitious goals, to making decisions without considering intelligence, terrain, morale or the enemy's capabilities, they have all erred. This not only wastes the lives of civilians, the enemy and one's own soldiers, but also means a failure to accomplish your objectives. Conflict scholar and former soldier Mike Martin takes the reader through the hard, elegant logic of how to fight an interstate war on land, including the factors that are often overlooked: the importance of psychology, training, getting the logistics right, and maintaining your esprit de corps. He then explains how to orchestrate the building blocks of military force--from infantry, artillery and air support, to information and cyber warfare-- in order to prevail over your adversary. 'How to Fight a War' explains in cool and precise prose the art of using extreme violence to convince your enemy that they should submit. It should be read by everyone who seeks to understand today's conflicts and those to come--and by all those who wish to lead us through the next decade of wars.

This book argues that understanding truces is crucial for our ability to wind down wars. We have paid too much attention to the idea of permanent peace, yet few conflicts end in this way. The book describes how truce makers think, which truces can be morally justified and provides a philosophical history of truce making in the Western tradition.

This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series "Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era" by two officers-one from the Philippines and the other from America-who fought as guerrillas against the Japanese occupation and went on to defeat the Huk rebellion after World War II. Unlike many other accounts of counterinsurgency operations that focus on theoretical principles and their tactical applications, the authors examine the means to assess the strengths and weaknesses of insurgencies. An enduring contribution of this book is its emphasis on the importance of intelligence in combating insurgent movements. With a new foreword prepared by Kalev Sepp.

This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era was among the first major published analyses by an American expert on the insurgency in Indochina. In addition to tracing the Chinese influence on the Vietminh cadres and the French military response, the book describes the organization, logistics, and tactics of the communist movement. The author, George Tanham, managed the U.S. rural development program in South Vietnam and later served as special assistant for counterinsurgency at the U.S. Embassy in Thailand during the mid-1960s. With a new foreword by Richard A. Shultz Jr.

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted unprecedented public interest in the ethics of war, a debate that has raged furiously in the media, in politics and in the public consciousness ever since. In this fascinating and informative book, Nicholas Fotion explores the notion of developing an ethical theory that guides the behaviour of those who are at war.Fotion gives a clear account of just war theory, presenting it as a useful device in helping us make decisions about what we should do when war appears on the horizon. Examining conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Israel, the Falklands and Afghanistan, the book interrogates the roles of the various parties involved in military action. Articulate, provocative and stimulating, "War and Ethics" is an ideal introduction to this hugely important debate."Think Now" is a brand new series of stimulating and accessible books examining key contemporary social issues from a philosophical perspective. Written by experts in philosophy, these books offer sophisticated and provocative yet engaging writing on political and cultural themes of genuine concern to the educated reader.

The republics of Greece and Rome proved incapable of waging war effectively and remaining free at the same time. The record of modern republics is not much more encouraging. How, then, did the United States manage to emerge victorious from the world wars of this century, including the Cold War, and still retain its fundamental liberties?

For Karl-Friedrich Walling, this unprecedented accomplishment was the work of many hands and many generations, but of Alexander Hamilton especially. No Founder thought more about the theory and practice of modern war and free government. None supplied advice of more enduring relevance to statesmen faced with the responsibility of providing for the common defense while securing the blessings of liberty to their posterity.

Hamilton's strategic sobriety led many of his contemporaries to view him as an American Caesar, but this revisionist account calls the conventional "militarist" interpretation of Hamilton into question. Hamilton sought to unite the strength necessary for war with the restraint required by the rule of law, popular consent, and individual rights. In the process, he helped found something new, the world's most durable republican empire.

Walling constructs a conversation about war and freedom between Hamilton and the Loyalists, the Anti-Federalists, the Jeffersonians, and other Federalists. Instead of pitting Hamilton's virtues against his opponents' vices (or vice versa), Walling pits Hamilton's virtue of responsibility against the revolutionary virtue of vigilance, a quarrel he believes is inherent to American party government. By reexamining that quarrel in light of the necessities of war and the requirements of liberty, Walling has written the most balanced and moving account of Hamilton so far.

From grassroots terrorism to the nuclear ambitions of hostile nations, the United States faces increasingly complex threats to its national security, and combating these threats continues to demand a reshaping of the nation's security structure, military forces and defense expenditures. In this study, Anthony Cordesman offers a detailed analysis of critical challenges affecting U.S. national security and how failures in adapting to these challenges have exacerbated the strains on available resources. He systematically identifies the most glaring obstacles to successful national security planning and proposes constructive and practical ways to proceed in the future. Cordesman focuses on ten specific challenges, and each is addressed within the context of the Iraq War, Afghan War, War on Terrorism, and the risk of conflict over the Taiwan Straits. Out of the lessons drawn from these experiences, he examines the future of international coalitions, asymmetric warfare, nation building, and stability operations, and concludes that perhaps the most pressing area for change is the need for accountability among civilian and military policymakers.

A generation after the First Gulf War, and in the wake of a decade of counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare, this book explores how the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs continues to shape the way modern militaries across the globe think about, plan and fight wars.

This book aims to serve the military profession, and so the national interest, by helping to generate intelligent reform of how the armed forces train, educate, and promote officers who shape our military strategy and write our war plans. Readers will discover the professional and intellectual improvement that wide reading in the masters of historical narrative offers to them. The first chapter, "Lessons Not Learned," surveys our strategic documents-and their recent applications-and offers criticism and recommendations. The second chapter, "Transformation Ballyhoo," evaluates our current efforts at military transformation and offers an alternative approach to rehabilitating our armed forces. The third chapter, "The Brain of An Army," offers ideas on building a first-rate Joint War College. Chapters four through six focus on military campaigns: France 1940; Stalingrad; North Africa, 1940-43. The theme is that moral and intellectual qualities determine the fate of armies in war, and that material and bureaucratic machinery are not nearly so vital as we seem to think nowadays.

What happened then to the intellectuals who spent their life working and writing about the Cold War when the conflict ended in 1991? Looking at one of the most emblematic American think tanks in recent history, the RAND Corporation, Samaan provides key insights on the evolution of strategic studies in the US in the last two decades. Based on numerous interviews and exclusive archives, this is a detailed analysis of RAND's intellectual and corporate development. But beyond this specific case study, the book is more than a historical portray of a American research center. Through RAND and its relationship with the American military, the author seeks to understand the rules of the 'field' of strategic studies in the United States. Moreover this work allows the readers to better comprehend the way the elements driving the US defense policies since 1989 - the political uncertainty and its doctrinal consequences - shaped major international events in the last two decades.