This is a narrative drawn from the era of the Southeast Asian conflict, detailing a unique event in that lengthy struggle called Linebacker II. For the first time in contemporary warfare, heavy jet bombers were employed for their designed role to conduct extended strategic operations against the warmaking capacity of a hostile nation. This monograph tells part of the story of Strategic Air Command's participation in Linebacker II. In doing so it addressed the efforts of a complex mixture of Air Force and sister service operations, with all service working in concern towards a common goal. Rather than develop a complete chronology or blow-by-blow account, which are matters of record in other works, the campaign is pursued more form the personal perspective. Office of Air Force History. United States Air Force.

The untold tale of the first year of the Centaurs in Vietnam as told through the eyes of air cavalry helicopter pilots and grunts who built a troop from the ground up at Cu Chi based on teamwork, fighting ability, and guts. Climb aboard their Huey for an up close and personal account of the war.

Not your typical war story, this book captures an unvarnished account of how the Army formed an air cavalry troop in early 1966. "Rookies to war," the pilots were plucked out of the skies of places like Fort Rucker, Alabama, and joined by troopers from across America to fight a guerilla war in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam. There were no field manuals for this war, and air cavalry was just a glimmer in the eyes of reconnaissance, infantry, and artillery units.

This is the story of one year of the storied 25th Infantry Division, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry that left the paradise of Hawaii's shores for the heat, rain, mud, and guerilla warfare of Vietnam. The combination of helicopters, infantry, and a Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon (LRRP) makes for compelling reading as you follow the lives and battles of 30 different contributors.

There are stories of bravery and fear, ingenuity and innovation, humor and sadness, boredom and electrifying insertions and extractions of LRRP teams. In the end, you will grasp the brotherhood of war and appreciate the sacrifices of those that serve in the name of freedom.

This is the fourth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This volume details the change in focus of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps. III MAF, faced with a continued threat in 1967 of North Vietnamese large unit entry across the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams, turned over the Chu Lai enclave to the U .S. Army's Task Force Oregon and shifted the bulk of its forces-and its attention-northward. Throughout the year, the 3d Marine Division fought a conventional, large-unit war against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) near the demilitarized zone. The 1st Marine Division, concentrated in Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces, continued both offensive and pacification operations. Its enemy ranged from small groups of Viet Cong guerrillas in hamlets and villages up to formations as large as the 2d NVA Division. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided air support to both divisions, as well as Army and allied units in I Corps. The Force Logistic Command, amalgamated from all Marine logistics organizations in Vietnam, served all, major Marine commands. This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and II I MAF's perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity. It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. There are additional chapters on supporting arms and logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overall American effort. The nature of the war facing III MAF during 1967 forced the authors to concentrate on major operations, particularly those characterized by heavy combat. The uneven quality of the official reports submitted by combat units also played a role in selecting the materials presented in this volume. This is not meant to slight those whose combat service involved long, hot days on patrol, wearying hours of perimeter defense, an d innumerable operations, named and un-named . These Marines also endured fights just as deadly as the ones against large enemy regular units. III MAF's combat successes in 1967 came from the efforts of all Americans in I Corps.

Two hundred and fifty-five men earned the nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor, during Vietnam; fourteen Airmen, fifty-seven Marines, fifteen Sailors, and one hundred and seventy Soldiers. The author is donating all profits he receives equally to the American Legion, the Disabled America Veterans, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Brian D. Blodgett, a professor of History and Military History at the American Public University System (American Military University and American Public University). He is a native of Ohio and a retired U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer who served two tours in the Republic of South Korea. Both tours were with the 2nd Infantry Division, 1989-1990 as an Infantryman and 2003-2004 as an Intelligence Analyst. He resides in Maryland.

The Vietnam War stands uneasily on the edge of public memory - slipping into the past and becoming part of our national history, yet still too recent to be forgotten by those who lived through its trials. But history seeks a meaning in its clouded events, a retrospective order and pattern that could instruct, and sometimes even inspire, successive generations. At present, then, Americans face the peculiar dilemma of having to respond to the impact of a war for which there is still no comprehensively shared vision. One cannot expect broad enthusiasm for a vision of the past whose primary purpose is to justify current policies, acquisitions, deployment, and research. Americans have thought of themselves as individualistic and unruly people - a flattering self-image, though in some ways a false one. Indeed, during the Vietnam War it was the patience and long-suffering of the American people that most deserved comment. This was not the first war to fact great protest and challenge from Americans. Opposition to a massive commitment that was killing young Americans, as well as many Southeast Asians, should hardly have seemed surprising. What should have caused real surprise was how long it took for opposition to coalesce. In the end, the Vietnam experience ought to remind us of how well Americans can rally to a cause, even when it is poorly conceived and executed. But these are not the lessons of Vietnam. They are only illustrations of how we may come to different understandings of the Vietnam experience. The central lesson is that even when we cannot control the circumstances around us, we can still control ourselves. The use of military and political resources to have our way is not only a practical and technical issue, it is also a philosophical and moral one. It may be worth asking if we have ever won a war by betraying our own traditions and values. In this study, Dr. Donald J. Mrozek probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. He poses far more questions that he answers, and some of what he says may invite strong dissent. Yet it will serve its purpose if something here provokes creative thinking and critical reexamination, even of some long-cherished ideas. Viewing the Vietnam War as a logical outcome of American defense thinking has challenging implications, as does seeing the "cold war consensus" on foreign affairs as an oddity. Yet this is not a litany of objection and protest. Doctor Mrozek raises serious questions about how the contemporary notion of deterrence has emerged; and dealing with such questions forthrightly could make deterrence more effective. So, too, questions the past relationship of military professionals with the mass media is not an assignment of guilt but an invitation to develop a beneficial and cooperative relationship. Nor is this study a tale of gloom and despair; it is rather an appeal for self-consciousness and self-awareness. It is a plea for us to take command of the problems that beset us by taking control of ourselves first.

This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history-the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.

This is the second volume in a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the Ill Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

U.S. Marines as advisors have a long history, from Presley O'Bannon at Tripoli through Iraq and Afghanistan via Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Vietnam. While most Marines think of the Vietnamese Marine Corps as the primary advisory experience during that conflict, others served with various other advisory programs with the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Joint Special Operations, and U.S. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. One of these is the subject of this study: Marine advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). This narrative is a combination of experience, research, and reflection. While other journalistic or academic accounts have been published, this is a narrative of participants. Many historians consider the two most effective counterinsurgency organizations employed during the Vietnam War to have been the PRU and USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP). In both cases, U.S. Marines played a significant role in the success of these innovative programs. It should be pointed out, however, that the number of U.S. Marines assigned to these programs was small and the bulk of the forces were locally recruited fighters. Both programs used a small cadre of Marines providing leadership, training, and combat support for large numbers of indigenous troops, and in so doing, capitalized on the inherent strengths of each. The author believes that both of these programs have applicability in any counterinsurgency where U.S. forces are called upon to assist a host government. Obviously, adjustments to these programs would have to be made to take into account local conditions, but the core concept of providing U.S. Marines to command or advise local militia and special police units is one that has great promise for success. With a clear understanding of why the PRUs and CAPs worked, and with the necessary adjustments to take into account local conditions, similar units can be created to defeat future insurgencies. With this in mind, the author hopes that this work will provide U.S. military planners with insights into creating and managing units capable of defeating a well-organized and highly motivated insurgent political infrastructure.

"Abandoned in Place" provides a snapshot of the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. From the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, in January 1973, ending American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia to the "dysfunctional" POW/MIA accounting effort of 2014. With the period 1980 -1981 a clear line in the sand. As the U.S. government refocused its efforts from the rescue of surviving POWs to the recovery of remains. "Abandoned in Place" painstakingly details the intelligence available in 1980 that led to the conclusion American POWs survived in Laos, six years after the end of the Vietnam War. Using never before seen documents, the author reconstructs events leading up to a CIA reconnaissance mission, doomed from the start, to confirm the presence of POWs held deep in the Laotian jungle. As the CIA team headed toward the camp, members of the Joint Special Operation Command trained for a strike of surgical precision. Its mission rescue the POWs held at the camp known as Nhom Marrott. A lack of political will, bureaucratic failures, and leaks forced a stand-down order, condemning any surviving POWs. The author highlights the post Nhom Marrott government accounting effort, focusing on several specific POW/MIA cases. Crippled by a "mindset to debunk" officials ignored evidence of capture and survival in captivity. They edited witness statements to support pre-conceived conclusion of death and dismissed Vietnamese admissions of capture. This despite overwhelming evidence POWs not only survived but also continued to lay down signals in hopes of eventual rescue. Early Reviews - Col. Don Gordon (USA-Ret) Special Operations Command, J2 Director of Intelligence 1980-1983 - "O'Shea leads readers to form their own reasoned conclusions. She writes the most comprehensive and thoroughly researched compendium, private or government, classified or unclassified, about this complicated and emotional subject. It is an event long needed to be told accurately and with respect for the missing in action and their families. O'Shea is fidelis to that cause. She carefully distinguishes fact from speculation. Abandoned in Place is a meticulously detailed, thoroughly verified, and reliable story, well told. It describes plans to rescue about 35 United States Military servicemen strongly believed held in a prison camp in Laos in 1980. Step-by-step, O'Shea builds a strong case that some US military likely remained under North Vietnamese and Lao control after the war." Former Senator and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Bob Smith - "Lynn O'Shea has provided the best in depth analysis ever written and brilliantly combined over 25 years of personal research, evidence and a chronological portrayal of the facts to prove, without any doubt, that America left men behind in Southeast Asia at the end of the Viet Nam War. When we were told that the North Vietnamese, Lao and Viet Cong had complied with the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and returned all of our men, the evidence shows that was an outright lie and many of our government leaders and the intelligence community knew it." Dr. Jeffrey Donahue, Brother of Major Morgan Donahue - "Lynn masterfully connects a mind-boggling array of dots to not only affirm the truth of the Indochina POW-MIA issue but also to rigorously convey how and why the U.S. government knowingly left men behind and then covered it up. Lynn has woven together tens of thousands of documents and countless hours of interviews to produce a cogent and unassailable profile of one of the most tragic episodes of modern American history. The how and why have never been so brilliantly researched, documented and conveyed."

The author first served with Vietnamese Marines in 1972 when they came on board the U.S. Navy ships that Battalion Landing Team 1/9 was embarked on. They were preparing for an amphibious landing to counter the North Vietnamese Army's Spring Offensive in Military Region 1 (I Corps) in South Vietnam. They brought with them their U.S. Marine advisors who were known by the senior members of the battalion. They had already witnessed or heard of the exploits of then-Captain John Ripley and Lieutenant Colonel Gerry Turley in blunting the initial attacks of the Easter Offensive. As the Vietnamese were formed into helicopter or boat teams and fed a meal before going ashore, they bantered with the American Marines and Sailors, telling them to come along to "kill communists." After a turbulent start to the offensive, the Vietnamese Marines exhibited the fighting spirit that elite units create for themselves. This was reflected in the various names of their battalions that were the focus of their unit identification. The infantry battalions had a series of nicknames and slogans that were reflected on their unit insignia: 1st Battalion's "Wild Bird," 2d Battalion's "Crazy Buffalo," 3d Battalion's "SeaWolf," 4th Battalion's "Killer Shark," 5th Battalion's "Black Dragon," 6th Battalion's "Sacred Bird," 7th Battalion's "Black Tiger," 8th Battalion's "Sea Eagle," and 9th Battalion's "Mighty Tiger." For the artillery units, this was the 1st Battalion's "Lightning Fire," 2d Battalion's "Sacred Arrow," and 3d Battalion's "Sacred Bow." Support and service battalions followed this example as well. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade and its embarked troops provided helicopters, amphibious tractors, and landing craft support for a series of attacks leading to the recapture of Quang Tri City through the fall of 1972. In addition, command and control facilities and liaison were provided to the Republic of Vietnam's I Corps and Military Advisory Command Vietnam's 1st Regional Advisory Command in the sustained counteroffensive. This reinforced the impression made by the Vietnamese Marines themselves. This began the interest in the story that follows. The period after World War II saw a number of associated Marine Corps formed in the republics of China, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. They had been founded, with the help of foreign military aid, to fight the various conflicts to contain communist expansion in the region. Also present at various times were other Marines from the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. The beginnings of the Cold War witnessed this proliferation of amphibious forces in Asia, in part because of the reputation the U.S. Marines had earned in the cross Pacific drive against Japan and in other postwar confrontations. This is about one of them, the Vietnamese Marine Corps or Thuy Quan Luc Chien (TQLC). This occasional paper provides documents on the topics of the Vietnamese Marines and the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit from this period.

James V. Weatherill served as an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968. His memoir, THE BLADES CARRY ME: INSIDE THE HELICOPTER WAR IN VIETNAM, takes the reader into the CH-47 Chinook helicopter cockpit and the daily life of a 22-year-old pilot. The young man must reconcile his ideals of patriotism, courage, and honor with the reality and politics of a war where victory is measured by body-count ratios instead of territory gained or lost. When it's time to go home, he realizes he'll leave more than war behind. On the home front, the pilot's wife, Annie, provides a counterpoint as a pregnant college senior and military spouse during an unpopular war. With letters and tape recordings their sole means of communication, how will they grow up without growing apart?

During the Vietnam War, when conventional warfare tactics weren't proving enough to eliminate Communist insurgency, the U.S. Army implemented small unit operations to take a new kind of fight to the enemy. Five to six man Long Range Patrol teams, composed of specially trained young enlisted soldiers, went behind enemy lines to gather intelligence on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units, capture POWs, or set deadly ambushes that unnerved the enemy in their once-thought-secure jungle sanctuaries. These Long Range Patrol or LRP teams would lead to the re-establishment of the 75th Infantry Ranger Companies in combat and would carry on the proud history and legacy of the U.S. Army Rangers. It would also earn them a coveted place in special operations units, at times at a painful and deadly cost. In this remarkably humble, first-hand account, Seymour covers what it took to do 54 LRP/Ranger missions behind the lines, and the dozens of team insertions and white knuckle extractions that he took part in. In The Jungle... Camping with the Enemy offers a unique and personal insight from an extraordinary soldier and those who served as LRP/Rangers with the U.S. Army First Air Cavalry Division.

Hovering Horizons is the exciting, at times death-defying story of Kenneth Whitley, decorated Vietnam Veteran Cobra pilot. It details how his boyhood in a small Texas town helped create the warrior he became. It takes readers through the many perils and split second decisions that he needed to make to stay alive in Vietnam. It then continues his journey as he flew choppers in Arabia and Africa, where he also met with exciting challenges of a completely different nature. Hovering Horizons is an excellent read for veterans, pilots, thrill-seekers, history buffs, or anyone who has ever wondered what it's like to live (not just travel) all around the world. His unique stories and insights will keep you turning the pages, and when you're finished, you'll wish there were more. It's that intriguing.

Hog's Exit explores the mysterious death in 1982 of Jerry "Hog" Daniels, a former CIA case officer to legendary Hmong leader General Vang Pao during the U.S.'s "secret war" in Laos. Drawing on first-person reminiscences of Daniels's colorful life, Morrison also captures the drama and beauty of the Hmong spirit rituals, as well as the lamentations and suspicions that pervade this unusual funeral ceremony. Americans and Hmong, ranchers and refugees, State Department officials and smokejumpers, share their memories about Daniels: growing up; hunting and fishing in Montana; cheating death in Laos; and carousing in the bars and brothels of Thailand. Hog's Exit provides a fascinating view of a man and the two very different cultures in which he lived.

John Vanvorden--the Flying Dutchman--is a Vietnam pilot and one of the rugged few who know the danger and thrill of combat while piloting the U.S. Army's UH-1H "Huey" Iroquois helicopter. He experiences screaming descents into hot landing zones to place military assault troops and rescue wounded soldiers. He has the clarity of mind to survive seven days of horror in a Vietnamese jungle swamp while the psychology of a fellow soldier is severely tested. He's got the guts to buck military orders and battle his own brass to pursue an investigation when a botched operation spells disaster for the men under him. Based on the authors' personal experiences in the Vietnam War, Huey is an authentic, action-filled book of historical fiction. Originally published 30 years ago, this moving novel became a New York Times bestseller within days of publishing. Editorial Reviews "Those who have read the classic book of helicopter combat in Vietnam, "Chickenhawk" by Robert Mason, but who still have an appetite for more books of that sort can do no better than to read this novel." - "The VVA Veteran," Books in Review II Book Excerpt: From eight thousand feet, the Flying Dutchman flew his chopper into a nose-high attitude and peeled off into a single-ship approach. His passengers were looking straight down at the ground from the open doorway. Before anyone could blink, they were diving toward the ground at four thousand feet a minute, about as fast as a helicopter can come out of the sky with its main rotor still attached. The 12.7's opened up. Tracer rounds looked like basketballs zooming by. The supersonic bullets popped as they passed, breaking the sound barrier. When a bullet found its mark, it smacked the ship like a baseball bat. As soon as the troops on the ground had hefted the two critical cases into each side, John blasted out low level, taking fire from the ground. He knew the Huey didn't have long before it became battered magnesium. . . .

This book examines Operation SEALORDS, the capstone campaign conducted by the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam. Specifically, this paper addresses the primary question: Was the SEALORDS campaign successful, and if so, what lessons, can be learned from SEALORDS and how might we employ brown-water forces in the future? This book breaks down the SEALORDS campaign into three areas of study. First, the study examines the barrier interdiction portion of the campaign designed to stem the flow of enemy infiltration of men and material from Cambodia into the Mekong Delta. Second, this study analyzes the Denial of Sanctuary Operations and Pacification portion of the SEALORDS operations. Lastly, the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese Program known as "ACTOV" is examined to determine its effectiveness. The Findings of this book suggest that by concentrating naval forces athwart the major infiltration routes along the Cambodian border, SEALORDS effectively cut enemy lines of communication into South Vietnam and severly restricted enemy attempts at infiltration. Additionally, the findings suggest that SEALORDS contributed significantly to pacification efforts in the southern part of III Corps and all of the TV Corps Tactical Zone. Finally, the ACTOV Program is evaluated as successful and put the navy out ahead of the other services with respect to Vietnamization of the war effort.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the first new agency established by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara after he assumed office in 1961. The ambitious McNamara intended to reformulate U.S. strategic nuclear policy and reduce inefficiencies that had developed in the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1950s. DIA was the lynchpin to both efforts. In the early and middle 1960s, McNamara and his subordinates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and new DIA Director Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll (USAF), worked hard to establish the Agency, but their efforts were delayed or stymied by intransigent and parochial military leadership who objected to the creation of DIA because they feared a loss of both battlefield effectiveness and political influence in Washington, D.C.1 The work of building the DIA was made all the more urgent by the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. By the early 1960s, millions of dollars and hundreds of advisory personnel sent by the U.S. were having a negligible impact on the anti-communist campaign there. As the U.S. continued to commit more resources to the ill-fated government in Saigon, the country found itself drawn deeper and deeper into the maelstrom. For DIA, the looming war in Southeast Asia would expose major problems in its organization and performance. Especially in the period from 1961 to 1969, DIA, either because of structural weaknesses or leadership failures, often failed to energetically seize opportunities to assert itself in the major intelligence questions involving the conflict there. This tendency was exacerbated by national military leadership's predilection for ignoring or undercutting the Agency's authority. In turn, this opened up DIA to severe criticism by Congress and other national policymakers, some of whom even considered abolishing the Agency. During the war, McNamara's great hope for reforming military intelligence would be swept up in quarrels between powerful domestic adversaries, and DIA's performance left the Secretary of Defense deeply embittered toward his creation. It was only at the end of the war that DIA assumed a more influential role in Southeast Asia. Until then, however, the Agency was consigned to the wilderness when it came to questions about the Vietnam conflict.

Among the many horrors of the Vietnam War, some of the most brutal and, until now, least documented were the experiences of the American prisoners of war, many of whom endured the longest wartime captivity, of any POWs in U.S. history. With this book, two of the most respected scholars in the field offer a comprehensive, balanced, and authoritative account of what happened to the nearly eight hundred Americans captured in Southeast Asia. The authors were granted unprecedented access to previously unreleased materials and interviewed over a hundred former POWs, enabling them to meticulously reconstruct the captivity record as well as produce an evocative narrative of a once sketchy and misunderstood, yet key chapter of the war. Powerful and moving in its portrayal of how men sought to cope with physical and psychological ordeals under the most adverse conditions, this landmark study separates fact from fiction. Its analysis of the shifting tactics and temperaments of captive and captor as the war evolved skillfully weaves domestic political developments and battlefield action with prison scenes that alternate between Hanoi's concrete cells, South Vietnam's jungle stockades, and mountain camps in Laos. Giving due praise but never shirking from criticism, the authors describe in gripping detail dozens of cases of individual courage and resistance from celebrated heroes like Jim Stockdale, Robinson Risner, Jeremiah Denton, Bud Day, and Nick Rowe to lesser known legends like Major Ray Schrump and Medal of Honor winner Donald Cook. Along with epic accounts of endurance under torture, breathtaking escape attempts, and remarkable prisoner communication efforts, they also reveal Code of Conduct lapses and instances of outright collaboration with the enemy. Published twenty-five years after Operation Homecoming, which brought home 591 POWs from Vietnam, this tour-de-force history is a compelling and important work that serves as a testament to tile courage, faith, and will of Americans in captivity, as well as a reminder of the sometimes impossible demands made on U.S. servicemen under the Code of Conduct in prisoner of war situations. It is vividly illustrated with maps, prisoners' renderings of camps and torture techniques, and dozens of photographs, many never before published. d and shameful conditions. It includes insightful analyses of the circumstances and conditions of captivity and its varying effects on the prisoners, the strategies and tactics of captors and captives, the differences between captivity in North and South Vietnam and between Laos and Vietnam, and analysis of the quality of the source materials for this and other works on the subject.

The author was an infantry squad leader and platoon sergeant in the famed 101st Airborne Division in the last years of the war in Vietnam. His poems, written often in foxholes and on bunker lines, trace a year-long tour of duty to chronicle the fear, hope, pride, guilt, and frustration of a combat soldier, and the issues of dealing with the experiences of war after separation from service. All profits from the sale of this book will be donated to support the programs of the 506th Airborne Infantry Regiment Association, a nonprofit veterans organization which strongly supports active duty soldiers.

This book looks at the Air Force's support of the ground war in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1968. The book covers the period of time when the United States began moving from an advisory role to one of active involvement to just before the time when the United Stated gradually began disengaging from the war. The final scene is the successful air campaign conducted during the Communists siege of the Marine camp at Khe Sanh. While the actual siege lasted from late January to the middle of March 1968, enemy preparations for the encirclement were seen as early as October 1967.

This monograph is an exciting and moving account of how all our Services, as well as several civilian agencies, pulled together to pull off the largest aerial evacuation in history - what many have referred to as the modern day Dunkirk. The authors have carefully pieced together an amazing story of courage, determination and American ingenuity. Above all, it is a story about saving lives, one that is seldom told in times of war.