James V. Weatherill served as an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968. His memoir, THE BLADES CARRY ME: INSIDE THE HELICOPTER WAR IN VIETNAM, takes the reader into the CH-47 Chinook helicopter cockpit and the daily life of a 22-year-old pilot. The young man must reconcile his ideals of patriotism, courage, and honor with the reality and politics of a war where victory is measured by body-count ratios instead of territory gained or lost. When it's time to go home, he realizes he'll leave more than war behind. On the home front, the pilot's wife, Annie, provides a counterpoint as a pregnant college senior and military spouse during an unpopular war. With letters and tape recordings their sole means of communication, how will they grow up without growing apart?

John Vanvorden--the Flying Dutchman--is a Vietnam pilot and one of the rugged few who know the danger and thrill of combat while piloting the U.S. Army's UH-1H "Huey" Iroquois helicopter. He experiences screaming descents into hot landing zones to place military assault troops and rescue wounded soldiers. He has the clarity of mind to survive seven days of horror in a Vietnamese jungle swamp while the psychology of a fellow soldier is severely tested. He's got the guts to buck military orders and battle his own brass to pursue an investigation when a botched operation spells disaster for the men under him. Based on the authors' personal experiences in the Vietnam War, Huey is an authentic, action-filled book of historical fiction. Originally published 30 years ago, this moving novel became a New York Times bestseller within days of publishing. Editorial Reviews "Those who have read the classic book of helicopter combat in Vietnam, "Chickenhawk" by Robert Mason, but who still have an appetite for more books of that sort can do no better than to read this novel." - "The VVA Veteran," Books in Review II Book Excerpt: From eight thousand feet, the Flying Dutchman flew his chopper into a nose-high attitude and peeled off into a single-ship approach. His passengers were looking straight down at the ground from the open doorway. Before anyone could blink, they were diving toward the ground at four thousand feet a minute, about as fast as a helicopter can come out of the sky with its main rotor still attached. The 12.7's opened up. Tracer rounds looked like basketballs zooming by. The supersonic bullets popped as they passed, breaking the sound barrier. When a bullet found its mark, it smacked the ship like a baseball bat. As soon as the troops on the ground had hefted the two critical cases into each side, John blasted out low level, taking fire from the ground. He knew the Huey didn't have long before it became battered magnesium. . . .

No experience etched itself more deeply into Air Force thinking than the air campaigns over North Vietnam. Two decades later in the deserts of Southwest Asia, American airmen were able to avoid the gradualism that cost so many lives and planes in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Readers should come away from this book with a sympathetic understanding of the men who bombed North Vietnam. Those airmen handled tough problems in ways that ultimately reshaped the Air Force into the effective instrument on display in the Gulf War. This book is a sequel to Jacob Van Staaveren's Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam, 1965-1966, which we have also declassified and are publishing. Wayne Thompson tells how the Air Force used that failure to build a more capable service-a service which got a better opportunity to demonstrate the potential of air power in 1972. Dr. Thompson began to learn about his subject when he was an Army draftee assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan during the Vietnam War. He took time out from writing To Hanoi and Back to serve in the Checkmate group that helped plan the Operation Desert Storm air campaign against Iraq. Later he visited Air Force pilots and commanders in Italy immediately after the Operation Deliberate Force air strikes in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force over Serbia and its Kosovo province, he returned to Checkmate. Consequently, he is keenly aware of how much the Air Force has changed in some respects-how little in others. Although he pays ample attention to context, his book is about the Air Force. He has written a well-informed account that is both lively and thoughtful.

This is the second volume in a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the Ill Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1975 study. The Air Staff tasked Project CHECO to write continuing reports on counterinsurgency in Thailand. Normally, the first work in a continuing report series describes the overall situation, and subsequent reports provide annual or biannual updates. Underlying details about the Thai insurgency, however, have slowly been coming to light over the past few years, therefore, counterinsurgency has necessarily continued to evolve and past CHECO works on counterinsurgency have been limited to reporting the specific end events of force and counter force. This study attempts to delimit the background to the Thai insurgency and counterinsurgency. Preliminary surveys of the literature and data available indicated that insurgency and counterinsurgency in Thailand have been well documented but that pertinent information is scattered throughout a multitude of separate reports and studies by many agencies. Consequently, one must read numerous publications to become enlightened on all but the most narrowly focused insurgency/counterinsurgency topics. This report attempts to integrate in one volume for the staff officer a broad background and wide perspective of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Thailand. It extracts from many of the completed works and indicates where more detail can be found. It avoids duplicating lengthy explanations already published, avoids citing detailed statistics on armed conflict which are all too often misleading indicators, and avoids discussing personalities which have been important but are left to more exhaustive studies. Due to the nature of its comprehensive approach, this report only indicates the complexities of the Thai insurgency/counterinsurgency and sketches in broadest terms the cultural heritage of the Thai.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. A study requested by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 showed that "when national interests are involved and tactical forces are deployed without a declaration of national emergency or war, a quick-reacting, heavy repair force, organic to the Air Force, is essential." Between June and September 1965, a study group from the Directorate of Civil Engineering at Headquarters USAF had analyzed the problem and obtained Air Staff approval to form such a force. On 23 September 1965, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given responsibility for organizing, training, procuring equipment and supplies, and administering the formation of the first two Red Horse Squadrons (the 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons). By 18 October 1965, Hq TAC at Langley Field, Virginia, completed and distributed a comprehensive programming plan covering the objectives, timetable of actions, reporting procedures, staffing requirements, and the naming of primary and subordinate unit project officers. The mission and capabilities of the squadrons, their limitations, and material requirements were also recorded. Thus, in the fall of 1965, responding to the changing military and political situation in Southeast Asia and the projected need for a rapid increase of U.S. military forces in that part of the world, Project RED HORSE was initiated. The rapidity of planning, organizing, and executing which characterized these early beginnings, was to become a permanent part of RED HORSE activities.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study.The primary mission of Ranch Hand was defoliation and crop destruction. Defoliation was directed against enemy strongholds, roadsides, power lines, railroads, and other lines of communication. The objectives were to increase visibility for Forward Air Controller (FAC) and tactical aircraft and to make it more difficult for the enemy to ambush ground forces. Two herbicides were used for. defoliation: Orange, a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chlorophenoxy acids; and White, a mixture of 2,4-D and picloram. Crop destruction was directed at food plots of enemy troops, the objective being to increase their logistics problem. The herbicide used for crop denial missions was Agent Blue, a sodium salt of cacodylic acid. Proposed targets were carefully screened at all echelons. Requests for defoliation and crop destruction were originated by army commanders at or below the province level. The request, when approved by the Province Chief, was sent to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). With their approval, it went to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) which reviewed specific target areas and operational requirements. A coordination meeting was then held at the province where the final plan was agreed upon. Following this, an operations order was published by the JGS and an execution order issued by MACV. It required approximately six months from the time the request for defoliation was first submitted until the final plan was agreed upon by all levels of command. A second mission of the Ranch was that of conducting airlift operations as directed by higher authority. This was accomplished by removing the spray tanks and spray booms from the aircraft and installing the conveyors and other essential equipment for airlift operations. The conversion, when required, was accomplished in less than 24 hours.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 eport. "The War in Vietnam--July - December 1967" summarizes and provides an overall look at the Air Force role in North and South Vietnam for the semi- annual period. It is a continuation of the summary of Air Force operations first detailed in "The War in Vietnam - 1965." ROLLING THUNDER gradually increased the weight of effort against a broadening, but still limited, target complex. The high incidence of radar-directed guns and SA-2s in the extended battle area also required changes in tactics by strike and reconnaissance forces. Close air support was instrumental in breaking the enemy attacks on Dak To, Loc Ninh, and Bo Duc, often by putting ordnance within 20 feet of prepared Allied positions. Airlift units retained their basic organizational structure and successfully supported the Allied requirements at Loc Ninh and Dak To. Flying safety was the paramount problem confronting the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and by August, aircraft losses due to pilot error exceeded combat losses, until finally an intensive instrument training program was initiated. The denial of crops through herbicide destruction often placed a severe strain on the enemy supply system, forcing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) out of their normal operating areas. Enemy attacks against air bases with a steadily improving rocket capability continued to present formidable problems. Successful efforts were made during the period to substantially increase the B-52 monthly sortie rate to keep pressure on the enemy's supply and infiltration system, while at the same time blocking his efforts to mass along the DMZ.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 study."The War in Vietnam" provides an overall look at the Southeast Asia situation, as it relates to the role of the United States Air Force. Intensifying its air operations, the USAF increased its close air support, interdiction, fixed-wing, and helicopter support. New tactics were also used to improve the Search and Rescue capability in highly defended areas and measures were devised to minimize limitations of aircraft in recovering downed airmen. In an effort to exhaust enemy resources and remove his sanctuaries in North Vietnam, one of the major objectives of the air campaign was greater targeting freedom. A probing for target alternatives showed destruction of hard-to-replace vehicles could be more effective than "cratering a road, interdicting a rail line, or destroying a bridge." Since enemy strategy emphasized prolonging the war by keeping the U.S. out of the: Hanoi/Haiphong region, CINCPAC enumerated methods of attacking his air defense system, including MIG air bases and aircraft on the ground.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the improvement and modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) from January 1970 to July 1971. The growth and development of the VNAF during this period was an integral part of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP). The goal of CRIMP was to assure the self-sufficiency of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) after the withdrawal of United States combat forces. Self-sufficiency in this context implied that the armed forces of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) could maintain the level of security that had been won jointly by the United States and South Vietnam. This did not mean that United States assistance would no longer be required to protect South Vietnamese independence. South Vietnam did not possess or plan to develop the industrial capacity to produce the equipment necessary for defense. The United States would continue to provide the materiel support for the defense of South Vietnam, as well as a military team to advise the RVNAF--but the RVNAF would have the capability of effectively using that equipment to maintain the security of South Vietnam without the active armed assistance of United States military forces. Though the United States advisory effort would still be needed, the United States would no longer be required to bear arms in defense of South Vietnam. That is the meaning of the term "self-sufficiency" as it is used in this study.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1971 study. The period from July 1971 through the end of 1973 was a time of transition, growth, and profound challenge for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). As U.S. personnel continued to withdraw from South Vietnam (SVN), the VNAF was faced with growing combat requirements and demanding force expansions. Then, following a massive Communist offensive in the Spring of 1972, VNAF personnel, support, and operational capabilities were pushed to the limit to respond to intensified combat needs, force structure increases, and accelerated squadron activation schedules. These difficulties were overshadowed in late 1972 when, in anticipation of a cease-fire and an accompanying total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, there was an unprecedented infusion of aircraft and equipment into South Vietnam, and a massive transfer of remaining U.S. facilities to the South Vietnamese. Once more the VNAF force structure was expanded and activation schedules were accelerated. Shortly thereafter, on 27 January 1973, the Agreement to End the War and Restore Peace in Vietnam was signed, and during the next 60 days U.S. forces and advisors were withdrawn from Vietnam. Unfortunately, the "cease-fire' did not bring with it a period of peace and stability, thus necessitating continuing VNAF combat requirements in addition to its monumental transition, expansion, and training tasks. The combination of these factors--marked VNAF growth, continuing combat requirements, and withdrawal of U.S. forces and advisors--presented the VNAF with its greatest challenge of the conflict. This report examines the events which occurred, the goals pursued, the problems encountered, and the achievements attained in the program to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force between July 1971 and December 1973. It also addresses the limitations which, as of the end of 1973, remained to be overcome on the road toward VNAF self-sufficiency.

This recently declassified 1967 report traces the development of the Assault Airlift capability from its inception through June, 1966. its growth, and the problems associated therewith including equipment, support, facilities and personnel are discussed. Operations during the French/Indo China War are briefly covered in the Introduction as well as "interim" operations following the close of that conflict and up to 1 January 1961. From the latter date, forward, the accomplishments of the 315th Air Division in its assault airlift role are more detailed. To examine the role of assault airlift in Southeast Asia without considering the effects of "out-country," or inter-theater airlift efforts would leave unexplained many of the logistical handicaps under which assault airlift operates today. Hence, the reader will find several references to "out-country" airlift and to organization and control beyond the geographical limits of South Vietnam.

This is the true story of the nurses who served a twelve month tour of duty with the 12th/483rd USAF Hospital, Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, Republic of Vietnam from 1965-1972. It was a nasty war in a remote land on the far side of the world; its rationale a mystery to many who were called to sacrifice for a country not fully committed to the fray. This is an untold story of the second largest military hospital in South Vietnam and of its courageous medical team. It is a poignant tale of the countless wounded soldiers whose mangled bodies were pieced together and often sent back into the endless battle... I went to Washington, D.C. in 1993 to attend the dedication of the statue to honor the women veterans who served during the Viet Nam Era. When I went to the stage area, where the march down Constitution Avenue was to begin, I was told by one of the Army Nurses that only those who served one year in the country could march up front. Well, I informed her that I was stationed at the large Air Force Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay for one year. She told me that she wasn't aware of that Air Force hospital. So, when I returned to my home, I decided to contact nurses that were stationed in Cam Ranh Bay before, during and after me. They rapidly sent pictures and stories of their tour. It is with thanks to these ladies and all of their help that this story could be written.

Here is the true story of Rob Hardy, who in the 1960's was attempting to escape from an abusive father and street gangs. Lured by the trapping of Marine dress blues, he joined the United States Marine Corps. Get into formation and let Rob Hardy, take you on his first of two tours of duty: "From the Streets of Chicago, to the Jungles of Vietnam."

THE SHOCKING TRUTH REVEALED A blistering, firsthand account of an American Soldier who joined forces with the Montagnards WHILE LOSING THE WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, ARVN TROOPS CONDUCTED A SECRET PROGRAM OF GENOCIDE AGAINST THE MONTAGNARD HILL PEOPLE. THE U.S. ARMY DIDN'T INTERVENE. THE GLOBAL MEDIA DIDN'T NOTICE. BUT THE 'YARDS WEREN'T ALONE. A HANDFUL OF GREEN BERETS FOUGHT AT THEIR SIDE...

Pictorial account of the preparation and transportation of the CIA A-12 Blackbird from the SkunkWorks in Burbank, California to Area 51.

One of the more striking aspects of the war in Southeast Asia was the adaptation of existing weapons in the American arsenal to the peculiar needs of an unconventional war. This volume traces the history from initial conception of the fixed-wing gunship in the early 1960's through deployment and operations to the end of American combat involvement in early 1973.

This is the second of a series of functional volumes on the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War, which will complement the nine-volume operational and chronological series also underway. This particular history examines the Marine Corps lawyer's role in Vietnam and how that role evolved. Also considered is the effectiveness of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a combat environment. Military law functioned in Vietnam. but was it acceptably efficient and effective? There were several thousand courts-martial tried by the 400 Marine Corps lawyers who served in Vietnam. Those trials stand as testament to the Marines, officer and enlisted, who made the justice system yield results through their work, dedication, and refusal to allow the circumstances of Vietnam to deter them. Did the military justice system really work? The reader can be the judge, for both successes and failures are depicted here. This book presents a straightforward and unflinching examination of painful subjects. Marine lawyers in Vietnam came to legal grips with drug use, racism, fragging, and the murder of noncombatants, along with the variety of offenses more usually encountered. The Marine Corps can take pride in the commanders and the judge advocates who ensured that whenever those crimes were discovered they were exposed and vigorously prosecuted. There were no cover-ups; no impediments to the judge advocates who conscientiously represented the accused or the United States.

19: I never had a birthday in Vietnam was written to show how the guys out in the field lived from day to day and not knowing if it was going to be their last day. There's some laughter, sorrow, feeling so down that taking a bullet to end it didn't seem so bad. Guys are guys and the nineteen to twenty four year olds that were in Vietnam were a little more intense than most. Living with death day to day is something only another combat soldier would understand. This was written to get the reader to understand that.

A book about the elite Army Ranger of the Republic of Vietnam

This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history-the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.

This is the third volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This particular volume details the continue d buildup in 1966 of the III Marine Amphibious Force in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and the accelerated tempo of fighting during the year . The result was an "expanding war." The III Marine Amphibious Force had established three enclaves in I Corps during 1965. Employing what they believed was a balanced strategy-base defense, offensive operations, and pacification-the Marines planned to consolidate their base areas in 1966. At the beginning of 1966, the 1st Marine Division reinforced the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Vietnam. By the end of the year, the III Marine Amphibious Force had nearly doubled in size. Two separate events, however, were to dash the high hopes held by the Marines in 1966. An internal political crisis in the spring halted the Marine pacification campaign south of the large Da Nang Airbase. In July, the North Vietnamese Army launched an incursion through the Demilitarized Zone and Marines went north to counter the enemy thrust. By December 1966, Marine units were stretched thin along the 265-mile length of I Corps. As one Marine commander observed, "too much real estate-do not have enough men." Although written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps, the volume treats the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, and Marines on the staff of the U .S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon.

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps Gazette, has served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam War. It has both complemented and supplemented our official histories on Marine operations in Vietnam. Since its publication in 1974, however, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional significant articles in the three periodicals have made both the anthology and bibliography somewhat dated. This expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliography to 1984.

In this study, Dr. Donald J. Mrozek probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. He poses far more questions than he answers, and, some of what he says may invite strong dissent. Yet it will serve its author's purpose if something here provokes creative thinking and critical reexamination, even of some long-cherished ideas. Viewing the Vietnam War as a logical outcome of American defense thinking has challenging implications, as does seeing the "cold war consensus" on foreign affairs as an oddity. The Vietnam War stands uneasily on the edge of public memory - slipping into the past and becoming part of our national history, yet still too recent to be forgotten by those who lived through its trials. But history seeks a meaning in its clouded events, a retrospective order and pattern that could instruct, and sometimes even inspire, successive generations. At present, then, Americans face the peculiar dilemma of having to respond to the impact of a war for which there is still no comprehensively shared vision. One cannot expect broad enthusiasm for a vision of the past whose primary purpose is to justify current policies, acquisitions, deployment, and research. Americans have thought of themselves as individualistic and unruly people - a flattering self-image, though in some ways a false one. Indeed, during the Vietnam War it was the patience and long-suffering of the American people that most deserved comment. This was not the first war to fact great protest and challenge from Americans. Opposition to a massive commitment that was killing young Americans, as well as many Southeast Asians, should hardly have seemed surprising. What should have caused real surprise was how long it took for opposition to coalesce. In the end, the Vietnam experience ought to remind us of how well Americans can rally to a cause, even when it is poorly conceived and executed. But these are not the lessons of Vietnam. They are only illustrations of how we may come to different understandings of the Vietnam experience. The central lesson is that even when we cannot control the circumstances around us, we can still control ourselves. The use of military and political resources to have our way is not only a practical and technical issue, it is also a philosophical and moral one. It may be worth asking if we have ever won a war by betraying our own traditions and values. In this study, Dr. Donald J. Mrozek probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. He poses far more questions that he answers, and some of what he says may invite strong dissent. Yet it will serve its purpose if something here provokes creative thinking and critical reexamination, even of some long-cherished ideas. Viewing the Vietnam War as a logical outcome of American defense thinking has challenging implications, as does seeing the "cold war consensus" on foreign affairs as an oddity. Yet this is not a litany of objection and protest. Doctor Mrozek raises serious questions about how the contemporary notion of deterrence has emerged; and dealing with such questions forthrightly could make deterrence more effective. So, too, questions the past relationship of military professionals with the mass media is not an assignment of guilt but an invitation to develop a beneficial and cooperative relationship. Nor is this study a tale of gloom and despair; it is rather an appeal for self-consciousness and self-awareness. It is a plea for us to take command of the problems that beset us by taking control of ourselves first.