Over recent decades, John W. Dower, one of America's preeminent historians, has addressed the roots and consequences of war from multiple perspectives. In War Without Mercy (1986), winner of the National Book Critics Circle Award, he described and analyzed the brutality that attended World War II in the Pacific, as seen from both the Japanese and the American sides. Embracing Defeat (1999), winner of numerous honors including the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award, dealt with Japan's struggle to start over in a shattered land in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, when the defeated country was occupied by the U.S.-led Allied powers. Turning to an even larger canvas, Dower now examines the cultures of war revealed by four powerful events-Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, and the invasion of Iraq in the name of a war on terror. The list of issues examined and themes explored is wide-ranging: failures of intelligence and imagination, wars of choice and "strategic imbecilities," faith-based secular thinking as well as more overtly holy wars, the targeting of noncombatants, and the almost irresistible logic-and allure-of mass destruction. Dower's new work also sets the U.S. occupations of Japan and Iraq side by side in strikingly original ways. One of the most important books of this decade, Cultures of War offers comparative insights into individual and institutional behavior and pathologies that transcend "cultures" in the more traditional sense, and that ultimately go beyond war-making alone.

NATO's military interventions in the Balkans have transformed the alliance. As the alliance goes East, its members are compelled to rethink NATO's, and each member nation's, military and political roles. Providing a well-rounded study of continuing change in the contemporary North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this book is constructed around eight essays by European security experts analyzing challenges confronting the Atlantic Alliance as a military alliance and as a collective security organization dealing simultaneously with deterrence, enlargement, and regional crisis intervention. It is intended for senior undergraduate and graduate students in international relations, American foreign policy, European studies, security and strategic studies.

The evidence is that NATO will undergo many more changes responding to actual and potential threats to Europe's peace. These range from a revival of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia to the proliferation and possible use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Also discussed is the matter of NATO's further enlargement and the question of whether this offers more or less security to the alliance membership, as are the emerging tensions between the EU and NATO security regimes.

In the past, posits Christopher Coker, wars were all-encompassing; they were a test not only of individual bravery, but of an entire community's will to survive. In the West today, in contrast, wars are tools of foreign policy, not intrinsic to the values of a society - they are instrumental rather than existential. The clash between these two ""cultures of war"" can be seen starkly in the recent struggle in Afghanistan. In this text, Coker offers both a history of martial cultures and an analysis of how these are now changing. He locates the origins of the Western way of war in ancient Greece: for example, in the heroic ideals of Homer's Iliad. He then traces the development of this warrior spirit, moving from Rome's systemization of violence to encounters with such alternative ways of war as Sun Tzu's, the Islamic tradition, and Japan's kamikaze actions during World War II. This trajectory, he finds, ends in a crucial contemporary fault line: for the first time in history, war is no longer considered humankind's most revealing behaviour.

This is Grady McWhiney at his finest. Confederate Crackers and Cavaliers is a collection of seventeen essays on a wide variety of topics relating to Confederate leadership and war-making.

The role of culture in the coming of the war is explored in depth as are the differences between Southern "Crackers" and "Cavaliers". Battlefield leadership is also discussed, including pieces on A. P. Hill, P. G. T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, and Leonidas Polk.

Other important essays include work on why the South fired the first shot of the war, how 1862 was actually the "doom year" of the Confederacy, and a treatment of the tactical revolution that occurred between the beginning of the Mexican War and the end of the Civil War. There are more than a few surprises. One chapter, entitled "Sex and Chivalry", investigates the role of West Point in shaping the deportment of America's class of military gentlemen.

Jefferson Davis, though, looms largest in this book. From his days along the banks of the Hudson, to his service in Mexico, to an analysis of his war leadership as president of the Confederacy, McWhiney investigates this tarnished American hero whom, the author claims, has been almost as vilified by Americans as Adolf Hitler.

McWhiney is known for his unconventional stances. While his work is sometimes controversial, often hotly debated, and nearly always provacative, it can never be ignored. After a long sabbatical from publishing, this astonishing author and historian is back at work.

Here, Philip Windsor explores the emergence, meaning, and significance of the Cold War mentality. Tracing the evolution of strategic thinking from its origins in medieval Europe to the demise of the Cold War, he considers the peculiar character and autonomy that strategy acquired in the nuclear age. Windsor is concerned with changes in our understanding of war and strategy - changes, he argues, that resulted less from technological innovation per se than from the combined effects of technological, social, and political transformations. This process culminated in the nuclear age, when strategic thinking became ""self-referring and self-legitimating"" and strategic considerations emerged as ""the decisive force in the conduct of the politics of states and blocs"". The book addresses many of the themes that preoccupied Windsor throughout his academic career and on which his reflections threw such penetrating light: Soviet strategic thought, arms control, the role of alliances, the guerilla phenomenon, and the rationality and ethics of nuclear deterrence. The final chapter explores the implications of the end of the Cold War for the future of strategic studies.

Peimani challenges the practical indifference of many Western and non-Western countries with interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus to their plight. Independence in 1991 suddenly worsened all the economic and social problems of the countries of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Their failure to address their numerous economic problems and to develop their economies has created a suitable ground for the rise of social and political popular dissent, including ethnic conflicts, in all these multi-ethnic countries.

Concerned about the stability of their political systems, their ruling elites have all opted for authoritarianism. The prevailing intolerance of dissent and the suppression of opposition, political parties have paved the way for the emergence of anti-government extremist ideologies and political groups. The domestic situation has become ripe for the rise of violent political activities and ethnic conflicts, with a great possibility for their escalation to civil wars. The ethnic structure of both the Caucasus and Central Asia makes their development into inter-state wars a strong possibility. The unsettled ethnic and territorial conflicts within and between countries, which turned into wars in the early 1990s, could easily re-emerge. There is a potential for the further escalation of military conflicts in those regions because of the intentional or unintentional intervention of Iran, China, Turkey, Russia, and the United States, which have long-term interests in the two regions. Given the geographical characteristics of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a link between Asia and Europe, war and instability in those regions could destabilize the two continents hosting six declared nuclear powers. Of particular interest to scholars and other researchers involved with Eurasian, Central Asian, and Caucasian countries.

Here, Philip Windsor explores the emergence, meaning, and significance of the Cold War mentality. Tracing the evolution of strategic thinking from its origins in medieval Europe to the demise of the Cold War, he considers the peculiar character and autonomy that strategy acquired in the nuclear age. Windsor is concerned with changes in our understanding of war and strategy - changes, he argues, that resulted less from technological innovation per se than from the combined effects of technological, social, and political transformations. This process culminated in the nuclear age, when strategic thinking became ""self-referring and self-legitimating"" and strategic considerations emerged as ""the decisive force in the conduct of the politics of states and blocs"". The book addresses many of the themes that preoccupied Windsor throughout his academic career and on which his reflections threw such penetrating light: Soviet strategic thought, arms control, the role of alliances, the guerilla phenomenon, and the rationality and ethics of nuclear deterrence. The final chapter explores the implications of the end of the Cold War for the future of strategic studies.

At the end of a century dominated by global conflict - and despite the unchanging nature of the human suffering it causes - the nature of war itself, argues Colin McInnes, has been transformed. McInnes considers the key developments that have led to this metamorphosis: the possibility of a major war in the West has become remote, and the limited Cold War conflicts in which superpower rivalries were played out have been succeeded by local conflicts with little or no potential for escalation. There has been a change in the relationship between war and society, with wars now fought by specialized professionals and viewed from a safe distance on television. Simultaneously, technological developments have made it easier for Western states to minimize the risks to their combatants, keeping casualities at a level that their citizens will tolerate. War, in short, has entered a new era. For only a small minority in the West does it have any direct meaning - it is no longer participatory for Western society as a whole, but has become for too many a kind of spectator sport. The implications of this phenomenon, for both the military and the broader community, are explored in the final chapter of the book.

This book treats the critical theory of religion of Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Alfred Sohn-Rethel, J rgen Habermas and other critical theorists who tried to make sense out of the senseless war experience by exploring the writings of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich W.J. Schelling, Georg W.F. Hegel, Artur Schopenhauer, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud.

In the capstone work of his career, distinguished military historian Jay Luvaas brings together in one volume the military genius of Napoleon.

Unlike Sun Tzu or Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon never wrote a unified essay on his military philosophy. Yet, as one of the world's great strategists and tacticians, he sprinkled wisdom throughout his many and varied writings. Jay Luvaas spent over three decades poring through the thirty-two volumes of Napoleon's correspondence, carefully translating and editing all of his writings on the art of war, and arranging them into seamless essays. The resulting book captures the brilliant commander's thoughts on everything from the preparation of his forces to the organization, planning, and execution of his battles -- all buttressing Napoleon's view that "in war there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it." Napoleon on the Art of War will be essential reading for military buffs, students of history, and any business leader looking for timeless insights on strategy.

As Rynning shows, armed forces have a natural interest in shaping military doctrine according to their resources, doctrinal traditions, as well as their assessment of the international environment. However, armed forces are also the instrument of policy-makers who are in charge of national security. Using civil-military relations in France from 1958 to the present as a case study, he shows when policy-makers are capable of controlling military doctrine as well as the means armed forces rely on to influence doctrine.

Some scholars argue that policy-makers can control military doctrine only when the international environment is threatening--a situation granting them added decision-making authority. Others argue that such control ultimately depends on the degree of domestic political disagreement/consensus. With access to most of the leading military personnel and policy-makers of the era, Rynning provides an analysis that will be instructive to scholars as well as policy-makers and military leaders concerned with contemporary civil-military relations.

Truppenfuehrung, the 20th-century equivalent of Sun Tzu's ""Art of War"", served as the basic manual for the German army from 1934 to the end of World War II. This document provided the doctrinal framework for blitzkrieg and, as a consequence, for the victories of Hitler's armies. Rather than giving German military leaders a ""cookbook"" on how to win battles, the manual offered instead a set of intellectual tools to be applied to complex and continually changing battle conditions. The keys to understanding the psychology, philosophy and social values of the German army that fought World War II are to be found here. This English-language translation is annotated to help the reader understand its military and social context.

In the first half of the twentieth century, both czarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, were confronted with the problem of conducting military operations involving mass armies along the broad fronts, a characteristic of modern war. Despite the ideological and technological differences between the two regimes, both strove toward a theory which became known as operational art-that level of warfare that links strategic goals to actual combat engagements.

From the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, through World War I, the civil war, and to the eve of World War II, modern operational art grew from theoretical speculations by a small group of officers to become a critical component of the Soviet art of war. In this first comprehensive treatment of the subject, Richard Harrison shows how this theory emerged and developed to become--despite radically different political settings and levels of technology--essential to the Red Army's victory over Germany in World War II.

Tracking both continuity and divergence between the imperial and Red armies, Harrison analyzes, on the basis of theoretical writings and battlefield performance, the development of such operationally significant phenomena as the "front" (group of armies), consecutive operations, and the deep operation, which relied upon aircraft and mechanized formations to penetrate the kind of intractable defense systems that characterized so much of World War I.

Drawing upon a wide range of sources, including memoirs, theoretical works, and materials from the Russian military archives (many presented here for the first time), Harrison traces the debates within the Russian and Soviet armies that engaged such theorists as Neznamov, Svechin, Triandafillov, and Isserson. The end result is an exemplary military intellectual history that helps illuminate a critical element in the "Russian way of war."

The writings of Carl von Clausewitz loom so large in the annals of military theory that they obscure the substantial contributions of thinkers who came after him. This is especially true for those German theorists who wrote during the half century preceding World War I. However, as Antulio Echevarria argues, although none of those thinkers approached Clausewitz's stature, they were nonetheless theorists of considerable vision.

The Kaiser's theorists have long been portrayed as narrow-minded thinkers rigidly attached to an outmoded way of war, little altered since Napoleon's time. According to this view, they ignored or simply failed to understand how industrialization and modernization had transformed the conduct of war. They seemed unaware of how numerous advances in technology and weaponry had so increased the power of the defensive that decisive victory had become virtually impossible.

But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists--Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoenig, and their American and European counterparts-were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield.

Among other things, they underscored the emerging need for synchronizing concentrated firepower with rapid troop movements, as well as the necessity of a decentralized command scheme in order to cope with the greater tempo, lethality, and scope of modern warfare. In effect, they redefined the essential relations among the combined arms of infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

Echevarria goes on to suggest that attempts to apply new military theories and doctrine were uneven due to deficiencies in training and an overall lack of interest in theory among younger officers. It is this failure of application, more than the theories themselves, that are responsible for the ruinous slaughter of World War I.

The characteristic act of men at war is not dying, but killing. Politicians and military historians may gloss over human slaughter, emphasizing the defense of national honor, but for men in active service, warfare means being - or becoming - efficient killers. In "An Intimate History of Killing," historian Joanna Bourke asks: What are the social and psychological dynamics of becoming the best "citizen soldiers?" What kind of men become the best killers? How do they readjust to civilian life?These questions are answered in this groundbreaking new work that won, while still in manuscript, the Fraenkel Prize for Contemporary History. Excerpting from letters, diaries, memoirs, and reports of British, American, and Australian veterans of three wars (World War I, World War II, and Vietnam), Bourke concludes that the structure of war encourages pleasure in killing and that perfectly ordinary, gentle human beings can, and often do, become enthusiastic killers without being brutalized.This graphic, unromanticized look at men at war is sure to revise many long-held beliefs about the nature of violence.

For many years, scholars and non-scholars have debated the ethics of dropping the atomic bomb, but have rarely studied American plans to invade Japan - the alternative to using the bomb to end World War II. Widely held beliefs about Japanese forces and the projected loss of American lives have been invoked to justify the decision to drop the bomb. This examination argues that the invasion plan, code-named ""Operation Downfall"", has not until now been sufficiently studied to allow such a justification.

In this innovative theoretical book, Elizabeth Kier uses a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Kier argues instead that a military's culture affects its choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Drawing on organizational theory, she demonstrates that military organizations differ in their worldview and the proper conduct of their mission. It is this organizational culture that shapes how the military responds to constraints, such as terms of conscription set by civilian policymakers. In richly detailed case studies, Kier examines doctrinal developments in France and Great Britain during the interwar period. She tests her cultural argument against the two most powerful alternative explanations and illustrates that neither the functional needs of military organizations nor the structural demands of the international system can explain doctrinal choice. She also reveals as a myth the argument that the lessons of World War I explain the defensive doctrines in World War II. Imagining War addresses two important debates. It tackles a central debate in security studies: the origins of military doctrine. And by showing the power of a cultural approach, it offers an alternative to the prevailing rationalist explanations of international politics. Originally published in 1999. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Brahmand World Defence Update 2019 provides a comprehensive assessment of the present day global military order with a focus on each nation's military capabilities, new arms acquisitions and defence spending. The eighth edition of the yearbook featuring a new chapter on air and missile defence systems of China, India, Israel, Japan, Russia and the USA - a chapter that promises to add fresh impetus to the book by focusing on major countries' various missile defence systems and their latest advancements that can influence the battlefield to tomorrow. The yearbook also contains the latest information on defence capabilities of 113 countries and has highlighted 33 important countries with their geopolitical importance, internal and external conflict areas, threat perspectives, strategic relations, multilateral alliances, defence capabilities including strategic forces and defence deals.

The author recalls those occasions in European history when states had to choose whether to wage war on land, or on the sea, and latterly in the air as well. He describes the results of their decisions about allocating defence resources and considers whether a different mix of land, sea and air forces might have produced different results. This survey of defence strategy starts in 490 BC with the Persian invasion of Greece and ends with some remarks about strategic choices after the Cold War.