Despite the strong influence of just war theory in military law and practice, warfare is commonly considered devoid of morality. Yet even in the most horrific of human activities, there is frequent communication and cooperation between enemies. One remarkable example is the Christmas truce-unofficial ceasefires between German and English trenches in December 1914 in which soldiers even mingled in No Man's Land. In Conspiring with the Enemy, Yvonne Chiu offers a new understanding of why and how enemies work together to constrain violence in warfare. Chiu argues that what she calls an ethic of cooperation is found in modern warfare to such an extent that it is often taken for granted. The importance of cooperation becomes especially clear when wartime ethics reach a gray area: To whom should the laws of war apply? Who qualifies as a combatant? Should guerrillas or terrorists receive protections? Fundamentally, Chiu shows, the norms of war rely on consensus on the existence and content of the laws of war. In a wide-ranging consideration of pivotal instances of cooperation, Chiu examines weapons bans, treatment of prisoners of war, and the Geneva Conventions, as well as the tensions between the ethic of cooperation and the pillars of just war theory. An original exploration of a crucial but overlooked phenomenon, Conspiring with the Enemy is a significant contribution to military ethics and political philosophy.

Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792 - 1914 traces was in Europe from the French Revolution to the eve of the First World War. The nineteenth century was profoundly affected by the Napoleonic style of warfare, which influenced all subsequent military development and shaped Europe's history, borders and culture. Throughout, this fine book treats warfare as a social and political phenomenon no less than a military and technologial one, and includes discussions of:
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars
Napoleon III and the militarization of Europe
Bismark, Molkte, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71
New technologies and weapons
Seapower, imperialism and naval warfare
The origins and outbreak of the First World War
Blending original research on Bismark's Wars, Austria-Hungary and Italy with the latest scholarship on European armies and navies in the modern period, this book details the evolution of land and naval warfare and highlights the swirling interplay of society, politics and military decision making.

Is it legal to kill, or capture and confine, someone in war? Is this relevant or wise to ask in the reality of war? What does 'legal' actually mean in the labyrinth of overlapping international laws? This volume explores the meaning, relevance, and wisdom of questioning the 'legality' of the use of force against individuals in war by reconnecting legal thought with the social world. Weaving together law, social theories, and actual practices, the book presents an interdisciplinary study of the laws regulating warfare. The Use of Force against Individuals in War under International Law uncovers different conceptions of 'legality' that generate tensions among different international laws regulating warfare and highlights the limits of legal techniques in addressing these tensions. Accepting these tensions serves not to denigrate the law itself but to invite a deeper level of engagement with it - through the lens of social theories. Drawing on the insight that every social action results from an interaction between human agency and social structures, this publication argues that in regulating warfare, one distinct body of international law, the law of armed conflicts, accommodates the diminished agency of human beings operating in highly structured conditions while other bodies of international law harbour the potential to transform these very structured conditions. Thus, assimilating these laws, whether in court or real-world practices, fundamentally conflates their underlying social ontologies.

Any state at war attempts to steer the conflict to the point where it can demonstrate its relative advantage. Thus underlying each war is a struggle over its particular nature, and in a dynamic process each side attempts to shape a war paradigm that suits its own relative strengths, while the adversary attempts to impose its preferred paradigm on the conflict. Israel, for example, seemingly has an edge in military effectiveness, and has therefore always preferred short, decisive wars. Its enemies, however, have an overall advantage in stamina and ability to leverage the international system. They therefore strive to lengthen the war and bring Israel to the point of defeat through attrition of the Israeli political-civilian system. ... In The Nature of War: Conflicting Paradigms and Israeli Military Effectiveness, Ron Tira examines the different aspects that characterize a war, from the center of gravity to be attacked to the elements constituting military decision, as they are manifested in 'simple' symmetrical wars; asymmetrical wars versus a state opponent; guerilla warfare; parallel warfare; and next generation warfare. ... The author first surveys types of war and the circumstances whereby the classical doctrine of war is progressively less valid, and then devises additional analytical tools necessary to understand these more complex conflicts. The study examines the relevance of classical doctrine and applies these new tools and concepts to a range of historical examples, from the Second Punic War to World War II to some of Israel's main wars. The final case evaluated is the next generation of wars that Israel and other Western countries may find themselves fighting - wars against states that have adopted the guerilla paradigm. Published in association with the Institute for National Security Studies, Israel

It has been 2500 years since the Greek heavy infantry known as hoplites dominated the battlefield. Yet they still capture the imagination today, through a wave of successful action films, novels and documentaries. The mass-media popularity of these famed warriors has, however, helped spawn a number of misconceptions about them. Drawing on classical literature, archaeology and the latest data from physical, behavioral and medical science, this study of hoplite equipment, tactics and command seeks to separate modern myths from observable facts. The authors resolve some persistent controversies and advance new theories about the nature of ancient Greek warfare.

Wars throughout history have been fought in the name of ideology, religion and the pursuit of peace. Our thinking about war - when it is justified, how it should be fought and how it is perceived - has changed dramatically over time. Whereas in the past war has been seen as a battle of wills, this provocative and illuminating new book shows how war has evolved into an exercise in risk management.
In a rare blend of political science, sociology, history and cultural thought, Christopher Coker peels away the layers of meaning shrouding our current understanding of war and warfare. Using the ideas of writers such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck and Frank Furedi, he shows that risk has become the language of business, politics and public policy and so we should not be surprised that it has now become the language of war. The book highlights the increasing difference between homeland security and national security in the modern world, arguing that the defense of the citizen is often now more challenging than the defense of the state. By demonstrating the changing character and complexity of conflict from World War I to the current the current fight against terrorism, the book provides a powerful and highly distinctive account of the re-branding of war in an age of risk.
This book is set to ignite debate amongst students and scholars of international politics as well as appealing to anyone interested in war and its place in contemporary society.

Daniel Whittingham presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell (1859-1928). It tells the story of his life, which included service in military intelligence, the South African War, and on the General Staff before and during the First World War. It also presents the first comprehensive analysis of his writing: from his well-known books Small Wars (1896) and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance (1905), to a host of other books and articles that are presented here for the first time. Through a study of Callwell's life and works, this book offers a new perspective on the nature and study of military history, the character of British strategy, and on the army to which he belonged.

Philosophers have wrestled over the morality and ethics of war for nearly as long as human beings have been waging it. The death and destruction that unmanned warfare entails magnifies the moral and ethical challenges we face in conventional warfare and everyday society. Intrinsically linked are questions and perennial problems concerning what justifies the initial resort to war, who may be legitimately targeted in warfare, who should be permitted to serve the military, the collateral effects of military weaponry and the methods of determining and dealing with violations of the laws of war. This book provides a comprehensive and unifying analysis of the moral, political and social questions concerning the rise of drone warfare.

When is it permissible to move an issue out of normal politics and treat it as a security issue? How should the security measures be conducted? When and how should the securitization be reversed? Floyd offers answers to these questions by combining security studies' influential securitization theory with philosophy's long-standing just war tradition, creating a major new approach to the ethics of security: 'Just Securitization Theory'. Of interest to anyone concerned with ethics and security, Floyd's innovative approach enables scholars to normatively evaluate past and present securitizations, equips practitioners to make informed judgements on what they ought to do in relevant situations, and empowers the public to hold relevant actors accountable for how they view security.

Isn't war rooted in the vested interests of the ruling classes? (But have not democracies proved as bellicose as other states?) Should not political disputes be settled by civilised negotiations? (But what if the adversary is not, by your standards, 'civilised'?) Ought states to steer clear of other states' internal conflicts? (Or should they help liberate oppressed peoples?) Which is better, appeasement or a war to end war? Such questions reflect the confusion that still besets liberal-minded men and women in the face of war, despite centuries during which they have tried to discover its causes and secure its abolition. Sir Michael Howard traces the pattern in their attitudes from Erasmus to the Americans after Vietnam, and concludes that peacemaking 'is a task which has to be tackled afresh every day of our lives'.

Gartner and Segura consider the costs of war - both human and political - by examining the consequences of foreign combat, on domestic politics. The personal costs of war - the military war dead and injured - are the most salient measure of war costs generally and the primary instrument through which war affects domestic politics. The authors posit a general framework for understanding war initiation, war policy and war termination in democratic polities, and the role that citizens and their deaths through conflict play in those policy choices. Employing a variety of empirical methods, they examine multiple wars from the last 100 years, conducting analyses of tens of thousands of individuals across a wide variety of historical and hypothetical conditions, whilst also addressing policy implications. This study will be of interest to students and scholars in American foreign policy, international politics, public opinion, national security, American politics, communication studies, and military history.

Since World War II, the United States has been engaged in near-constant military conflict abroad, often with ill-defined objectives, ineffectual strategy, and uncertain benefits. In this era of limited congressional oversight and wars of choice, the executive and the armed services have shared the primary responsibility for making war. The negotiations between presidents and their generals thus grow ever more significant, and understanding them becomes essential.

Matthew Moten traces a sweeping history of the evolving roles of civilian and military leaders in conducting war, demonstrating how war strategy and national security policy shifted as political and military institutions developed, and how they were shaped by leaders personalities. Early presidents established the principle of military subordination to civil government, and from the Civil War to World War II the president s role as commander-in-chief solidified, with an increasingly professionalized military offering its counsel. But General Douglas MacArthur s insubordination to President Harry Truman during the Korean War put political-military tensions on public view. Subsequent presidents selected generals who would ally themselves with administration priorities. Military commanders in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan did just that and the results were poorly conceived policy and badly executed strategy.

The most effective historical collaborations between presidents and their generals were built on mutual respect for military expertise and civilian authority, and a willingness to negotiate with candor and competence. Upon these foundations, future soldiers and statesmen can ensure effective decision-making in the event of war and bring us closer to the possibility of peace."

Command assignments are the most cherished part of an officer`s career. Yet, they seem to have become stepping stones for career progression rather than a calling to be cherished and leave a legacy. Today officers assume the command of the units with inadequate regimental experience, as reflected in the number of untoward incidents in many units in the recent past. One took place in the author's division where the commanding officer abdicated command and left his unit in a state of anarchy. This book is the author's perspective on unit command, based on his wide experience and his command philosophy driven by passion, commitment and fearlessness. The book covers a wide range of important issues that a commanding officer has to deal with in war and peace. The author has emphasised that battalion command is all about leadership, and while the army order can appoint one a commanding officer, no order can appoint anyone a leader. That is a moral position which has to be earned through character, competence and personal example. This revised edition has addressed additional aspects such as emotional quotient, human quotient, officer-men relationship, directive style of command, leading from the front etc. as they apply to a commanding officer. The author emphasises the point that the raison d'etre for the unit's existence is to fight and win in war, thus, all activities of the unit must be oriented towards that. The book crystal gazes into the command challenges in future that cover a wide spectrum from human resource to the changing character of warfare and their implications for a commanding officer. The book highlights the immense responsibilities that a commanding officer shoulders, and therefore, the need for him to know his job thoroughly, to be fearless and selfless in command. The author believes that the single most important battle-winning factor is the 'Human Quotient' which needs to be nurtured through top-quality leadership top-down. Based on his experiences, practical recommendations on meaningful training, leadership development and operational effectiveness have been discussed. The author has listed the caveats that he followed as a commanding officer that made his command so special, distinctive and inspirational. They should be a Bible for any passionate commanding officer who wishes to leave his mark as a leader of substance. A must read for officers of all ranks.

A century ago Frederick Lanchester formulated a mathematical model of combat which suggested that the combat power of a military force was proportional to the product of the individual effectiveness of the units in the force and the square of the number of units deployed. This model reinforced a long-established faith in the importance of superior numbers. However, successive historical studies failed to identify any clear relationship between the numbers and losses in opposing forces. This Element analyses American Civil War battles, and shows that the ratio of losses incurred was inversely proportional to the ratio of numbers effectively engaged. This result demonstrates that the numbers of fighting units in a military force are less important than the ability of those units to get into action and inflict losses on the enemy. This result demonstrates the limitations of the Square Law, and should prevent it from being applied indiscriminately.

It is generally accepted in the West that Buddhism is a 'peaceful' religion. The Western public tends to assume that the doctrinal rejection of violence in Buddhism would make Buddhist pacifists, and often expects Buddhist societies or individual Asian Buddhists to conform to the modern Western standards of 'peaceful' behavior. This stereotype - which may well be termed 'positive Orientalism,' since it is based on assumption that an 'Oriental' religion would be more faithful to its original non-violent teachings than Western Christianity - has been periodically challenged by enthusiastic acquiescence by monastic Buddhism to the most brutal sorts of warfare. This volume demolishes this stereotype, and produces instead a coherent, nuanced account on the modern Buddhist attitudes towards violence and warfare, which take into consideration both doctrinal logic of Buddhism and the socio-political situation in Asian Buddhist societies. The chapters in this book offer a deeper analysis of 'Buddhist militarism' and Buddhist attitudes towards violence than previous volumes, grounded in an awareness of Buddhist doctrines and the recent history of nationalism, as well as the role Buddhism plays in constructions of national identity. The international team of contributors includes scholars from Thailand, Japan, and Korea.

Antulio J. Echevarria II reveals how successive generations of American strategic theorists have thought about war. Analyzing the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy Mitchell, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Henry Eccles, Joseph Wiley, Harry Summers, John Boyd, William Lind, and John Warden, he uncovers the logic that underpinned each theorist's critical concepts, core principles, and basic assumptions about the nature and character of war. In so doing, he identifies four paradigms of war's nature - traditional, modern, political, and materialist - that have shaped American strategic thought. If war's logic is political, as Carl von Clausewitz said, then so too is thinking about war.

A valuable collection of articles, which should be widely read. DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE Studies on war and violence in Bosnia, Somalia and other regions, their effect on ethnic minorities, and the intervention of political and other agencies. The great majority of today's wars take place within rather than between states and are often explained and justified by participants as the result of deep and ineradicable differences between "them" and "us". The contributors tothis book, whose disciplinary backgrounds include history, political science, international relations and anthropology, explore the growing importance of such 'ethnic' differences in a world that is also becoming more unified, politically, economically and culturally. They discuss the causes of internal war, the techniques used by nationalist politicians and intellectuals to turn ethnicity into a powerful political resource, the response of the UN and of non-governmental agencies to such "complex" political emergencies as those in former Yugoslavia and Somalia and the constitutional strategies that can be used to acknowledge and accommodate ethnic diversity. Taken together, the papers demonstrate that the relationship between ethnicity and war is not a simple matter of cause and effect. Ethnic differences are not given in nature, ethnicity does not arise suddenly andspontaneously but only in specific historical circumstances and it is unlikely to become a lethal force in human affairs except through the deliberate calculation of political elites. DAVID TURTON is Director of the Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford. CONTRIBUTORS: TOM GALLAGHER, STEFAN TROEBST, THOMAS ZITELMANN, KLAUS JUERGEN GANTZEL, JAKOB ROESEL, HARRY GOULBOURNE, IOAN LEWIS, MARK DUFFIELD.

The goal of war is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. But how this can be accomplished is a thorny issue. "Nothing Less than Victory" provocatively shows that aggressive, strategic military offenses can win wars and establish lasting peace, while defensive maneuvers have often led to prolonged carnage, indecision, and stalemate. Taking an ambitious and sweeping look at six major wars, from antiquity to World War II, John David Lewis shows how victorious military commanders have achieved long-term peace by identifying the core of the enemy's ideological, political, and social support for a war, fiercely striking at this objective, and demanding that the enemy acknowledges its defeat.

Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy--as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius's policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace.

Recognizing the human motivations behind military conflicts, "Nothing Less than Victory" makes a powerful case for offensive actions in pursuit of peace.

Throughout history society has determined specific rules of engagement between adversaries in armed conflict. With advances in technology, from armor to in the Middle Ages to nerve gas in World War I to weapons of mass destruction in our own time, the rules have constantly evolved. Today, when killing the enemy can seem palpably risk-free and tantamount to playing a violent video game, what constitutes warfare? What is the effect of remote combat on individual soldiers? And what are the unforeseen repercussions that could affect us all? Lt Col Wayne Phelps, former commander of a Remotely Piloted Aircraft unit, and Lt Col Dave Grossman, author of the landmark work On Killing and a leading scholar of the effects of killing on the human psyche, address these questions and many others as they tell the story of the men and women of today's "chair force." Exploring the ethics of remote military engagement, the misconceptions about PTSD among RPA operators, and the specter of military weaponry controlled by robots, their book is an urgent and compelling reminder that it should always be difficult to kill another human being lest we risk losing what makes us human.

The Lightning Warfare that changed history foreverIf Hitler had failed in his invasion of Western Europe in 1940 he could well have been assassinated by a group of his senior officers. But he decisively defeated the combined efforts of the British, French, Dutch and Belgian armies in a matter of days. The technique employed was known as Blitzkrieg or Lightning War. Nothing would be the same again. Although strands were clearly apparent by 1918, it was perfected through the interwar years before being deployed with terrifying effect by the Nazis at the outbreak of the Second World War. Eventually, other combatants would employ similar methods and the tide would turn. As well as discussing the developing nature of tactics, fighting vehicles and aircraft from 1918 onwards, the author examines the potent workings of Blitzkrieg in-depth, describing not only its obvious triumphs but also its fatal flaws. This is explosive military history from bestseller Bryan Perrett, perfect for readers of Antony Beevor or Damien Lewis.

Russian Information Warfare: Assault on Democracies in the Cyber Wild West examines how Moscow tries to trample the very principles on which democracies are founded and what we can do to stop it. In particular, the book analyzes how the Russian government uses cyber operations, disinformation, protests, assassinations, coup d'états, and perhaps even explosions to destroy democracies from within, and what the United States and other NATO countries can do to defend themselves from Russia's onslaught. The Kremlin has been using cyber operations as a tool of foreign policy against the political infrastructure of NATO member states for over a decade. Alongside these cyber operations, the Russian government has launched a diverse and devious set of activities which at first glance may appear chaotic. Russian military scholars and doctrine elegantly categorizes these activities as components of a single strategic playbook -- information warfare. This concept breaks down the binary boundaries of war and peace and views war as a continuous sliding scale of conflict, vacillating between the two extremes of peace and war but never quite reaching either. The Russian government has applied information warfare activities across NATO members to achieve various objectives. What are these objectives? What are the factors that most likely influence Russia's decision to launch certain types of cyber operations against political infrastructure and how are they integrated with the Kremlin's other information warfare activities? To what extent are these cyber operations and information warfare campaigns effective in achieving Moscow's purported goals? Dr. Bilyana Lilly addresses these questions and uses her findings to recommend improvements in the design of U.S. policy to counter Russian adversarial behavior in cyberspace by understanding under what conditions, against what election components, and for what purposes within broader information warfare campaigns Russia uses specific types of cyber operations against political infrastructure.

The rise of American Empire has coincided with appeals for a more humane war. But what if efforts to make war more ethical-to ban torture and limit civilian casualties-have only shored up the military enterprise and made it sturdier? During this period the campaign to abolish wars has transformed into to opposing war crimes, with fateful consequences. The ramifications of this shift became apparent in the post-9/11 era. By that time, the US military had embraced the agenda of humane war, driven both by the availability of precision weaponry and the need to protect its image. The battle shifted from the streets to the courtroom, where the tactics of the war on terror were litigated but its foundational assumptions went without serious challenge. These trends only accelerated during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Even as the two administrations spoke of American power and morality in radically different tones, they ushered in the second decade of the "forever" war. Humane is the story of how America went off to fight and never came back, and how armed combat was transformed from an imperfect tool for resolving disputes into an integral component of the modern condition. As American wars have become more humane, they have also become endless. This provocative book argues that this development might not represent progress at all.

Still in the early stages of development, conflict theory presents a growing interest in understanding the economic costs and benefits of conflicts. In this book, Mehrdad Vahabi analyses one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation, in which a dominant power hunts down its prey and the goal of the prey is to escape and thus survive. This contrasts with traditional warfare, in which two (or more) powers enter into a conflict and the goal is to fight to win domination. The economics of escape casts light on costs and benefits of predatory activities, and explores the impact of violence as an impediment to developing countries with respect to assets structure. This book is unprecedented in its research and thought, and develops a new theory of predation in economics that makes a significant contribution to the field.

'Foucault must be reckoned with by humanists, social scientists, and political activists' The New York Times Book Review Society Must Be Defended is Michel Foucault's devastating critique of the systems of power and control inherent in civilization. Taken from a series of lectures given by Foucault at the College de France in 1975-76, it reveals how war is the foundation of all power relations, and politics ultimately a continuation of battlefield violence. He offers a politically charged re-reading of history, with examples ranging from the Trojan myth to Nazi Germany, to show a continual, 'silent war' between the powerful and the powerless. 'A timely and prescient book, mainly because of what it says about the way in which war is necessary as a means of control' New Statesman Translated by David Macey