With armed conflict in the Persian Gulf now upon us, Harvard archaeologist Steven LeBlanc takes a long-term view of the nature and roots of war, presenting a controversial thesis: The notion of the "noble savage" living in peace with one another and in harmony with nature is a fantasy. In "Constant Battles: The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage," LeBlanc contends that warfare and violent conflict have existed throughout human history, and that humans have never lived in ecological balance with nature.
The start of the second major U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf, combined with regular headlines about spiraling environmental destruction, would tempt anyone to conclude that humankind is fast approaching a catastrophic end. But as LeBlanc brilliantly argues, the archaeological record shows that the warfare and ecological destruction we find today fit into patterns of human behavior that have gone on for millions of years.
"Constant Battles" surveys human history in terms of social organization-from hunter gatherers, to tribal agriculturalists, to more complex societies. LeBlanc takes the reader on his own digs around the world -- from New Guinea to the Southwestern U.S. to Turkey -- to show how he has come to discover warfare everywhere at every time. His own fieldwork combined with his archaeological, ethnographic, and historical research, presents a riveting account of how, throughout human history, people always have outgrown the carrying capacity of their environment, which has led to war.
Ultimately, though, LeBlanc's point of view is reassuring and optimistic. As he explains the roots of warfare in human history, he also demonstrates that warfare today has far less impact than it did in the past. He also argues that, as awareness of these patterns and the advantages of modern technology increase, so does our ability to avoid war in the future.

Military conflicts, particularly land combat, possess all of the key attributes of complex adaptive systems: combat forces are composed of many nonlinearly interacting parts and are organized in a dynamic command-and-control hierarchy; local action, which often appears disordered, self-organizes into long-range order; military conflicts, by their nature, proceed far from equilibrium; military forces adapt to a changing combat environment; and there is no master "voice" that dictates the actions of every soldier (i.e., battlefield action is decentralized). Nonetheless, most modern "state of the art" military simulations ignore the self-organizing properties of combat. This book develops the proposition that combat is more like an interpenetration of two living, coevolving fluids rather than an elastic collision between two hard billiard balls. Artificial-life techniques--specifically, multiagent-based models coupled with evolutionary learning algorithms--provide a powerful new approach to understanding the fundamental processes of war. The book introduces an artificial-life model of combat called EINSTein. Recently developed at the Center for Naval Analyses, USA by the author, EINSTein is one of the first systematic attempts to simulate combat on a small-to-medium scale by using autonomous agents to model individual behaviors and personalities rather than hardware. EINSTein shows that many aspects of land combat may be understood as self-organized, emergent phenomena resulting from the dynamic web of interactions among coevolving agents. Thus, its bottom-up, synthesist approach to modeling combat stands in vivid contrast to the current top-down, reductionist approach taken byconventional models. EINSTein is the first step toward a complex-systems-theoretic toolbox for identifying, exploring, and exploiting self-organized emergent patterns of behavior on the real battlefield.

Is war ever a just way to resolve conflict? Diana Francis argues that it is not. With passion and eloquence, she mounts a head-on challenge to the belief that war as an institution is either necessary or effective for good. Refuting the notion that human nature condemns us to perpetual carnage, she argues that we can change the ways we think and the systems we live by. In a tightly reasoned discussion of the ethics of war and peace she asserts that war is a gross denial of the core values on which peace depends, and that the Just War Theory has failed and deceived us. The book explores alternative ways of confronting aggression and injustice, showing that these are neglected but well proven. Francis argues that our security can be enhanced by recognition of our shared responsibility for each other and our planet. Practical solutions require a new level of participation in public affairs. Recent events have shown that this is possible. Francis outlines the steps we must take to bring about the radical shift so urgently needed.

This is one of the most significant military books of the twentieth century. By an outstanding soldier of independent mind, it pushed forward the evolution of land warfare and was directly responsible for German armoured supremacy in the early years of the Second World War. Published in 1937, the result of 15 years of careful study since his days on the German General Staff in the First World War, Achtung Panzer! argues how vital the proper use of tanks and supporting armoured vehicles would be in the conduct of a future war. When that war came, just two years later, he proved it, leading his Panzers with distinction in the Polish, French and Russian campaigns. Panzer warfare had come of age, exactly as he had forecast.This first English translation of Heinz Guderian's classic book - used as a textbook by Panzer officers in the war - has an introduction and extensive background notes by the modern English historian Paul Harris.

In the spring of 1987, the father of China's strategic missile program, Qian Xuesen, told colleagues that China must steel itself for a century of sustained "intellectual warfare." His use of a military metaphor was not a linguistic quirk, but reflected the central role of the military in China's emergence as a modern state, especially in the period since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Over the course of the Communist era, a uniquely military approach to China's development became embedded in the ideologies of the country's political leadership, in policy choices about national security and economic development, and in the organizational solutions adopted to put these policies into practice.
This book tells the story of how and why the Chinese military came to play such a powerful role in China's economic and institutional development. It weaves together four stories: Chinese views of technology since 1950, the role of the military in China's political and economic life, the evolution of open and flexible conceptions of public management in China, and the technological dimensions of the rise of Chinese power.
But the book primarily explores and explains a paradox. This military approach to technology and development emerged during China's period of greatest external threat, 1950-69. Yet these policies and management methods persist even as China enjoys perhaps its most benign strategic environment since the 1840s.

The essays in this compelling collection examine the period between the two world wars of the twentieth century; one of the most exciting in the history of war. They explore the lingering consequences of World War I; the intellectual efforts to analyze this conflict's military significance; the attempts to plan for another general war; and several episodes in the 1930s that portended the war that erupted in 1939.

This work explains why the concern to minimize civilian casualties is solidly based in Western civilization's most fundamental principles of justice. The author interprets Augustine's just war theory, Vitoria and Suarez's "transitional" model of war, and offers explanation for the modern characterization of the combatant as a depersonalized instrument.

Over recent decades, John W. Dower, one of America's preeminent historians, has addressed the roots and consequences of war from multiple perspectives. In War Without Mercy (1986), winner of the National Book Critics Circle Award, he described and analyzed the brutality that attended World War II in the Pacific, as seen from both the Japanese and the American sides. Embracing Defeat (1999), winner of numerous honors including the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award, dealt with Japan's struggle to start over in a shattered land in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, when the defeated country was occupied by the U.S.-led Allied powers. Turning to an even larger canvas, Dower now examines the cultures of war revealed by four powerful events-Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, and the invasion of Iraq in the name of a war on terror. The list of issues examined and themes explored is wide-ranging: failures of intelligence and imagination, wars of choice and "strategic imbecilities," faith-based secular thinking as well as more overtly holy wars, the targeting of noncombatants, and the almost irresistible logic-and allure-of mass destruction. Dower's new work also sets the U.S. occupations of Japan and Iraq side by side in strikingly original ways. One of the most important books of this decade, Cultures of War offers comparative insights into individual and institutional behavior and pathologies that transcend "cultures" in the more traditional sense, and that ultimately go beyond war-making alone.

NATO's military interventions in the Balkans have transformed the alliance. As the alliance goes East, its members are compelled to rethink NATO's, and each member nation's, military and political roles. Providing a well-rounded study of continuing change in the contemporary North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this book is constructed around eight essays by European security experts analyzing challenges confronting the Atlantic Alliance as a military alliance and as a collective security organization dealing simultaneously with deterrence, enlargement, and regional crisis intervention. It is intended for senior undergraduate and graduate students in international relations, American foreign policy, European studies, security and strategic studies.

The evidence is that NATO will undergo many more changes responding to actual and potential threats to Europe's peace. These range from a revival of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia to the proliferation and possible use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Also discussed is the matter of NATO's further enlargement and the question of whether this offers more or less security to the alliance membership, as are the emerging tensions between the EU and NATO security regimes.

In the past, posits Christopher Coker, wars were all-encompassing; they were a test not only of individual bravery, but of an entire community's will to survive. In the West today, in contrast, wars are tools of foreign policy, not intrinsic to the values of a society - they are instrumental rather than existential. The clash between these two ""cultures of war"" can be seen starkly in the recent struggle in Afghanistan. In this text, Coker offers both a history of martial cultures and an analysis of how these are now changing. He locates the origins of the Western way of war in ancient Greece: for example, in the heroic ideals of Homer's Iliad. He then traces the development of this warrior spirit, moving from Rome's systemization of violence to encounters with such alternative ways of war as Sun Tzu's, the Islamic tradition, and Japan's kamikaze actions during World War II. This trajectory, he finds, ends in a crucial contemporary fault line: for the first time in history, war is no longer considered humankind's most revealing behaviour.

This is Grady McWhiney at his finest. Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers is a collection of seventeen essays on a wide variety of topics relating to Confederate leadership and war-making.

The role of culture in the coming of the war is explored in depth as are the differences between Southern "Crackers" and "Cavaliers". Battlefield leadership is also discussed, including pieces on A. P. Hill, P. G. T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, and Leonidas Polk.

Other important essays include work on why the South fired the first shot of the war, how 1862 was actually the "doom year" of the Confederacy, and a treatment of the tactical revolution that occurred between the beginning of the Mexican War and the end of the Civil War. There are more than a few surprises. One chapter, entitled "Sex and Chivalry", investigates the role of West Point in shaping the deportment of America's class of military gentlemen.

Jefferson Davis, though, looms largest in this book. From his days along the banks of the Hudson, to his service in Mexico, to an analysis of his war leadership as president of the Confederacy, McWhiney investigates this tarnished American hero whom, the author claims, has been almost as vilified by Americans as Adolf Hitler.

McWhiney is known for his unconventional stances. While his work is sometimes controversial, often hotly debated, and nearly always provacative, it can never be ignored. After a long sabbatical from publishing, this astonishing author and historian is back at work.

Here, Philip Windsor explores the emergence, meaning, and significance of the Cold War mentality. Tracing the evolution of strategic thinking from its origins in medieval Europe to the demise of the Cold War, he considers the peculiar character and autonomy that strategy acquired in the nuclear age. Windsor is concerned with changes in our understanding of war and strategy - changes, he argues, that resulted less from technological innovation per se than from the combined effects of technological, social, and political transformations. This process culminated in the nuclear age, when strategic thinking became ""self-referring and self-legitimating"" and strategic considerations emerged as ""the decisive force in the conduct of the politics of states and blocs"". The book addresses many of the themes that preoccupied Windsor throughout his academic career and on which his reflections threw such penetrating light: Soviet strategic thought, arms control, the role of alliances, the guerilla phenomenon, and the rationality and ethics of nuclear deterrence. The final chapter explores the implications of the end of the Cold War for the future of strategic studies.

Peimani challenges the practical indifference of many Western and non-Western countries with interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus to their plight. Independence in 1991 suddenly worsened all the economic and social problems of the countries of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Their failure to address their numerous economic problems and to develop their economies has created a suitable ground for the rise of social and political popular dissent, including ethnic conflicts, in all these multi-ethnic countries.

Concerned about the stability of their political systems, their ruling elites have all opted for authoritarianism. The prevailing intolerance of dissent and the suppression of opposition, political parties have paved the way for the emergence of anti-government extremist ideologies and political groups. The domestic situation has become ripe for the rise of violent political activities and ethnic conflicts, with a great possibility for their escalation to civil wars. The ethnic structure of both the Caucasus and Central Asia makes their development into inter-state wars a strong possibility. The unsettled ethnic and territorial conflicts within and between countries, which turned into wars in the early 1990s, could easily re-emerge. There is a potential for the further escalation of military conflicts in those regions because of the intentional or unintentional intervention of Iran, China, Turkey, Russia, and the United States, which have long-term interests in the two regions. Given the geographical characteristics of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a link between Asia and Europe, war and instability in those regions could destabilize the two continents hosting six declared nuclear powers. Of particular interest to scholars and other researchers involved with Eurasian, Central Asian, and Caucasian countries.

Here, Philip Windsor explores the emergence, meaning, and significance of the Cold War mentality. Tracing the evolution of strategic thinking from its origins in medieval Europe to the demise of the Cold War, he considers the peculiar character and autonomy that strategy acquired in the nuclear age. Windsor is concerned with changes in our understanding of war and strategy - changes, he argues, that resulted less from technological innovation per se than from the combined effects of technological, social, and political transformations. This process culminated in the nuclear age, when strategic thinking became ""self-referring and self-legitimating"" and strategic considerations emerged as ""the decisive force in the conduct of the politics of states and blocs"". The book addresses many of the themes that preoccupied Windsor throughout his academic career and on which his reflections threw such penetrating light: Soviet strategic thought, arms control, the role of alliances, the guerilla phenomenon, and the rationality and ethics of nuclear deterrence. The final chapter explores the implications of the end of the Cold War for the future of strategic studies.

At the end of a century dominated by global conflict - and despite the unchanging nature of the human suffering it causes - the nature of war itself, argues Colin McInnes, has been transformed. McInnes considers the key developments that have led to this metamorphosis: the possibility of a major war in the West has become remote, and the limited Cold War conflicts in which superpower rivalries were played out have been succeeded by local conflicts with little or no potential for escalation. There has been a change in the relationship between war and society, with wars now fought by specialized professionals and viewed from a safe distance on television. Simultaneously, technological developments have made it easier for Western states to minimize the risks to their combatants, keeping casualities at a level that their citizens will tolerate. War, in short, has entered a new era. For only a small minority in the West does it have any direct meaning - it is no longer participatory for Western society as a whole, but has become for too many a kind of spectator sport. The implications of this phenomenon, for both the military and the broader community, are explored in the final chapter of the book.

This book treats the critical theory of religion of Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, J rgen Habermas and other critical theorists who tried to make sense out of the senseless war experience by exploring the writings of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich W.J. Schelling, Georg W.F. Hegel, Artur Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud.

In the capstone work of his career, distinguished military historian Jay Luvaas brings together in one volume the military genius of Napoleon.

Unlike Sun Tzu or Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon never wrote a unified essay on his military philosophy. Yet, as one of the world's great strategists and tacticians, he sprinkled wisdom throughout his many and varied writings. Jay Luvaas spent over three decades poring through the thirty-two volumes of Napoleon's correspondence, carefully translating and editing all of his writings on the art of war, and arranging them into seamless essays. The resulting book captures the brilliant commander's thoughts on everything from the preparation of his forces to the organization, planning, and execution of his battles -- all buttressing Napoleon's view that "in war there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it." Napoleon on the Art of War will be essential reading for military buffs, students of history, and any business leader looking for timeless insights on strategy.

As Rynning shows, armed forces have a natural interest in shaping military doctrine according to their resources, doctrinal traditions, as well as their assessment of the international environment. However, armed forces are also the instrument of policy-makers who are in charge of national security. Using civil-military relations in France from 1958 to the present as a case study, he shows when policy-makers are capable of controlling military doctrine as well as the means armed forces rely on to influence doctrine.

Some scholars argue that policy-makers can control military doctrine only when the international environment is threatening--a situation granting them added decision-making authority. Others argue that such control ultimately depends on the degree of domestic political disagreement/consensus. With access to most of the leading military personnel and policy-makers of the era, Rynning provides an analysis that will be instructive to scholars as well as policy-makers and military leaders concerned with contemporary civil-military relations.

Truppenfuehrung, the 20th-century equivalent of Sun Tzu's ""Art of War"", served as the basic manual for the German army from 1934 to the end of World War II. This document provided the doctrinal framework for blitzkrieg and, as a consequence, for the victories of Hitler's armies. Rather than giving German military leaders a ""cookbook"" on how to win battles, the manual offered instead a set of intellectual tools to be applied to complex and continually changing battle conditions. The keys to understanding the psychology, philosophy and social values of the German army that fought World War II are to be found here. This English-language translation is annotated to help the reader understand its military and social context.