Why do some countries choose to end wars short of total victory while others fight on, sometimes in the face of appalling odds? "How Wars End" argues that two central factors shape war-termination decision making: information about the balance of power and the resolve of one's enemy, and fears that the other side's commitment to abide by a war-ending peace settlement may not be credible.

Dan Reiter explains how information about combat outcomes and other factors may persuade a warring nation to demand more or less in peace negotiations, and why a country might refuse to negotiate limited terms and instead tenaciously pursue absolute victory if it fears that its enemy might renege on a peace deal. He fully lays out the theory and then tests it on more than twenty cases of war-termination behavior, including decisions during the American Civil War, the two world wars, and the Korean War. Reiter helps solve some of the most enduring puzzles in military history, such as why Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, why Germany in 1918 renewed its attack in the West after securing peace with Russia in the East, and why Britain refused to seek peace terms with Germany after France fell in 1940.

"How Wars End" concludes with a timely discussion of twentieth-century American foreign policy, framing the Bush Doctrine's emphasis on preventive war in the context of the theory.

Where the implications of war and peace are open to question, the possibility of change depends more on politics than economics. This book asks whether the region's great powers can overcome opposing interests and commit to political restraint. The concept of regional security is based on great power support for regional order. However, there are many pitfalls to consider: notably, the politics of contested nationalisms; the Asia-Pacific rivalry of China and the US; and India's inclinations to function - or be seen - as a benevolent hegemon for the region. Yet there are signs of renewed determination to move the region in new directions. While China's Silk Road projects are long-term regional investments that hinge on regional stability, the US is attempting to fashion new partnerships and India strives to reconcile regional differences to promote a peaceful environment.This book, as it sets out the emerging agendas of the great powers and local powers, makes a significant contribution to a better understanding of the international relations and diplomatic politics of South Asia.

This eight-chapter volume, African Military Geosciences: Military History and the Physical Environment, is a tour-de-force covering nearly 500 years of African military geosciences. It is a truly global book that reveals keen insights into regional, national and international military-forces activities centered in Africa and how the understanding of geosciences plays important roles. It is written for the specialist, but also attractive to the general military buff – well referenced and illustrated with figures from primary sources, historical catalogues and compendia.The publication further explores the “age of sail”, harbour defenses, the trafficability of desert environments and marshes, as well as climate-controls on sailing or land battles. There is even insight into an elite artillery unit staffed by women during Second World War – essentially covering the whole gamut. Ultimtely, the reader explores a nearly 500 year journey around the African continent and beyond.

Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia reviews the historical origins, contemporary patterns, and emerging changes in civil-military relations in Southeast Asia from colonial times until today. It analyzes what types of military organizations emerged in the late colonial period and the impact of colonial legacies and the Japanese occupation in World War II on the formation of national armies and their role in processes of achieving independence. It analyzes the long term trajectories and recent changes of professional, revolutionary, praetorian and neo-patrimonial civil-military relations in the region. Finally, it analyzes military roles in state- and nation-building; political domination; revolutions and regime transitions; and military entrepreneurship.

What essential leadership lessons do we learn by distilling the actions and ideas of great military commanders such as George Washington, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Colin Powell? The Art of Command demonstrates that great leaders become great through a commitment not only to develop vital skills but also to surmount personal shortcomings. In the second edition of this classic resource, Harry S. Laver, Jeffrey J. Matthews, and the other contributing authors identify eleven core characteristics of highly effective leaders, such as integrity, determination, vision, and charisma, and eleven significant figures in American military history who embody those qualities. Featuring new chapters on transitional leadership, innovative leadership, and authentic leadership, this insightful book offers valuable perspectives on the art of military command in American history.

Why do so many states adopt a position of non-recognition of gains from war?Despite being proven ineffective as a coercive tool or deterrent, the international community has actively withheld recognition in numerous instances of territorial conquest since the 1930s. Joseph O'Mahoney systematically analyses 21 case studies including the Manchurian Crisis, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and Russia's annexation of Crimea to explore why so many states have adopted a policy of non-recognition of the spoils of war. By drawing on historical sources including recently declassified archival documents, he evaluates states' decision-making. He develops a new theory for non-recognition as a symbolic sanction aimed at reproducing common knowledge of the rules of international behaviour.Key FeaturesChapter-length case studies of two major instances of non-recognition: the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of Manchukuo in the 1930s, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern CyprusIncludes discussion of cases including Russia's annexation of CrimeaCompares non-recognised cases with two cases where force was used but the results were recognised as legitimate: the Italian conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 and the Indian invasion of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971Challenges conventional IR theory that symbolic sanctions are either failed attempts at coercion or mere posturing for domestic audiencesElucidates a model of rule maintenance, combining rationalist and constructivist insights, which could be applied to other fields in international politics

In today's information era, the use of specific words and language can serve as powerful tools that incite violence—or sanitize and conceal the ugliness of war. This book examines the complex, "twisted" language of conflict. Why is the term "collateral damage" used when military strikes kill civilians? What is a "catastrophic success"? What is the difference between a privileged and unprivileged enemy belligerent? How does deterrence differ from detente? What does "hybrid warfare" mean, and how is it different from "asymmetric warfare"? How is shell shock different from battle fatigue and PTSD? These are only a few of the questions that Talking Conflict: The Loaded Language of Genocide, Political Violence, Terrorism, and Warfare answers in its exploration of euphemisms, "warspeak," "doublespeak," and propagandistic terms. This handbook of alphabetically listed entries is prefaced by an introductory overview that provides background information about how language is used to obfuscate or minimize descriptions of armed conflict or genocide and presents examples of the major rhetorical devices used in this subject matter. The book focuses on the "loaded" language of conflict, with many of the entries demonstrating the function of given terms as euphemisms, propaganda, or circumlocutions. Each entry is accompanied by a list of cross references and "Further Reading" suggestions that point readers to pertinent sources for further research. This book is ideal for students—especially those studying political science, international relations, and genocide—as well as general readers.

In this innovative theoretical book, Elizabeth Kier uses a cultural approach to take issue with the conventional wisdom that military organizations inherently prefer offensive doctrines. Kier argues instead that a military's culture affects its choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines. Drawing on organizational theory, she demonstrates that military organizations differ in their worldview and the proper conduct of their mission. It is this organizational culture that shapes how the military responds to constraints, such as terms of conscription set by civilian policymakers. In richly detailed case studies, Kier examines doctrinal developments in France and Great Britain during the interwar period. She tests her cultural argument against the two most powerful alternative explanations and illustrates that neither the functional needs of military organizations nor the structural demands of the international system can explain doctrinal choice. She also reveals as a myth the argument that the lessons of World War I explain the defensive doctrines in World War II. Imagining War addresses two important debates. It tackles a central debate in security studies: the origins of military doctrine. And by showing the power of a cultural approach, it offers an alternative to the prevailing rationalist explanations of international politics. Originally published in 1999. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In the seminal Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer famously considered the ethics of modern warfare, examining the moral issues that arise before, during, and after conflict. However, Walzer and subsequent scholars have often limited their analyses of the ethics of combat to soldiers on the ground and failed to recognize the moral responsibilities of senior political and military leaders. In Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory, James M. Dubik draws on years of research as well as his own experiences as a soldier and teacher to fill the gaps left by other theorists. He applies moral philosophy, political philosophy, and strategic studies to historical and contemporary case studies to reveal the inaccuracies and moral bankruptcy that inform some of the literature on military ethics. Conventional just war theory adopts a binary approach, wherein political leaders have moral accountability for the decision to go to war and soldiers have accountability for fighting the war ethically. Dubik argues, however, that political and military leadership should be held accountable for the planning and execution of war in addition to the decision to initiate conflict. Dubik bases his sober reassessment on the fundamental truth that war risks the lives of soldiers and innocents as well as the political and social health of communities. He offers new standards to evaluate the ethics of warfare in the hope of increasing the probability that the lives of soldiers will not be used in vain and the innocent not put at risk unnecessarily.

Since ancient times, poets, historians, and philosophers have contemplated warlords' exploits in battle and praised their ability to lead armies toward victory as the "art of the general." Today, this quality is designated military strategy. Military strategy plays a vital role in every conflict, because, as the United States' involvement in the Vietnam conflict showed, when the overarching strategy is weak it is possible to win every battle but still lose a war. Taking inspiration from the greatest military theoreticians of history, such as Sun Tzu, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Carl von Clausewitz, this Very Short Introduction highlights the dynamic relationship between the principal components of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on paradigmatic examples, from Hannibal's war against Rome to Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, from the Allies' campaign to overwhelm Hitler's fortress to the terror attacks of September 11, Antulio J. Echevarria II vividly illustrates the factors contributing to the success or failure of military strategy. Echevarria describes the major types of military strategy and their advantages and disadvantages: annihilation and dislocation; attrition and exhaustion; deterrence and coercion; terror and terrorism; targeted killing; and cyber power. He also explores the emerging nano- and bio-genetic technologies and explains how they are affecting today's military strategy. Clear and engaging, this book shows that military strategy is essential for understanding major events of the past and becomes even more critical today, in a world increasingly threatened by weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, and new dimensions of conflict, such as cyberwar and space.

It is axiomatic that in a democracy, the nation's Armed Forces are subordinate to its elected Government. But a Nation's Armed Forces are 'Forces' that exude and represent national power and areno ordinary subordinate agencies. Besides, they are unique organizations with long and proud traditions. Control of the armed Forces is hence an arduously complex and delicate function requiring comprehensive and more importantly, a mature understanding of the Forces; ethos and internal mechanisms of operation. No universally accepted templates exist for how this control must be exercised and each nation evolves a model best suited to its own polity, geography and geo-strategic environment. A cardinal dimension underlying the entire control regime remains the capacity of its economy to allocate fiscal resources towards ensuring its security. The primary structures of control of India's Armed Forces evolved under the British Rule. The course of evolution of these structures from the days of the East India Company and the Raj, their adaptation to conform to the requirements of a democracy, post-independence developments and the course this process needs to take to meet future requirements are some of the fascinating aspects of an absorbing subject this book attempts to explore.

Three-quarters of a century after the Second World War, almost all the participants are gone. This book contains interviews with and about the Canadian generals who led the troops during that war. Edited and introduced by one of the foremost military historians of our time, this carefully curated collection brings to life the generals and their wartime experiences. The content is revealing and conversations frank. Peers and subordinates alike scrutinize key commanders of the war, sometimes offering praise but often passing harsh judgment. We learn of their failings and successes - and of the heavy weight of command borne by all.

China is building a modern and regionally powerful military with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations away from China's immediate periphery. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernisation effort is a central issue in U.S. defense planning and foreign policy. Congress' decisions on this issue could affect U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, and the U.S. defense industrial base. This book provides a brief overview of the Chinese military. It provides background information and issues for Congress on China's naval modernisation effort and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities.

The end of cold war and the on-going globalization process along with the proliferation of non-traditional threat to security of the nations led to multilateralism in international relations. Though the great powers are not ready to accept the new developments, the post-cold war events such as threat from non-state actors to the security of nation, the global economic slowdown, and global climate change compelled even the most militarily powerful nation to seek multilateral approach to address these trans-border menaces. The global movements towards democratization and protection and promotion of human rights supported by ICT once again brought individuals rights and security into focal point. It appears that even if nations are secure people living there may not be secure. The civil wars taken place in some nation states to protect the rights of multi-ethnic groups or the demand for right to self-determinations of people are examples of such a situation. In this context security means people's security and international efforts are required to ensure people's security from any threat emanates from within or outside the nation states. Thus human security assumes great significance in the post-cold war era of profoundly interdependent global system. There is a blurred boundary between national security and international security on the one hand and the national security and human security on the other hand. The initiative taken by the new government at the federal level towards good neighbourhood and better relation with great powers along with focusing more on human security issues appears to be policy in the right direction. Again the shift from a land centric security paradigm to maritime security and coastal security are also visible in recent times. The book deals with the changing dimensions of security at the theoretical level and a wide spectrum of security issues that India is confronted with and also certain policy options. In the theoretical section the strategic doctrine of India is well reviewed and policy options are also explored. It covers areas such as biological perspective of security, human security perspective, energy security and maritime security. In addition it also examines some of the bilateral security issues and concerns with neighbouring countries.

Nearly 45 countries are at different stages of developing robotic weapons or lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS). The United States, for example, has recently test launched its robotic vessel Sea Hunter, a self-driving, 132-foot ship designed to travel thousands of miles without a single crew member on board. As reported, the vessel has the capability to detect and destroy stealth diesel-electric submarines and sea mines. However, though the militaries of the developed countries are in a race to develop LAWS to perform varied functions on the battlefield, a large section of robotic engineers, ethical analysts, and legal experts are of the firm belief that robotic weapons will never meet the standards of distinction and proportionality required by the laws of war, and therefore will be illegal. This book provides an insight into lethal autonomous weapon systems and debates whether it would be morally correct to give machines the power to decide who lives and who dies on the battlefield.

The central task of all statebuilding is to create a state that is regarded as legitimate by the people over whom it exercises authority. This is a necessary condition for stable, effective governance. States sufficiently motivated to bear the costs of building a state in some distant land are likely to have interests in the future policies of that country, and will therefore seek to promote loyal leaders who are sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies. In The Statebuilder's Dilemma, David A. Lake addresses the key tradeoff between legitimacy and loyalty common to all international statebuilding attempts. Except in rare cases where the policy preferences of the statebuilder and the population of the country whose state is to be built coincide, as in the famous success cases of West Germany and Japan after 1945, promoting a leader who will remain loyal to the statebuilder undermines that leader's legitimacy at home.In Iraq, thrust into a statebuilding role it neither anticipated nor wanted, the United States eventually backed Nouri al-Malaki as the most favorable of a bad lot of alternative leaders. Malaki then used the support of the Bush administration to govern as a Shiite partisan, undermining the statebuilding effort and ultimately leading to the second failure of the Iraqi state in 2014. Ethiopia faced the same tradeoff in Somalia after the rise of a promising but irredentist government in 2006, invading to put its own puppet in power in Mogadishu. But the resulting government has not been able to build significant local support and legitimacy. Lake uses these cases to demonstrate that the greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the more difficult it is to build a legitimate state that can survive on its own.