Despite the strong influence of just war theory in military law and practice, warfare is commonly considered devoid of morality. Yet even in the most horrific of human activities, there is frequent communication and cooperation between enemies. One remarkable example is the Christmas truce-unofficial ceasefires between German and English trenches in December 1914 in which soldiers even mingled in No Man's Land. In Conspiring with the Enemy, Yvonne Chiu offers a new understanding of why and how enemies work together to constrain violence in warfare. Chiu argues that what she calls an ethic of cooperation is found in modern warfare to such an extent that it is often taken for granted. The importance of cooperation becomes especially clear when wartime ethics reach a gray area: To whom should the laws of war apply? Who qualifies as a combatant? Should guerrillas or terrorists receive protections? Fundamentally, Chiu shows, the norms of war rely on consensus on the existence and content of the laws of war. In a wide-ranging consideration of pivotal instances of cooperation, Chiu examines weapons bans, treatment of prisoners of war, and the Geneva Conventions, as well as the tensions between the ethic of cooperation and the pillars of just war theory. An original exploration of a crucial but overlooked phenomenon, Conspiring with the Enemy is a significant contribution to military ethics and political philosophy.

What are the causes of war? How might the world be made more peaceful? In this landmark work of international relations theory, first published in 1959, the eminent realist scholar Kenneth N. Waltz offers a foundational analysis of the nature of conflict between states. He explores works by both classic political philosophers, such as St. Augustine, Hobbes, Kant, and Rousseau, and modern psychologists and anthropologists to discover ideas intended to explain war among states and related prescriptions for peace. Waltz influentially distinguishes among three "images" of the origins of war: those that blame individual leaders or human nature, those rooted in states' internal composition, and those concerning the structure of the international system. With a foreword by Stephen M. Walt on the legacy and continued relevance of Waltz's work, this anniversary edition brings new life to a perennial international relations classic.

The aim of defence procurement and production is to ensure quality, timeliness and value for money in provision of defence equipement to the armed forces. Recently new system and broad structures have been announced. However, the operating procedures have not been defined, these would necessarily to be set out and modernized.

When is it right to go to war? The most persuasive answer to this question has always been 'in self-defense'. In a penetrating new analysis, bringing together moral philosophy, political science, and law, David Rodin shows what's wrong with this answer. He proposes a comprehensive new theory of the right of self-defense which resolves many of the perplexing questions that have dogged both jurists and philosophers.

This volume illuminates the moral views on violence, from the moral restraint of the just-war tradition through pragmatic nonviolence to principled variations of pacifism.

Is it legal to kill, or capture and confine, someone in war? Is this relevant or wise to ask in the reality of war? What does 'legal' actually mean in the labyrinth of overlapping international laws? This volume explores the meaning, relevance, and wisdom of questioning the 'legality' of the use of force against individuals in war by reconnecting legal thought with the social world. Weaving together law, social theories, and actual practices, the book presents an interdisciplinary study of the laws regulating warfare. The Use of Force against Individuals in War under International Law uncovers different conceptions of 'legality' that generate tensions among different international laws regulating warfare and highlights the limits of legal techniques in addressing these tensions. Accepting these tensions serves not to denigrate the law itself but to invite a deeper level of engagement with it - through the lens of social theories. Drawing on the insight that every social action results from an interaction between human agency and social structures, this publication argues that in regulating warfare, one distinct body of international law, the law of armed conflicts, accommodates the diminished agency of human beings operating in highly structured conditions while other bodies of international law harbour the potential to transform these very structured conditions. Thus, assimilating these laws, whether in court or real-world practices, fundamentally conflates their underlying social ontologies.

The Soldier and the State in India is one of the first attempts at offering a theoretical perspective for examining some of the most critical issues that have emerged in Indian civil-military relations. It specifically examines issues pertaining to military expertise and military professionalism that emerged whenever there was a contestation in civil-military functions, thereby allowing the military greater influence in policy-making. The book uses Samuel Huntington's ideas on military professionalism and Peter Feaver's discussion of military expertise in the American context as the theoretical framework for addressing similar issues that have emerged in debates on Indian civil-military relations. Moreover, it also includes a serious focus on the role of the Indian military in counterinsurgency operations and the impact of Indian nuclear strategy on the relationship between civilians and the military in India. Most books on the subject have failed to address issues that emerge when there is a contestation in civil-military functions; this book seeks to fill that gap.

In this far-reaching exploration of the evolution of warfare in human history, Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson provide insight into the perennial questions of why and how humans fight. Beginning with the origins of warfare among foraging groups, "The Arc of War" draws on a wealth of empirical data to enhance our understanding of how war began and how it has changed over time. The authors point to the complex interaction of political economy, political and military organization, military technology, and the threat environment - all of which create changing incentives for states and other actors. They conclude that those actors that adapt survive, and those that do not are eliminated. In modern times, warfare between major powers has become exceedingly costly and therefore quite rare, while lesser powers are too weak to fight sustained and decisive wars or to prevent internal rebellions. Conceptually innovative and historically sweeping, "The Arc of War" represents a significant contribution to the existing literature on warfare.

Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792 - 1914 traces was in Europe from the French Revolution to the eve of the First World War. The nineteenth century was profoundly affected by the Napoleonic style of warfare, which influenced all subsequent military development and shaped Europe's history, borders and culture. Throughout, this fine book treats warfare as a social and political phenomenon no less than a military and technologial one, and includes discussions of:
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars
Napoleon III and the militarization of Europe
Bismark, Molkte, and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71
New technologies and weapons
Seapower, imperialism and naval warfare
The origins and outbreak of the First World War
Blending original research on Bismark's Wars, Austria-Hungary and Italy with the latest scholarship on European armies and navies in the modern period, this book details the evolution of land and naval warfare and highlights the swirling interplay of society, politics and military decision making.

Command assignments are the most cherished part of an officer`s career. Yet, they seem to have become stepping stones for career progression rather than a calling to be cherished and leave a legacy. Today officers assume the command of the units with inadequate regimental experience, as reflected in the number of untoward incidents in many units in the recent past. One took place in the author's division where the commanding officer abdicated command and left his unit in a state of anarchy. This book is the author's perspective on unit command, based on his wide experience and his command philosophy driven by passion, commitment and fearlessness. The book covers a wide range of important issues that a commanding officer has to deal with in war and peace. The author has emphasised that battalion command is all about leadership, and while the army order can appoint one a commanding officer, no order can appoint anyone a leader. That is a moral position which has to be earned through character, competence and personal example. This revised edition has addressed additional aspects such as emotional quotient, human quotient, officer-men relationship, directive style of command, leading from the front etc. as they apply to a commanding officer. The author emphasises the point that the raison d'etre for the unit's existence is to fight and win in war, thus, all activities of the unit must be oriented towards that. The book crystal gazes into the command challenges in future that cover a wide spectrum from human resource to the changing character of warfare and their implications for a commanding officer. The book highlights the immense responsibilities that a commanding officer shoulders, and therefore, the need for him to know his job thoroughly, to be fearless and selfless in command. The author believes that the single most important battle-winning factor is the 'Human Quotient' which needs to be nurtured through top-quality leadership top-down. Based on his experiences, practical recommendations on meaningful training, leadership development and operational effectiveness have been discussed. The author has listed the caveats that he followed as a commanding officer that made his command so special, distinctive and inspirational. They should be a Bible for any passionate commanding officer who wishes to leave his mark as a leader of substance. A must read for officers of all ranks.

Daniel Whittingham presents the first full-length study of one of Britain's most important military thinkers, Major-General Sir Charles E. Callwell (1859-1928). It tells the story of his life, which included service in military intelligence, the South African War, and on the General Staff before and during the First World War. It also presents the first comprehensive analysis of his writing: from his well-known books Small Wars (1896) and Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance (1905), to a host of other books and articles that are presented here for the first time. Through a study of Callwell's life and works, this book offers a new perspective on the nature and study of military history, the character of British strategy, and on the army to which he belonged.

War has been a key topic of speculation and theorizing ever since the invention of philosophy in classical antiquity. This anthology brings together the work of distinguished contemporary political philosophers and theorists who address the leading normative and conceptual issues concerning war. The book is divided into three parts: initiating war, waging war, and ending war. The contributors aim to provide a comprehensive introduction to each of these main areas of dispute concerning war. Each essay is an original contribution to ongoing debates on various aspects of war and also provides a survey of the main topics in each subfield. Serving as a companion to the theoretical issues pertaining to war, this volume also is an important contribution to debates in political philosophy. It can serve as a textbook for relevant courses on war offered in philosophy departments, religious studies programs, and law schools.

What makes a war just? What makes a specific weapon, strategy, or decision in war just? The tradition of Just War Theory has provided answers to these questions since at least 400 AD, yet each shift in the weapons and strategies of war poses significant challenges to Just War Theory. This book assembles renowned scholars from around the world to reflect on the most pressing problems and questions in Just War Theory, and engages with all three stages of war: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Providing detailed historical context as well as addressing modern controversies and topics including drones, Islamic jihad, and humanitarian intervention, the volume will be highly important for students and scholars of the philosophy of war as well as for others interested in contemporary global military and ethical issues.

What are the causes of war? How might the world be made more peaceful? In this landmark work of international relations theory, first published in 1959, the eminent realist scholar Kenneth N. Waltz offers a foundational analysis of the nature of conflict between states. He explores works by both classic political philosophers, such as St. Augustine, Hobbes, Kant, and Rousseau, and modern psychologists and anthropologists to discover ideas intended to explain war among states and related prescriptions for peace. Waltz influentially distinguishes among three “images” of the origins of war: those that blame individual leaders or human nature, those rooted in states’ internal composition, and those concerning the structure of the international system. With a foreword by Stephen M. Walt on the legacy and continued relevance of Waltz’s work, this anniversary edition brings new life to a perennial international relations classic.

Larry May argues that the best way to understand war crimes is as crimes against humanness rather than as violations of justice. He shows that in a deeply pluralistic world, we need to understand the rules of war as the collective responsibility of states that send their citizens into harm's way, as the embodiment of humanity, and as the chief way for soldiers to retain a sense of honour on the battlefield. Throughout, May demonstrates that the principle of humanness is the cornerstone of international humanitarian law, and is itself the basis of the traditional principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality. He draws extensively on the older Just War tradition to assess recent cases from the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia as well as examples of atrocities from the archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Wars throughout history have been fought in the name of ideology, religion and the pursuit of peace. Our thinking about war - when it is justified, how it should be fought and how it is perceived - has changed dramatically over time. Whereas in the past war has been seen as a battle of wills, this provocative and illuminating new book shows how war has evolved into an exercise in risk management.
In a rare blend of political science, sociology, history and cultural thought, Christopher Coker peels away the layers of meaning shrouding our current understanding of war and warfare. Using the ideas of writers such as Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck and Frank Furedi, he shows that risk has become the language of business, politics and public policy and so we should not be surprised that it has now become the language of war. The book highlights the increasing difference between homeland security and national security in the modern world, arguing that the defense of the citizen is often now more challenging than the defense of the state. By demonstrating the changing character and complexity of conflict from World War I to the current the current fight against terrorism, the book provides a powerful and highly distinctive account of the re-branding of war in an age of risk.
This book is set to ignite debate amongst students and scholars of international politics as well as appealing to anyone interested in war and its place in contemporary society.

When is it permissible to move an issue out of normal politics and treat it as a security issue? How should the security measures be conducted? When and how should the securitization be reversed? Floyd offers answers to these questions by combining security studies' influential securitization theory with philosophy's long-standing just war tradition, creating a major new approach to the ethics of security: 'Just Securitization Theory'. Of interest to anyone concerned with ethics and security, Floyd's innovative approach enables scholars to normatively evaluate past and present securitizations, equips practitioners to make informed judgements on what they ought to do in relevant situations, and empowers the public to hold relevant actors accountable for how they view security.

Isn't war rooted in the vested interests of the ruling classes? (But have not democracies proved as bellicose as other states?) Should not political disputes be settled by civilised negotiations? (But what if the adversary is not, by your standards, 'civilised'?) Ought states to steer clear of other states' internal conflicts? (Or should they help liberate oppressed peoples?) Which is better, appeasement or a war to end war? Such questions reflect the confusion that still besets liberal-minded men and women in the face of war, despite centuries during which they have tried to discover its causes and secure its abolition. Sir Michael Howard traces the pattern in their attitudes from Erasmus to the Americans after Vietnam, and concludes that peacemaking 'is a task which has to be tackled afresh every day of our lives'.

This book develops a new approach in explaining how a nation's Grand Strategy is constituted, how to assess its merits, and how grand strategies may be comparatively evaluated within a broader framework. The volume responds to three key problems common to both academia and policymaking. First, the literature on the concept of grand strategy generally focuses on the United States, offering no framework for comparative analysis. Indeed, many proponents of US grand strategy suggest that the concept can only be applied, at most, to a very few great powers such as China and Russia. Second, characteristically it remains prescriptive rather than explanatory, ignoring the central conundrum of why differing countries respond in contrasting ways to similar pressures. Third, it often understates the significance of domestic politics and policymaking in the formulation of grand strategies - emphasizing mainly systemic pressures. This book addresses these problems. It seeks to analyze and explain grand strategies through the intersection of domestic and international politics in ten countries grouped distinctively as great powers (The G5), regional powers (Brazil and India) and pivotal powers hostile to each other who are able to destabilize the global system (Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). The book thus employs a comparative framework that describes and explains why and how domestic actors and mechanisms, coupled with external pressures, create specific national strategies. Overall, the book aims to fashion a valid, cross-contextual framework for an emerging research program on grand strategic analysis.

This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises--ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines?
Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm--with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities--generally doesn't work.
Based on historical case analysis of successful "under-fire" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes, and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars "in real time."
His proposed method combines conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that, when properly applied, this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises.

John A. Vasquez explains the processes that cause the spread of interstate war by looking at how contagion worked to bring countries into the First World War. Analysing all the key states that declared war, the book is comprised of three parts. Part I lays out six models of contagion: alliances, contiguity, territorial rivalry, opportunity, 'brute force' and economic dependence. Part II then analyses in detail the decision making of every state that entered the war from Austria-Hungary in 1914 to the United States and Greece in 1917. Part III has two chapters - the first considers the neutral countries, and the second concludes the book with an overarching theoretical analysis, including major lessons of the war and new hypotheses about contagion. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, conflict studies and international history, especially those interested in the spread of conflict, or the First World War.

It is generally accepted in the West that Buddhism is a 'peaceful' religion. The Western public tends to assume that the doctrinal rejection of violence in Buddhism would make Buddhist pacifists, and often expects Buddhist societies or individual Asian Buddhists to conform to the modern Western standards of 'peaceful' behavior. This stereotype - which may well be termed 'positive Orientalism,' since it is based on assumption that an 'Oriental' religion would be more faithful to its original non-violent teachings than Western Christianity - has been periodically challenged by enthusiastic acquiescence by monastic Buddhism to the most brutal sorts of warfare. This volume demolishes this stereotype, and produces instead a coherent, nuanced account on the modern Buddhist attitudes towards violence and warfare, which take into consideration both doctrinal logic of Buddhism and the socio-political situation in Asian Buddhist societies. The chapters in this book offer a deeper analysis of 'Buddhist militarism' and Buddhist attitudes towards violence than previous volumes, grounded in an awareness of Buddhist doctrines and the recent history of nationalism, as well as the role Buddhism plays in constructions of national identity. The international team of contributors includes scholars from Thailand, Japan, and Korea.

The Lightning Warfare that changed history foreverIf Hitler had failed in his invasion of Western Europe in 1940 he could well have been assassinated by a group of his senior officers. But he decisively defeated the combined efforts of the British, French, Dutch and Belgian armies in a matter of days. The technique employed was known as Blitzkrieg or Lightning War. Nothing would be the same again. Although strands were clearly apparent by 1918, it was perfected through the interwar years before being deployed with terrifying effect by the Nazis at the outbreak of the Second World War. Eventually, other combatants would employ similar methods and the tide would turn. As well as discussing the developing nature of tactics, fighting vehicles and aircraft from 1918 onwards, the author examines the potent workings of Blitzkrieg in-depth, describing not only its obvious triumphs but also its fatal flaws. This is explosive military history from bestseller Bryan Perrett, perfect for readers of Antony Beevor or Damien Lewis.

This collection of counterfactual essays by noted historians analyzes incidents from military history spanning 3000 years to the end of the 20th-century. Broad speculative analysis is built from a wealth of detail, as some major turning points of military history are re-examined.

The goal of war is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. But how this can be accomplished is a thorny issue. "Nothing Less than Victory" provocatively shows that aggressive, strategic military offenses can win wars and establish lasting peace, while defensive maneuvers have often led to prolonged carnage, indecision, and stalemate. Taking an ambitious and sweeping look at six major wars, from antiquity to World War II, John David Lewis shows how victorious military commanders have achieved long-term peace by identifying the core of the enemy's ideological, political, and social support for a war, fiercely striking at this objective, and demanding that the enemy acknowledges its defeat.

Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy--as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius's policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace.

Recognizing the human motivations behind military conflicts, "Nothing Less than Victory" makes a powerful case for offensive actions in pursuit of peace.