Buddhism has played a significant role in the current global rise in religious nationalism and violence, but the violent aspects of Buddhist tradition have been neglected in the outpouring of academic analyses and case studies of this disturbing trend. This book offers eight essays examining the dark side of a tradition often regarded as the religion of peace. The authors note the conflict between the Buddhist norms of non-violence and the prohibition of the killing of sentient beings and acts of state violence supported by the Buddhist community (sangha), acts of civil violence in which monks participate, and Buddhist intersectarian violence. They consider contemporary and historical cases of Buddhist warfare from a wide range of traditions - Tibetan, Mongolian, Japanese, Chinese, Sri Lankan, and Thai - critically examining both Buddhist textual sources justifying violence and Buddhist actors currently engaged in violence. They draw not only on archival material but interviews with those living and involved in war zones around the world. The book enriches our understanding both of the complexities of the Buddhist tradition and of the violence that is found in virtually all of the world's religious traditions.

This Book Set consists of: *9781848558908 - Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos (Part A) *9781848558922 - Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos (Part B) There could be no better homage to recently deceased sociologist Charles C. Moskos than dedicating to him this selection of the papers presented at RC01's international conference in Seoul (July 2008). It offers an up-to-date view of the panorama of social studies on armed forces and conflict resolution in a context of fast-moving change that renders many preceding theoretical previsions obsolete. Just to cite two aspects of this change, one can point first of all to how the presented studies move beyond the very concept of globalization, after which the conference had been named. It in fact emerged with clarity that the new dimensions of the context in which militaries and military policy must move are those of a constant, diffuse interaction of the 'local' and the 'global', so-called globalization. A second aspect, in the international area, is the shift towards a multipolar global order with the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, Latin America, Japan and India all manoeuvring for position, a shift that has significant consequences on military action as well.

This comprehensive overview examines the many facets of military ethics as they are applied during times of armed conflict and times of peace. An Introduction to Military Ethics: A Reference Handbook presents the philosophical and conceptual foundations of military ethics, offering an excellent foundation for exploration and discussion of these issues. It focuses first on the 2,500-year legacy of the "just war theory" and its application through history. It then moves to the application of that tradition in the modern era, showing how acts of terrorism by nonstate participants require a new theory and way of thinking about when and how armed force can be justifiably employed. Further, the author analyzes how new theories might alter the fundamental identity of traditional defensive military forces. The book also addresses peacetime ethical issues, such as gender integration and the role of religion in the military. The book is essential reading for military officers and students, as well as those policymakers who confront decisions about how to deploy military force during the War on Terror.

Pathbreaking and controversial, Darwin and International Relations offers the first comprehensive analysis of international affairs of state through the lens of evolutionary theory. Bradley A. Thayer provides a new method for investigating and explaining human and state behavior while generating insights into the origins of human and animal warfare, ethnic conflict, and the influence of disease on international relations. Using ethnological and statistical studies of warfare among tribal societies, Thayer argues that humans wage war for reasons predicted by evolutionary theory -- to gain and protect vital resources but also for the physically and emotionally stimulating effects of combat. Thayer demonstrates that an evolutionary understanding of disease will become a more important part of the study of international relations as new strains of diseases emerge and advances in genetics make biological warfare a more effective weapon for states and terrorists. He also explains the deep causes of ethnic conflict by illuminating how xenophobia and ethnocentrism evolved in humans. He notes that these behaviors once contributed to our ancestors' success in radically different environments, but they remain a part of us. Darwin and International Relations makes a major contribution to our understanding of human history and the future of international relations.

This important work, edited by an expert on terrorism, focuses on the 21st-century struggle for strategic influence and ways in which states can neutralize the role of new media in spreading terrorist propaganda. In an era where anyone can have access to the Internet or other media forms that make widespread communication easy, terrorists and insurgents can spread their messages with complete freedom, creating challenges for national security. Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas focuses on the core of the ongoing struggle for strategic influence and, particularly, how states can counter the role media and the Internet play in radicalizing new agents of terrorism. As the book makes clear, governments need to find ways to effectively confront non-state adversaries at all levels of the information domain and create an understanding of strategic communications within a broad range of technologies. The essays from the international group of authors who contributed to this work offer a deeper understanding of the ongoing struggle. Influence Warfare also provides a set of case studies that illustrate how the means and methods of strategic influence can impact a nation's security. Case studies

Current trends suggest that the fog of war continues to make strategy an opaque enterprise notwithstanding enormous U.S. investments in high-tech weapons, intelligence capabilities, and homeland defense. This edited volume includes essays originally presented at the IISS Global Strategic Review, which was held in Geneva on September 7-9, 2007.

The war in Iraq has expanded from a struggle between Coalition forces and the remnants of former regime loyalists to a multi-faceted conflict involving numerous Sunni groups, Shi'ite militias, Kurdish nationals, and foreign jihadists. Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict is Anthony Cordesman's latest assessment of the Iraqi conflict and documents its entire evolution, from the history of ethnic tensions through the current U.S. "surge." He identifies each actor in the arena, analyzes their motivations, and presents a detailed record of their actions, tactics, and capabilities. Cordesman's exhaustive study, based on meticulous research, is the most thorough account of the war to date. Beginning with the consequences of imperial colonialism and touching upon the ethnic tensions throughout Saddam's regime, Cordesman examines and details the confluence of forces and events that have paved the way toward Iraq's current civil conflict. He analyzes major turning points, including elections, economic developments, and key incidents of violence that continue to shape the war. Finally, he outlines the lessons learned from this history and what can and cannot be done to stabilize the nation.

Military transformation can be understood as comprising three overlapping and sometimes competing "layers"--the conventional-force dominated revolution in military affairs, a more recent irregular warfare emphasis, and a wider dimension including homeland defense, space and nuclear policy. The Western world is currently focusing its attention on transformation's middle layer, while China and Russia are focusing on the RMA and transformation's wider aspects. This dynamic indicates the United States and its allies should continue to prepare for the full range of conflicts. This book establishes the meaning of "military transformation," assesses the manner in which certain countries are transforming their military forces, discusses the relevancy of transformation efforts to modern conflict and, in drawing out the key areas of emphasis on the part of various countries, provides a window on the future global security environment. It is divided into seven chapters, plus a conclusion. The first chapter focuses on the meaning of military transformation, establishing a framework through which national militaries can be examined. This comprises transformation's revolution in military affairs components, its newer special operations forces, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction aspects, and its wider homeland defense, space and deterrence dimensions. The book devotes two chapters to the United States and one each to China, Russia, and NATO. It also has a chapter that looks individually at each of Australia, Britain, Canada, France and Germany. An assessment of the relevancy of force transformation to modern warfare is integrated into the discussion of what transformation means, how the United States is responding, and the concluding chapter. The book contains a biographical sketch of Andrew Marshall, Andrew Krepinevich, William Owens, Arthur Cebrowski, Donald Rumsfeld, and Thomas Barnett, all of whom have been involved in some aspect of military transformation.

The United Nations effort in East Timor was precedent - setting in its use of a regional power to affect a UN mandate leading to the independence of a new nation. Based on first-person accounts, interviews, declassified documents, and secondary background sources, this book gives readers an insight into the significant actions and innovative techniques of the struggle for East Timorese independence from 1999 to 2006.The book begins with a two-chapter historical overview of the circumstances that caused the United Nations to intervene in East Timor in 1999, and then continues with a detailed account of the referendum on independence and the military operations required to restore order after the Timorese people decided upon freedom from Indonesia. In the final three chapters, the author describes the actions taken to support the first national elections, the writing of a constitution, and the formation of a new national government in East Timor. The final chapter compares UN operations in East Timor to previous operations in Somalia, Eastern Europe and Haiti, and outlines key lessons for the future, including the critical importance of economic development and good governance in fledgling states.

One of the greatest sources of America's troubles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and New Orleans was the inability of our government's many parts to work well together. Often called interagency operations, applying everything that official Washington can do to keep Americans safe, free, and prosperous, is no easy task. The Pentagon, State Department, Homeland Security, Treasury, FBI, CIA, and other agencies have different capabilities, budgets, cultures, operational styles, Congressional oversight committees, and even operate under different laws. Getting them all organized on battlefields, after disasters, and during other times of crisis is often equated with herding cats. The history of getting government agencies to cooperate is replete with stories of courage, heart-breaking tragedy, and blundering incompetence. To meet the dangers of the 21st century, interagency operations will be more important than ever, yet few Americans understand the troubling history of Washington's failures and the pressing needs for reform. One of the greatest sources of America's troubles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and New Orleans was the inability of our government's many parts to work well together. Often called interagency operations, the coordination of everything official Washington can do to keep Americans safe, free, and prosperous, is no easy task. The Pentagon, State Department, Homeland Security, Treasury, FBI, CIA, and other agencies have different capabilities, budgets, cultures, operational styles, Congressional oversight committees, and even operate under different laws. Getting them all organized on battlefields, after disasters, and during other times of crisis is often equated with herding cats. The history of getting government agencies to cooperate is replete with stories of courage, heart-breaking tragedy, and blundering incompetence. To meet the dangers of the 21st century, interagency operations will be more important than ever, yet few Americans understand the troubling history of Washington's failures and the pressing needs for reform. This book is the first comprehensive history and sober analysis of one of the most pressing national security challenges of the century. The goal is to make a serious and unappreciated subject accessible to a wide audience through a series of engaging and informative historical case studies. The case studies span American history from the turn of the 20th century to today. They cover a variety of subjects from dealing with the great flu epidemic of 1918, to responding to natural disasters at home and abroad, to fighting wars and rebuilding countries after war. Each engaging chapter is a single case study written by a distinguished scholar who covers the historical context, the key players, actions, incidents, and, perhaps most important, lessons learned.

What if the true weak link of the Information Age force is not the hardware of machines, but the software of the human mind? And if so, could it be that the entire conceptual structure of the Information Revolution theorists, at least as it applies to military affairs, is built on sand, on the notorious fickleness of human cognition? These are the questions this book strives to examine. Looking at the command and control of information-rich warfare, the contributors explore its potential new processes, techniques, and organizational structures. As they do so, they find reasons for both optimism and concerns about the limitations of human cognition and supporting technologies in commanding battles in the Information Age. Since the beginning of the Information Revolution, the military in the United States and elsewhere has been analyzing and implementing the changes driven by the rapidly advancing information technologies. Among military theorists and practitioners, many focus on the Information Revolution's impact on matters of military equipment. Far fewer, however, seem to worry about the gray matter—the mind of the commander, the place where all the information power of the new age is supposed to converge and to yield its mighty dividends. Consider that it is the human mind, particularly the minds of military commanders and their staffs that remain the pinnacle and the ultimate consumer of the rapidly growing information flows. What if the true weak link of the Information Age force is not the hardware of machines, but the software of the human mind? And if so, could it be that the entire conceptual structure of the Information Revolution theorists, at least as it applies to military affairs, is built on sand, on the notorious fickleness of human cognition? These are the questions this book strives to examine. Looking at the command and control of information-rich warfare, the authors explore its potential new processes, techniques, and organizational structures. As they do so, they find reasons for both optimism and concerns about the limitations of human cognition and supporting technologies in commanding Information Age battles.

Military, economic, and environmental violence in the era of globalization cause immense suffering and may ultimately threaten the existence of life as we know it, but author Pilisuk explains that the future can change if we understand and act upon the roots of violence. A professor emeritus of psychology and human and community development, Pilisuk explains how most violence is the product of a human-built social order in which some people and institutions control most of the resources, make the decisions that necessitate violence, and operate with minimal accountability. The common root of war, poverty, environmental destruction, and other forms of violence is spotlighted. Such violence, says Pilisuk, is a natural consequence of a system inordinately influenced by a relatively small, interconnected group of corporate, military, and government leaders with the power to instill fear, to increase their excessive fortunes, and to restrict information, particularly about their own clandestine dealings. This text includes scholarship hailing from across disciplines, combined with information from investigative journalism, and insights from nonprofit watchdog groups, all shedding light on centralized power and its effects. Pilisuk presents material including the range of tactics used to manipulate and destroy adversaries, the human capacity to kill as a challenge, and how media is used by powerful groups to manipulate fear and maintain their power. Here, readers find solid social science to support what whistleblowers and social critics are observing about a system that needs change.

This book aims to serve the military profession, and so the national interest, by helping to generate intelligent reform of how the armed forces train, educate, and promote officers who shape our military strategy and write our war plans. Readers will discover the professional and intellectual improvement that wide reading in the masters of historical narrative offers to them. The first chapter, "Lessons Not Learned," surveys our strategic documents-and their recent applications-and offers criticism and recommendations. The second chapter, "Transformation Ballyhoo," evaluates our current efforts at military transformation and offers an alternative approach to rehabilitating our armed forces. The third chapter, "The Brain of An Army," offers ideas on building a first-rate Joint War College. Chapters four through six focus on military campaigns: France 1940; Stalingrad; North Africa, 1940-43. The theme is that moral and intellectual qualities determine the fate of armies in war, and that material and bureaucratic machinery are not nearly so vital as we seem to think nowadays.

The battle is an old one: man versus nature. And in modern society, man includes the military. Machines. Chemicals. Who wins the battle and at what cost? This practical analysis of the conflict between national security requirements and environmental responsibility looks at just that. William Wilcox examines the most common environmental issues that the military faces during wartime and peacetime and provides an introduction to the legal authorities, including statutes, regulations, and executive orders, governing the application of environmental law to military activities. It also illuminates the tension between environmentalists and regulators concerned with the damages that military development, testing, and training operations inflict on the environment and military leaders dedicated to using actual field conditions to prepare soldiers for war. In addition, this book addresses environmentalists' desire for greater accountability from the military, which has a history of dumping, spilling, stockpiling, and launching harmful chemicals. Although some exemptions from environmental compliance have been granted to the military, federal agencies are sometimes held to higher standards than private sector companies. Wilcox, an experienced environmental attorney and former military attorney, focuses on the legal framework in which environmental issues are addressed and examines how policy translates into legal application. He also examines the changing relationship between the military and the environment by exploring environmental law as it applies to the military domestically and the impact of international environmental law on combat operations. In addition to addressing such environmental laws as the National Environmental Policy Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the author provides an overview of the laws governing access to information concerning the military's impact on the environment. Other topics covered include civil penalties and sovereign immunity, water rights,

Clausewitz's On War has, at least until very recently, been regarded as the most important work of theory on its subject. But since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and even more since the 9/11 attacks on the United states in 2001, an increasing number of commentators have argued that On War has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. They have argued that Clausewitz was concerned solely with inter-state war and with properly defined armies, and that the sorts of conflicts which he discussed are therefore part of a historical pattern which dominated Europe between 1648, the end of the Thirty Years War, and 1990 itself. Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's best known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century reconsiders the principal themes in Clausewitz's writings from a contemporary perspective, and finds in them much more inspiration and insight than these generalisations allow. Embracing the perspectives of history, philosophy and political science, the book reconsiders both the text and its current implications. Traditional interpretations of On War are put into fresh light; neglected passages are re-examined; and new insights are derived from the conjunction between Clausewitz's text and today's challenges. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

'In war, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or peril...' ("Sun Tzu The Art of War"). We speak of Caesar who conquered Gaul, not the legions; MacArthur who landed at Inchon, not the Marines - and we speak of Napoleon, one of history's most successful generals. Major General Jonathon Riley is supremely well qualified to write on Napoleon's generalship and has written an informed and insightful account. He opens with a short treatise on generalship in order to define Napoleon's achievement before moving on to the man himself. He examines Napoleon as a strategist; as a coalition commander; Napoleon's campaigns and Napoleon on the battlefield. Areas often ignored in the context of pre-industrial warfare - logistics and counter-insurgency - are also examined. Riley proceeds to three specific case studies beginning with Napoleon's first essay in generalship and the conquest of Piedmont; Napoleon at the height of his powers at the conquest of Prussia, to Napoleon's final defeats and the Battle of the Nations in 1813.

This book examines the politics and individuals that have shaped the military reform process in the U.S.This book traces the history of various attempts to impose military reform on American armed forces, especially from Congress, from the American Revolution and Continental Congress to the present day. Particular focus will be placed on the effort of a small group in Congress and the Pentagon in the 1980s (who coined the term military reform in the modern context). Emphasis will be on the reforms these actors advocated, variously successful and unsuccessful, to fundamentally alter how the Department of Defense designs and buys hardware and how U.S. armed forces fight. The book uses the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 Iraq War (and the subsequent insurgency in Iraq) to demonstrate what has been reformed in U.S. armed forces and the Department of Defense, and what has not.The volume explains fundamental strengths and weaknesses in America's military forces, exploring what genuine military reform is, what it is not, and what remains to be done. Ideas are presented to compare genuine reform to cosmetic dabbling, which fundamentally improves nothing and which sometimes arrives as ill-conceived fads that promise only to burden U.S. combat forces to the point of mental and physical immobility.Part of the Contemporary Military, Strategic, and Security Issues series, this is the only current reference book that allows readers to understand the strengths and weaknesses in U.S. military forces. Both authors served in the Pentagon and Congress, and provide unique first-hand analysis regarding military reform.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon in 2001 with an agenda that included the transformation of the American armed forces. His intent was to modernize the existing force while simultaneously developing high-tech innovations to revolutionize the military of the future. The primary architect of transformation, Arthur Cebrowski, conceived what is known as network-centric warfare--a concept to leverage advances in military technology that will influence the U.S. Armed Forces for many decades to come. The basis of this work was Arthur Cebrowski's autobiographical history of the development of network-centric warfare. He passed away, however, before he could complete his account. Blaker has used much of the material gathered by Cebrowski to craft a history based on the former naval officer's own writings, testimony, and interviews of Cebrowski conducted by a variety of individuals in the media and military during his time in Washington, D.C. Transforming Military Force is also an examination of the successes and failures of this new form of warfare, analyzing what has been done in the past and offering suggestions on the future direction of this form of conflict.

Rapid and momentous technological changes at the turn of the 20th century forced military professionals and educated civilians to envision the future of war and warfare, especially during an age where nations found themselves aggressively competing for dominance on the world stage. Antulio J. Echevarria II offers a comparative study of these predictions to assess who "got it right" and why. He concludes that professionals were particularly adept at predicting the warfare of the immediate future by framing their discussions in terms of solving tactical problems, but they were much less successful at thinking of the long-term. Unburdened by the necessity of strategic problem-solving, educated amateurs were allowed more flexibility to imagine the long-term future of warfare, and, at times, proved to be remarkably accurate. Echevarria organizes his study by comparing visions of future wars on land, at sea, undersea, and in air. In each instance professionals and amateurs had their own distinctive imaginings. Among the notable speculators included in this book are science fiction author H.G. Wells and military theorist Ivan Bloch. This approach to the study of warfare is one of those rare examples of a book that can appeal to and inform a wide cross-section of readers.

From grassroots terrorism to the nuclear ambitions of hostile nations, the United States faces increasingly complex threats to its national security, and combating these threats continues to demand a reshaping of the nation's security structure, military forces and defense expenditures. In this study, Anthony Cordesman offers a detailed analysis of critical challenges affecting U.S. national security and how failures in adapting to these challenges have exacerbated the strains on available resources. He systematically identifies the most glaring obstacles to successful national security planning and proposes constructive and practical ways to proceed in the future. Cordesman focuses on ten specific challenges, and each is addressed within the context of the Iraq War, Afghan War, War on Terrorism, and the risk of conflict over the Taiwan Straits. Out of the lessons drawn from these experiences, he examines the future of international coalitions, asymmetric warfare, nation building, and stability operations, and concludes that perhaps the most pressing area for change is the need for accountability among civilian and military policymakers.

Chatting with notorious war criminal Charles Taylor on the lawn of his presidential mansion as ostriches and armed teenagers strut in the background. Landing in snow-covered Afghanistan weeks after the fall of the Taliban and trying to make sense of a country shattered by years of war. Being held at gunpoint by young soldiers amid the tragedy of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Standing in the middle of a violent riot in the streets of Kathmandu. Having hushed conversations with the widows of Europe's largest massacre since World War II. These are all scenes from The Disaster Gypsies, a compelling personal memoir by a relief worker and conflict specialist who has worked on the ground in a host of war-torn countries. Initially deployed as part of a humanitarian relief team in Rwanda almost by accident, Norris has experienced the tragedies of Rwanda, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Liberia over a span of ten years. Rich with poignant human stories, The Disaster Gypsies captures the reality of modern war with an immediacy and compassion that puts the reader in the front seat for some of the most wrenching events of our times. Norris approaches his story with a unique and dynamic perspective, having worked both in the upper echelons of the U.S. government and in some of the world's most dangerous places. Moving from face-to-face encounters with powerful warlords to quiet moments with the victims of horrific violence, Norris gives readers a behind-the-scenes tour of a world most of them can barely imagine. He makes a compelling argument that these nasty civil wars were often dismissed as tribal, ethnic, or regional disputes by most Americans, when in reality such violence is fundamentallypart of the human condition. That may sound simple or even self-evident, but Norris contends that most people in the United States and Europe continue to view war as something that is outside of themselves and profoundly foreign in its nature, even as their own troops continue to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Blending detailed contextual analysis with issues in modern-day international relations this book provides a major new analysis of the theory of Clausewitz and its relevance to contemporary society. This book argues that Clausewitz developed a wide-ranging political theory of war by reflecting on the success, the limitations, and the failure of Napoleon's method of waging war, a theory, which is still relevant in light of contemporary conflict. This new interpretation is the result of reflecting on Clausewitz's theory in light of the new developments and lays down the foundation of a general theory of war by concentrating on Clausewitz's historical analyses of war campaigns. For the first time analysis of three paradigmatic military campaigns is placed at the centre of understanding surrounding Clausewitz's 'On War': The author argues that the limitations of Napoleon's strategy, as revealed in Russia and in his final defeat, enabled Clausewitz to develop a general theory of war. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

Professional Military Education (PME) is broader and more rigorous than is widely understood in the United States. Improving educational programs within the military service branches is at the very center of ongoing force transformation efforts and advanced educational opportunities occur at various, set levels of military experience. Military education increasingly conforms to standards imposed by outside civilian accrediting bodies and is mandated and monitored, to an extent, by Congress. Military Education explores this often-overlooked area of education within the context of the modern military force structure. In this unique work, Watson chronicles the evolution of professional military education during the last sixty years. Careful to draw distinctions between training and education, she briefly traces the history of PME and examines some of the major personalities involved in shaping it, as well as the evolution of the curriculum stressed in PME programs. Her narrative, combined with key documents, a glossary, and a timeline of important events, dispels popular notions of an uneducated military force.

When Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983, he boldly challenged the long-accepted nuclear doctrine of "mutual assured destruction." He argued that the development of this costly and complex missile defense system, popularly known as "Star Wars," was the only viable and real alternative to the ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons. While Reagan's vision unwittingly accelerated the end of the Cold War, SDI soon became a program shrouded in controversy. Costs soared and researchers struggled to develop the essential and successful technologies, although the threat of an atomic exchange with the former Soviet Union no longer loomed on the horizon. Despite those factors, SDI has survived. It remains in the active stages of development more than two decades after it was introduced, even as American policy makers struggle to counter the emerging threat posed by "rogue states" engaged in the active pursuit and development of atomic weapons. Devoid of any political agenda, Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age presents a concise overview of the history of SDI, chronicling its successes and failures through the ongoing evolution of the program. It is the most up-to-date account on the market today. Sanford Lakoff is an established expert on the development of SDI. In this work, he chronicles the history of the program from its initial introduction during the Reagan years, through the ongoing struggles associated with research and development that plague the program to this day. Each chapter provides analysis of the strategic, scientific, and diplomatic challenges policy makers and scientists struggle to overcome, at the same time exploring the changingstrategic needs and specific purposes for the program. Offering a glossary that provides an explanation of key scientific terms and an appendix by noted physicist Richard L. Garwin, this book will appeal to scholars and students, as well as to the general public.

Perhaps the most famous and admired soldier to fight in World War II was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who achieved immortality as the Desert Fox. Rommel's first field command during the war was the 7th Panzer Division—also known as the Ghost Division—which he led in France in 1940. During this campaign, the 7th Panzer suffered more casualties than any other division in the German Army, at the same time inflicting a disproportionate number of casualties upon the enemy. It took 97,486 prisoners, captured 458 tanks and armored vehicles, 277 field guns, 64 anti-tank guns and 4,000 to 5,000 trucks. It captured or destroyed hundreds of tons of other military equipment, shot down 52 aircraft, destroyed 15 more aircraft on the ground, and captured 12 additional planes. It destroyed the French 1st Armored Division and the 4th North African Division, punched through the Maginot Line extension near Sivry, and checked the largest Allied counteroffensive of the campaign at Arras. When France surrendered, the Ghost Division was within 200 miles of the Spanish border. No doubt about it—Rommel had proven himself a great military leader who was capable of greater things. His next command, in fact, would be the Afrika Korps, where the legend of the Desert Fox was born. Rommel had a great deal of help in France—much more than his published papers suggest. His staff officers and company, battalion, and regimental commanders were an extremely capable collection of military leaders that included 12 future generals (two of them SS), and two colonels who briefly commanded panzer divisions but never reached general rank. They also included Colonel Erich von Unger, who would no doubt have become a general had he not been killed in action while commanding a motorized rifle brigade on the Eastern Front in 1941, as well as Karl Hanke, a Nazi gauleiter who later succeeded Heinrich Himmler as the last Reichsfuehrer-SS. No historian has ever recognized the talented cast of characters who supported the Desert Fox in 1940. No one has ever attempted to tell their stories. This book remedies that deficiency.