China is modernizing her military very rapidly and as her economy strengthens, the pace of military modernization is going to touch higher trajectories. This modernization would impact and alter the existing strategic environment in the world. In the region the impact will be more profound and will force her neighbors to rework their own military modernization programs, war fighting doctrines and their present position on relations with China and other regional powers and the US. Today, in addition to issues relating to human resource development, the biggest impediment is the availability of technology to develop new modern weapon systems and equipment. Will the drivers and trends of Chinese military modernization continue to be same or will there be changes? How will the modernization impact the PLA behavior, especially in its neighborhood? How will the neighbors react to this stupendous pace of militarization in the East Asia? What will be the role of Japan, Vietnam, India, Russia and US? How will china's restive periphery and PLA respond to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism? To correctly appreciate these changes, an in-depth understanding of Chinese military modernization is essential. This book is an effort in this direction and attempts to find some answers to the questions posed. The trends of modernization of the four services of the PLA have been analyzed and a capability suggested that the PLA is likely to have by 2025.

About the Allies' victory in the Pacific in WWII, it goes almost without question that Japan's defeat was inevitable in the face of overwhelming American military might and economic power. But the outcome, Michael W. Myers contends, was actually anything but inevitable. This book is Myers's thorough and deeply informed explanation of how contingent the "foregone conclusion" of the war in the Pacific really was. However disproportionate their respective resources, both Japan and the Allied forces confronted significant obstacles to ultimate victory. One the two sides shared, Myers shows, was the lack of a single individual with the knowledge, vision, and authority to formulate and implement effective strategy. Both exercised leadership by committee, and Myers cogently explains how this contributed to the contingent nature of the conflict. A remarkable exercise in logical methods of strategic thinking, his book analyzes decisive campaigns in the Pacific War, examining the economic and strategic challenges that both sides faced and had to overcome to achieve victory. Japan, for instance, had two goals going into the war: to expand the boundaries of what they termed the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and to end their long and frustrating war in China. These goals, as Myers shows us, had unforeseen and devastating logistical and strategic consequences. But the United States faced similar problems-as well as other hurdles specific to a nation not yet on full war footing. Overturning conventional historiography, The Pacific War and Contingent Victory clarifies the proper relationship between freedom and determinism in historical thinking. A compelling retelling of the Pacific war that might easily have been, the book offers historical lessons in thinking about contemporary American foreign policy and American exceptionalism-most saliently about the dangers of the presumption of American ascendancy.

Reflections on War is a comprehensive and objective investigation into the problems of war. The book explores the crucial link between theory, strategy and objectives in war, taking all the evidence and theory into account, and should be of interest to military practitioners, specialists in defence studies, and others interested in military history. Also notable about the work is its ability to draw insights together from international legal theory, management sciences, history, sociology and the political economy of war – showing due respect for the moral complexities involved in waging war.

This book is the result of its author's determination to understand the phenomenon of war, a determination which has been one of the driving forces of his life for over half a century. It has taken well over ten years to write.
In this book two basic types of conflict are defined, primary and secondary warfare. The study mostly covers secondary warfare which is considered in terms of the army/government/people triad, both in the context of conventional war between countries, and guerrilla insurrections within countries.
Each aspect of warfare is illustrated, and each conclusion is backed up, with copious examples.
The final conclusion of the endemic nature of warfare will not please many people who read it, but if it has the effect of causing them to be much more critical of various government policies then this book can be regarded as a success.

Drones have become the controversial new weapon of choice for the US military abroad. Unmanned details the causes and deadly consequences of this terrifying new development in warfare, and explores the implications for international law and global peace. Ann Rogers and John Hill argue that drones represent the first truly globalised technology of war. The book shows how unmanned systems are changing not simply how wars are fought, but the meaning of conflict itself. Providing an unparalleled account of new forms of 21st century imperial warfare, Unmanned shows how drone systems dissolve the conventional obstacles of time and space that have traditionally shaped conflict in the international system. It considers the possibility that these weapons will become normalised in global conflict, raising the spectre of new, unpredictable and unaccountable forms of warfare.

This book focuses on the relevance of space as a new domain towards enhancing war fighting capabilities. The Cold War saw rapid development of space technologies, which in turn spurred the growth of satellites. Slowly the traditional military capabilities for C4ISR were transferred to the space, the 'Ultimate High Ground.' The use of navigation and communication satellites in direct support to the US war efforts was visible during Gulf War I, which is aptly referred as "First Space War." The book delves at length about the Chinese Space Programme and their military exploits. Apart from militarization, the Chinese went ahead with weaponization of space, in order to gain asymmetric advantages over the much stronger and technologically advance US capabilities. The existing and futuristic military exploits of space assets by India has also been discussed in this book. A case for an "Indian Space Security Architecture" has been proposed, which shall secure the Indian space assets and provide comprehensive National Security. This book also highlights the necessity and urgency of Indian ASAT, as a strategic deterrence, to counter the threat to our space assets from the Chinese ASATs.

The text for the NEW SOLDIER deals with the causes, symptoms and solutions to global terrorism, particularly Jihadist Islamic-based terrorism. The book is an expanded version of the essay "A Fearful Symmetry: A New Global Balance of Power?" for which the author was awarded the 2007 Grand Prize by the St Cyr Foundation, which supports the St. Cyr military academy established by Napoleon Bonaparte - in effect, France's West Point. The work was unanimously awarded the First (Grand) Prize by a jury of four distinguished panelists, and later translated and published in French under the title, "Une Symetrie de la Peur : Vers un Nouvel Equilibre Mondial Des Puissances ? " (Paul Wormser, trans.)(CLD Editions, November 2008). The New Soldier is, in essence, a traditional soldier but one who is endowed with compassion, empathy and cultural understanding. This soldier is better able to navigate through the unknown terrain of ideological, emotional and psychological conflicts within the realm of global terrorism. The New Soldier is a strategic tool in combating global terrorism, and may be immediately deployed in multilateral forces. The practical uses of the New Soldier in the context of fragile states, particularly in terms of stabilizing and reconstructing war-torn or collapsed states by multilateral forces is analyzed in great depth in the book.

Any state at war attempts to steer the conflict to the point where it can demonstrate its relative advantage. Thus underlying each war is a struggle over its particular nature, and in a dynamic process each side attempts to shape a war paradigm that suits its own relative strengths, while the adversary attempts to impose its preferred paradigm on the conflict. Israel, for example, seemingly has an edge in military effectiveness, and has therefore always preferred short, decisive wars. Its enemies, however, have an overall advantage in stamina and ability to leverage the international system. They therefore strive to lengthen the war and bring Israel to the point of defeat through attrition of the Israeli political-civilian system. In this book, Ron Tira examines the different aspects that characterise a war, from the centre of gravity to be attacked to the elements constituting military decision, as they are manifested in "simple" symmetrical wars; asymmetrical wars versus a state opponent; guerrilla warfare; parallel warfare; and next generation warfare. The author first surveys types of war and the circumstances whereby the classical doctrine of war is progressively less valid, and then devises additional analytical tools necessary to understand these more complex conflicts. The study examines the relevance of classical doctrine and applies these new tools and concepts to a range of historical examples, from the Second Punic War to World War II to some of Israel's main wars. The final case evaluated is the next generation of wars that Israel and other Western countries may find themselves fighting -- wars against states that have adopted the guerrilla paradigm. Published in association with the Institute for National Security Studies, Israel.

Policy-makers generally believe that science and technology can and will play significant roles in improving homeland security. When Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it included the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) to ensure that the new department had access to science and technology advice and capabilities for research and development (R&D). The S&T Directorate is the primary organisation for R&D in the DHS. It conducts R&D in several DHS laboratories and funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national laboratories, academia, and the private sector. Additionally, the directorate supports the development of operational requirements and oversees the operational testing and evaluation of homeland security systems for the DHS. This book provides a brief overview of the S&T Directorate's mission, organisation, and budgetary structure; a discussion of selected critiques of the S&T Directorate; and an analysis of selected issues facing congressional policy-makers.

This study aims to identify patterns of warfare in the southern French Iron Age through examination of the documentary, settlement, iconographic and osteological evidence for warfare in this region, each within its chronological context and in tandem with one another. The Iron Age of southern France remains relatively unknown in the English-speaking archaeological world. The best known aspects of the archaeological material suggest a society in which warfare was an overriding preoccupation. Major, fortified centres, such as Entremont and Saint-Blaise, and the tradition of 'warrior statues' like those from Entremont and Roquepertuse, suggest that conflict was a recurrent theme. Literary sources, such as Poseidonius have described the indigenous populations of this area as a volatile and warlike people who took the heads of their enemies from the battlefield and displayed or preserved them in their settlements. Finds of skulls, some with nails still embedded in the bone, appear to verify such reports. The pattern of warfare which emerges from this analysis is then discussed within some of the more prominent models of social-anthropological study. This case study offers a more nuanced and contextual interpretation of warfare in the southern French Iron Age and demonstrates how, if treated as a form of social interaction, rather than a breakdown in social norms, might be integrated into wider archaeological interpretations of social and political change.

The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with cyber warfare in general bringing out the unique characteristics of cyber space, the recent cyber attack on Estonia and the Stuxnet attack on Iranian Nuclear facilities, how the established Principles of War can be applied in cyberspace, cyber strategy of US and China, offensive and defensive aspects of cyber warfare cyber deterrence and the new challenge facing the militaries the world over- leadership in cyber domain. Part 2 is devoted to the Indian context. It discusses in detail the impact of ICT on the life of an ordinary Indian citizen, the cyber challenges facing the country and the implications for the Indian Armed Forces. A few recommendations have been summarised in the end.

"Virtual War and Magical Death" is a provocative examination of the relations between anthropology and contemporary global war. Several arguments unite the collected essays, which are based on ethnographic research in varied locations, including Guatemala, Uganda, and Tanzania, as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and the United States. Foremost is the contention that modern high-tech warfare--as it is practiced and represented by the military, the media, and civilians--is analogous to rituals of magic and sorcery. Technologies of "virtual warfare," such as high-altitude bombing, remote drone attacks, night-vision goggles, and even music videoes and computer games that simulate battle, reproduce the imaginative worlds and subjective experiences of witchcraft, magic, and assault sorcery long studied by cultural anthropologists.

Another significant focus of the collection is the U.S. military's exploitation of ethnographic research, particularly through its controversial Human Terrain Systems (HTS) Program, which embeds anthropologists as cultural experts in military units. Several pieces address the ethical dilemmas that HTS and other counterinsurgency projects pose for anthropologists. Other essays reveal the relatively small scale of those programs in relation to the military's broader use of, and ambitions for, social scientific data.
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Contributors." Robertson Allen, Brian Ferguson, Sverker Finnstrom, Roberto J. Gonzalez, David H. Price, Antonius Robben, Victoria Sanford, Jeffrey Sluka, Koen Stroeken, Matthew Sumera, Neil L. Whitehead

How easy is it for rebel groups to purchase weapons and ammunition in the middle of a war? How quickly can commodities such as diamonds and cocoa be converted into cash to buy war supplies? And why does answering these questions matter for understanding civil wars? In What Rebels Want, Jennifer M. Hazen challenges the commonly held view that rebel groups can get what they want, when they want it, and when they most need it. Hazen's assessments of resource availability in the wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire lead to a better understanding of rebel group capacity and options for war and war termination.

Resources entail more than just cash; they include various other economic, military, and political goods, including natural resources, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and diplomatic support. However, rebel groups rarely enjoy continuous access to resources throughout a conflict. Understanding fluctuations in fortune is central to identifying the options available to rebel groups and the reasons why a rebel group chooses to pursue war or peace. The stronger the group's capacity, the more options it possesses with respect to fighting a war. The chances for successful negotiations and the implementation of a peace agreement increase as the options of the rebel group narrow. Sustainable negotiated solutions are most likely, Hazen finds, when a rebel group views negotiations not as one of the solutions for obtaining what it wants, but as the only solution."

China has evolved from a nation with local and regional security interests to a major economic and political power with global interests, investments, and political commitments. It now requires a military that can project itself around the globe, albeit on a limited scale, to secure its interests. Therefore, as Larry M. Wortzel explains, the Chinese Communist Party leadership has charged the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with new and challenging missions that require global capabilities. Advances in technology and the development of indigenous weapons platforms in China, combined with reactions to modern conflicts, have produced a military force very different from that which China has fielded in the past. Wortzel presents a clear and sobering picture of the PLA's modernization effort as it expands into space and cyberspace, and as it integrates operations in the traditional domains of war. This book will appeal to the specialist in security and foreign policy issues in Asia as well as to the person interested in arms control, future warfare, and global military strategies. The book puts China's military growth into historical context for readers of recent military and diplomatic history. About the Author Larry M. Wortzel, spent much of his thirty-two-year military career in the Asia-Pacific region, including two tours of duty as a military attachein China. He served as director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College and, after retirement, as Asian studies director and vice president at the Heritage Foundation. For a decade he was a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He is the author or editor of ten previously published books about China. He lives in Williamsburg, Virginia.

With a distinguished career spanning more than four decades, Professor Desmond Ball is one of the world's greatest scholars of strategy and defence, Australia's home-grown giant. In this collection of essays, leading political, media and academic figures, including former United States President Jimmy Carter, pay tribute to his remarkable contributions. From a base at the Australian National University in Canberra, Professor Ball has unflinchingly researched topics from Cold War nuclear strategy and the defence of Australia to spy scandals and Southeast Asian paramilitaries. His roaming intellect, appetite for getting the facts and commitment to publishing on sensitive topics ensure he is a towering figure who has provided impeccable service to Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific region and the Australian community.

The convergence of military strategy and mathematics in war games, from medieval to modern times. For centuries, both mathematical and military thinkers have used game-like scenarios to test their visions of mastering a complex world through symbolic operations. By the end of World War I, mathematical and military discourse in Germany simultaneously discovered the game as a productive concept. Mathematics and military strategy converged in World War II when mathematicians designed fields of operation. In this book, Philipp von Hilgers examines the theory and practice of war games through history, from the medieval game boards, captured on parchment, to the paper map exercises of the Third Reich. Von Hilgers considers how and why war games came to exist: why mathematical and military thinkers created simulations of one of the most unpredictable human activities on earth. Von Hilgers begins with the medieval rythmomachia, or Battle of Numbers, then reconstructs the ideas about war and games in the baroque period. He investigates the role of George Leopold von Reiswitz's tactical war game in nineteenth-century Prussia and describes the artifact itself: a game board-topped table with drawers for game implements. He explains Clausewitz's emphasis on the "fog of war" and the accompanying element of incalculability, examines the contributions of such thinkers as Clausewitz, Leibniz, Wittgenstein, and von Neumann, and investigates the war games of the German military between the two World Wars. Baudrillard declared this to be the age of simulacra; war games stand contrariwise as simulations that have not been subsumed in absolute virtuality.

The Illusion of Victory demonstrates that most of the rewards of victory in modern warfare are either exaggerated or false. When the ostensible benefits of victory are examined a generation after a war, it becomes inescapably evident that the defeated belligerent rarely conforms to the demands and expectations of the victor. Consequently, long-term political and military stability is denied to both the victorious power and to the defeated one. As a result, neither victory nor defeat deter further outbreaks of war. This sobering reality is increasingly the case in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Ian Bickerton persuasively argues that as the rhetoric of victory becomes more hollow all countries must adopt creative new approaches to resolving disputes.

This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged its revolutionary implications.
Utilizing primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible, and borrowing methods of analysis from political science, history, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, this book suggests a cultural explanation for this puzzling transformation in warfare.
"The Culture of Military Innovation" offers a systematic, thorough, and unique analytical approach that may well be applicable in other perplexing strategic situations. Though framed in the context of specific historical experience, the insights of this book reveal important implications related to conventional, subconventional, and nonconventional security issues. It is therefore an ideal reference work for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies.

"Beating Goliath" examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak over the strong more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit regimes. Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success, Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces performance against the Iraqi insurgency. Make no mistake: insurgent victories are the exception, not the rule. But when David does beat Goliath, the consequences can be earth shattering and change the course of history. Jeffrey Record s persuasive logic and clear writing make this timely book a must read for scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and anyone interested in the Iraq War s outcome.

Pathbreaking and controversial, Darwin and International Relations offers the first comprehensive analysis of international affairs of state through the lens of evolutionary theory. Bradley A. Thayer provides a new method for investigating and explaining human and state behavior while generating insights into the origins of human and animal warfare, ethnic conflict, and the influence of disease on international relations. Using ethnological and statistical studies of warfare among tribal societies, Thayer argues that humans wage war for reasons predicted by evolutionary theory -- to gain and protect vital resources but also for the physically and emotionally stimulating effects of combat. Thayer demonstrates that an evolutionary understanding of disease will become a more important part of the study of international relations as new strains of diseases emerge and advances in genetics make biological warfare a more effective weapon for states and terrorists. He also explains the deep causes of ethnic conflict by illuminating how xenophobia and ethnocentrism evolved in humans. He notes that these behaviors once contributed to our ancestors' success in radically different environments, but they remain a part of us. Darwin and International Relations makes a major contribution to our understanding of human history and the future of international relations.

In "First Do No Harm," David Gibbs raises basic questions about the humanitarian interventions that have played a key role in U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years. Using a wide range of sources, including government documents, transcripts of international war crimes trials, and memoirs, Gibbs shows how these interventions often heightened violence and increased human suffering.

The book focuses on the 1991--99 breakup of Yugoslavia, which helped forge the idea that the United States and its allies could stage humanitarian interventions that would end ethnic strife. It is widely believed that NATO bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo played a vital role in stopping Serb-directed aggression, and thus resolving the conflict.

Gibbs challenges this view, offering an extended critique of Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide." He shows that intervention contributed to the initial breakup of Yugoslavia, and then helped spread the violence and destruction. Gibbs also explains how the motives for U.S. intervention were rooted in its struggle for continued hegemony in Europe.

"First Do No Harm" argues for a new, noninterventionist model for U.S. foreign policy, one that deploys nonmilitary methods for addressing ethnic violence.

In "First Do No Harm," David Gibbs raises basic questions about the humanitarian interventions that have played a key role in U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years. Using a wide range of sources, including government documents, transcripts of international war crimes trials, and memoirs, Gibbs shows how these interventions often heightened violence and increased human suffering.

The book focuses on the 1991--99 breakup of Yugoslavia, which helped forge the idea that the United States and its allies could stage humanitarian interventions that would end ethnic strife. It is widely believed that NATO bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo played a vital role in stopping Serb-directed aggression, and thus resolving the conflict.

Gibbs challenges this view, offering an extended critique of Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide." He shows that intervention contributed to the initial breakup of Yugoslavia, and then helped spread the violence and destruction. Gibbs also explains how the motives for U.S. intervention were rooted in its struggle for continued hegemony in Europe.

"First Do No Harm" argues for a new, noninterventionist model for U.S. foreign policy, one that deploys nonmilitary methods for addressing ethnic violence.

What makes a war just? What makes a specific weapon, strategy, or decision in war just? The tradition of Just War Theory has provided answers to these questions since at least 400 AD, yet each shift in the weapons and strategies of war poses significant challenges to Just War Theory. This book assembles renowned scholars from around the world to reflect on the most pressing problems and questions in Just War Theory, and engages with all three stages of war: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Providing detailed historical context as well as addressing modern controversies and topics including drones, Islamic jihad, and humanitarian intervention, the volume will be highly important for students and scholars of the philosophy of war as well as for others interested in contemporary global military and ethical issues.