Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics is an analysis of how ideas, or political ideology, can threaten states and how states react to ideational threats. It examines the threat perception and policies of two Arab Muslim majority states, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in response to the rise and activities of two revolutionary "Islamic states," established in Iran (1979) and Sudan (1989). Using these comparative case studies, the book provides important insight about the role of religious ideology for the international and domestic politics of the Middle East and, in doing so, advances our understanding of how, why, and when ideology affects threat perception and state policy. Rubin makes clear that transnational ideologies may present a greater and more immediate national security threat than shifts in the military balance of power: first because ideology, or ideational power, triggers threat perception and affects state policy; second because states engage in ideational balancing in response to an ideological threat. The book has significant implications for international relations theory and engages important debates in comparative politics about authoritarianism and Islamic activism. Its findings about how an Islamist regime or state behaves will provide vital insight for policy creation by the US and its Middle East allies should another such regime or state emerge.

Global events of the early twenty-first century have placed new stress on the relationship among anthropology, governance, and war. Facing prolonged insurgency, segments of the U.S. military have taken a new interest in anthropology, prompting intense ethical and scholarly debate. Inspired by these issues, the essays in "Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency" consider how anthropologists can, should, and do respond to military overtures, and they articulate anthropological perspectives on global war and power relations.

This book investigates the shifting boundaries between military and civil state violence; perceptions and effects of American power around the globe; the history of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice; and debate over culture, knowledge, and conscience in counterinsurgency. These wide-ranging essays shed new light on the fraught world of Pax Americana and on the ethical and political dilemmas faced by anthropologists and military personnel alike when attempting to understand and intervene in our world.

There is now a major new interest in ethical issues about warfare emerging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, conflict in Syria and Libya, the war on terror, and the introduction of new weapon systems, such as unmanned drones. In this re-written version of the author's classic text, Waging War, Ian Clark asks probing questions about how we think about war, the changes it is undergoing, and what exactly it is we wage when we wage war. Waging War argues that much of what passes for ethical debate is actually a set of disagreements about what counts as war or not. This philosophical introduction provides a critical review of the various different ways in which the ethical debates are already framed, the questions that arise from these debates, and seeks to bring greater clarity and precision to the important moral arguments about political violence.

Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras are four Spanish speaking countries in Central America that possess uniformed military institutions. These four countries represent different approaches to reforms of civil-military relations, and embody varying degrees of success in both institutional democratization and the managing of security forces. In this book, Orlando J. Perez expertly examines the competing theories of civil-military relations in Central America to advance our understanding of the origins, consequences and persistence of militarism in Latin America. Divided into four parts, Perez begins by proposing a theoretical framework for analyzing civil-military relations, including an analysis of how U.S. foreign and military policy affects the establishment of stable civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Part Two examines the institutional and legal structures under which civil-military relations are carried out revealing in Part Three the reorientation of the missions and roles performed by the armed forces in each country. The concluding part analyzes the role beliefs of members of the military and public opinion about the armed forces in relation to other institutions. Combining both qualitative and quantitative data, Perez bridges the gap between structural and cultural analyses for a more comprehensive understanding of the links between micro and macro level factors that influence civil-military relations and democratic governance.

Joshua M. Epstein argues that prevailing assumptions about the East- West balance of power rest on erroneous measures of military strength. He develops a method for analyzing military capabilities and applies that general procedure to the Soviet tactical air threat to NATO.

Originally published in 1984.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Review: This brilliant work cannot fail to stimulate debate and advance understanding. It is gloriously replete with arguments from and about philosophy, biology, sociology and the course of our all too human history. The reasons for the grim longevity of war have rarely been more cogently explained or better illustrated by telling anecdote. Colin Gray, director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading A wide-ranging meditation on the embeddedness of war- in our cultures, our minds and our expectations - and its evolution by one of the subject's most erudite, informed and reflective scholars. Philip Bobbitt, author of The Shield of Achilles Christopher Coker's new book is a masterpiece of erudite concision in which I learned something new on every page. He is not only Britain's leading philosopher of warfare, but a prolific historian who puts the competition to shame. Michael Burleigh, author of Small Wars, Faraway Places: Global Insurrection and The Making of the Modern World From pre-modern city-state to post-modern cyberspace, Christopher Coker reminds us that war is a natural part of our human condition. Both idealists and realists will benefit from reading this small gem of a book from an outstanding scholar of the role of war in the history of ideas. Michael Evans, General Sir Francis Hassett Chair of Military Studies, Australian Defence College With searingly elegant prose, Professor Coker brings a vast array of ideas and events to bear on one of the most pressing issues of this or any other time. A must-read book. Steven Metz, Director of Research, U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

In 2010, David Bates presented the Ford Lectures in British History at the University of Oxford, and The Normans and Empire is the book which was born from these lectures. It provides an interpretative analysis of the history of the cross-Channel empire created by William the Conqueror in 1066 to its end in 1204 when the duchy of Normandy was conquered by the French king, Philip Augustus, the so-called 'Loss of Normandy'. This volume emphasizes the cross-Channel and Continental dimensions of the subject, and uses modern approaches to suggest new interpretations. Bates proposes that historians of the Normans can learn from the methods of social scientists and historians of other periods of history - such as making use of such tools as life-stories and biographies - and he employs such methods to offer an interpretative history of the Normans, as well as a broader history of England, the British Isles, and Northern France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises--ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines?
Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm--with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities--generally doesn't work.
Based on historical case analysis of successful "under-fire" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes, and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars "in real time."
His proposed method combines conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that, when properly applied, this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises.

Soldier and intellectual Carl von Clausewitz first entered combat at the tender age of thirteen. He later rose to the rank of Major General, married into the Prussian nobility and wrote a book which was to become one of the most influential works on military strategy ever published. On War is one of the first books on modern military strategy. Writing mostly after the Napoleonic wars, between 1816 and 1830, von Clausewitz never lived to see it published. He had a theory that it was the integration of political, societal and economic issues that was the most important factor in deciding the outcome of a war. This new theory made On War one of the most important texts on strategy ever written. On War has been translated into practically every major language and remains a source of inspiration for modern strategic thinkers. In this fascinating new interpretation, Andrew Holmes illustrates how von Clausewitz's ideas can be applied to contemporary business. Readers will discover: * Why business, like war, is neither an art nor a science; * How to 'fortify' their business; * The importance of a strong commander; * The secrets of being ruthless; * Why they should bypass their smart phones and open up the lines of communication. By re-interpreting von Clausewitz's original theories, Holmes demonstrates that On War is not just about the battlefield. This clear, concise and waffle-free book shows how you can treat life like a military operation and steer your troops in the right direction in the world of business. Andrew Holmes' Carl von Clausewitz's On War illustrates the timeless nature of von Clausewitz's insights by bringing them to life with modern examples and business case studies. This brilliant interpretation of On War is an entertaining accompaniment to one of the most famous strategy books ever written.

Between June 1812 and January 1815, US and British forces, notably the regular infantrymen of both sides (including the Canadian Fencibles Regiment), fought one another on a host of North American battlefields. This study examines the evolving role and combat performance of the two sides' regulars during the conflict, with particular reference to three revealing battles in successive years: Queenston Heights, Crysler's Farm, and Chippawa. Featuring full-color artwork and battle maps, this fully illustrated study investigates the US and British regular infantry's role, tactics, junior leadership, and combat performance on three battlefields of the War of 1812. The actions assessed here notably demonstrate the evolution of US regulars from their initial poor showing to an emerging professionalism that allowed them to face their British opponents on equal terms.

War is a paradox. On the one hand, it destroys bodies and destroys communities. On the other hand, it is responsible for some of the strongest human bonds and has been the genesis of many of our most fundamental institutions. War and Society addresses these paradoxes while providing a sociological exploration of this enigmatic phenomenon which has played a central role in human history, wielded an incredible power over human lives, and commanded intellectual questioning for countless generations. The authors offer an analytical account of the origins of war, its historical development, and its consequences for individuals and societies, adopting a comparative approach throughout. It ends with an appraisal of the contemporary role of war, looking to the future of warfare and the fundamental changes in the nature of violent conflict which we are starting to witness. This short, readable and engaging book will be an ideal reading for upper-level students of political sociology, military sociology, and related subjects.

An exploration of military responses to revolutions and how to predict such reactions in the future We know that a revolution's success largely depends on the army's response to it. But can we predict the military's reaction to an uprising? How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why argues that it is possible to make a highly educated guess—and in some cases even a confident prediction—about the generals' response to a domestic revolt if we know enough about the army, the state it is supposed to serve, the society in which it exists, and the external environment that affects its actions. Through concise case studies of modern uprisings in Iran, China, Eastern Europe, Burma, and the Arab world, Zoltan Barany looks at the reasons for and the logic behind the variety of choices soldiers ultimately make. Barany offers tools—in the form of questions to be asked and answered—that enable analysts to provide the most informed assessment possible regarding an army's likely response to a revolution and, ultimately, the probable fate of the revolution itself. He examines such factors as the military's internal cohesion, the regime's treatment of its armed forces, and the size, composition, and nature of the demonstrations. How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why explains how generals decide to support or suppress domestic uprisings.

As a veteran campaigner, the Byzantine emperor Maurice (582-602) compiled a unique and influential handbook intended for the field commander. In this first complete English translation, the "Strategikon" is an invaluable source not only for early Byzantine history but for the general history of the art of war. Describing in detail weaponry and armor, daily life on the march or in camp, clothing, food, medical care, military law, and titles of the Byzantine army of the seventh century, the "Strategikon" offers insights into the Byzantine military ethos. In language contemporary, down-to-earth, and practical, the text also provides important data for the historian, and even the ethnologist, including eyewitness accounts of the Persians, Slavs, Lombards, and Avars at the frontier of the Empire.

How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914-but shaped Britain's success in the Second World War and beyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854-1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914-18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill's conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett's ideas continue to influence British thinking.

Based on a MOOC (Massive Open Online Course) designed for both military personnel and non-specialists across the globe, Key Concepts in Military Ethics is structured as a series of 'mini-chapters' that cover a huge range of topics and issues: moral dilemmas, military and civilian interactions, freedom of the press, peacekeeping, terrorism and humanitarian intervention. Written by a team of academic experts, many with military experience, the book contains scenarios and case studies, including the Gulf War, the Falklands War, 'Ground Zero' in New York City and more conventional theatres of war through history, as well as cyber-terrorism, the role of military contractors and unmanned weapons systems.

How and when should we end a war? What place should the pathways to a war's end have in war planning and decision-making? This volume treats the topic of ending war as part and parcel of how wars begin and how they are fought - a unique, complex problem, worthy of its own conversation. New essays by leading thinkers and practitioners in the fields of philosophical ethics, international relations, and military law reflect on the problem and show that it is imperative that we address not only the resolution of war, but how and if a war as waged can accommodate a future peace. The essays collectively solidify the topic and underline its centrality to the future of military ethics, strategy, and war.

Since 1979, few rivalries have affected Middle Eastern politics as much as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, too often the rivalry has been framed purely in terms of 'proxy wars', sectarian difference or the associated conflicts that have broken out in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. In this book, Simon Mabon presents a more nuanced assessment of the rivalry, outlining its history and demonstrating its impact across the Middle East. Highlighting the significance of local groups, Mabon shows how regional politics have shaped and been shaped by the rivalry. The book draws from social theory and the work of Pierre Bourdieu to challenge problematic assumptions about 'proxy wars', the role of religion, and sectarianism. Exploring the changing political landscape of the Middle East as a whole and the implications for regional and international security, Mabon paints a complex picture of this frequently discussed but oft-misunderstood rivalry.

This book develops a new approach in explaining how a nation's Grand Strategy is constituted, how to assess its merits, and how grand strategies may be comparatively evaluated within a broader framework. The volume responds to three key problems common to both academia and policymaking. First, the literature on the concept of grand strategy generally focuses on the United States, offering no framework for comparative analysis. Indeed, many proponents of US grand strategy suggest that the concept can only be applied, at most, to a very few great powers such as China and Russia. Second, characteristically it remains prescriptive rather than explanatory, ignoring the central conundrum of why differing countries respond in contrasting ways to similar pressures. Third, it often understates the significance of domestic politics and policymaking in the formulation of grand strategies - emphasizing mainly systemic pressures. This book addresses these problems. It seeks to analyze and explain grand strategies through the intersection of domestic and international politics in ten countries grouped distinctively as great powers (The G5), regional powers (Brazil and India) and pivotal powers hostile to each other who are able to destabilize the global system (Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). The book thus employs a comparative framework that describes and explains why and how domestic actors and mechanisms, coupled with external pressures, create specific national strategies. Overall, the book aims to fashion a valid, cross-contextual framework for an emerging research program on grand strategic analysis.

Prior to the progressive development of the law of armed conflict heralded by the 1949 Geneva Conventions - most particularly in relation to the concepts of international and non-international armed conflict-the customary doctrine on recognition of belligerency functioned for almost 200 years as the definitive legal scheme for differentiating internal conflict from "civil wars", in which the law of war as applicable between states applied de jure. Employing a legal historical approach, this book describes the thematic and practical fundamentals of the doctrine, and analyzes some of the more significant challenges to its application. In doing so, it assesses whether, how, and why the doctrine on recognition of belligerency was considered "fit for purpose," and seeks to inform debate as to its continuity and utility within the modern scheme of the law of armed conflict.

Compiled during the Warring States period of 475-221 B.C.E., "The Art of War" has had an enormous impact on the development of Chinese military strategy over the past two thousand years and occupies an important place in East Asian intellectual history. It is the first known attempt to formulate a rational basis for the planning and conduct of military operations, and while numerous editions of the work exist, Victor Mair's translation is the first to remain true to the original structure and essential style of the text.

Mair's fidelity to the original, along with his insightful commentary and reliance on archaeologically recovered manuscripts, breaks new ground in solving "The Art of War"'s difficult textual and contextual problems. He confronts complex questions concerning the authorship of the work, asserting that Sun Wu, a supposed strategist of the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.E.) to whom the text is traditionally attributed, never existed. Instead, Mair claims that "The Art of War" coalesced over a period of around seventy-five years, from the middle of the fourth century to the first quarter of the third century B.C.E.

Mair also reveals the way "The Art of War" reflects historical developments in technological and military strategy in civilizations throughout Eurasia, especially in regards to iron metallurgy. He demonstrates the close link between the philosophy in "The Art of War" and Taoism and discusses the reception of the text from the classical period to today. Finally, Mair highlights previously unaddressed stylistic and statistical aspects and includes philological annotations that present new ways of approaching the intellectual and social background of the work. A phenomenal achievement, Mair's comprehensive translation is an indispensable resource for today's students, strategists, and scholars.

The aim of defence procurement and production is to ensure quality, timeliness and value for money in provision of defence equipement to the armed forces. Recently new system and broad structures have been announced. However, the operating procedures have not been defined, these would necessarily to be set out and modernized.

In the spring of 1987, the father of China's strategic missile program, Qian Xuesen, told colleagues that China must steel itself for a century of sustained "intellectual warfare." His use of a military metaphor was not a linguistic quirk, but reflected the central role of the military in China's emergence as a modern state, especially in the period since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Over the course of the Communist era, a uniquely military approach to China's development became embedded in the ideologies of the country's political leadership, in policy choices about national security and economic development, and in the organizational solutions adopted to put these policies into practice.
This book tells the story of how and why the Chinese military came to play such a powerful role in China's economic and institutional development. It weaves together four stories: Chinese views of technology since 1950, the role of the military in China's political and economic life, the evolution of open and flexible conceptions of public management in China, and the technological dimensions of the rise of Chinese power.
But the book primarily explores and explains a paradox. This military approach to technology and development emerged during China's period of greatest external threat, 1950-69. Yet these policies and management methods persist even as China enjoys perhaps its most benign strategic environment since the 1840s.

After the unsuccessful Jameson Raid of 1896 the Kruger government realized how vulnerable the South African Republic was. Four forts were therefore built around Pretoria. For each fort a 155-mm gun was bought from the firm Schneider et Cie in Le Creusot, France. When the Anglo-Boer War erupted in 1899 these guns were taken from Pretoria to be used against the British at the sieges of Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberley. After the relief of these towns and especially after the Boers adopted guerrilla tactics, the Long Toms became a burden, because they could not easily be moved about. The result was that the Boers destroyed the Long Toms to prevent the guns being taken by the enemy.Several myths and legends about these four guns had their origin during the war. And, as is so typical with folklore, it is often difficult to distinguish between what is fact and what is fiction about the Long Toms, especially as accounts have come to us through the years by means of oral tradition. Were they really as formidable as the Boers made them out to be? Did they really outclass the British guns in range as well as in accuracy and effectiveness? And what happened to them eventually? Why are there today no Long Toms to be seen anywhere? How did they disappear? Were they destroyed by the Boers themselves and, if not, what happened to them after the war? Is there, as rumor has it, one lying somewhere in a hidden kloof where it was dumped by the Boers still waiting to be found? What happened to their remains? Why are the remains nowhere to be seen? Is there still a complete Long Tom somewhere in England?"