In the 77 days from 20 January to 18 March of 1968, two divisions of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) surrounded a regiment of U.S. Marines on a mountain plateau in the northwest corner of South Vietnam known as Khe sanh. The episode was no accident; it was in fact a carefully orchestrated meeting in which both sides got what they wanted. The north Vietnamese succeeded in surrounding the Marines in a situation in many ways similar to Dien Bien Phu, and may have been seeking similar tactical, operational, and strategic results. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the joint U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), meanwhile, sought to lure the NVA into the unpopulated terrain around the 26th Marines in order to wage a battle of annihilation with air power. In this respect Khe Sanh has been lauded as a great victory of air power, a military instrument of dubious suitability to much of the Vietnam conflict. The facts support the assessment that air power was the decisive element at Khe Sanh, delivering more than 96 percent of the ordnance used against the NVA. This work focuses mainly on fixed-wing close air support, or the support provided by jet and propeller-driven conventional aircraft, to the general exclusion of rotary-wing aircraft, also known as helicopters. There are several reasons for this, none of which are meant to belittle the contributions or heroism of the Marine, Army, and Air Force helicopter pilots who fought in the hills around Khe Sanh. First, until the arrival of the AH-1G Cobra in April 1969, there was no helicopter designed for dedicated close air support of Marines in Vietnam. The primary gunship during the battle of Khe Sanh was the UH-1E outfitted with machine guns and rocket launchers for the escort of unarmed helicopters. These helicopters were sometimes used for the direct support of ground troops with suppressive fires and were frequently used as forward air controllers, spotting and marking targets for fixed-wing aircraft with heavier ordnance. These roles are appropriately discussed alongside the contributions of the fixed-wing aircraft, but as a general rule, analysis remains focused on the heavier attack aircraft.

In his widely acclaimed Chasing Shadows (""the best account yet of Nixon's devious interference with Lyndon Johnson's 1968 Vietnam War negotiations""-- Washington Post), Ken Hughes revealed the roots of the covert activity that culminated in Watergate. In Fatal Politics, Hughes turns to the final years of the war and Nixon's reelection bid of 1972 to expose the president's darkest secret.Forty years after the fall of Saigon, and drawing on more than a decade spent studying Nixon's secretly recorded Oval Office tapes--the most comprehensive, accurate, and illuminating record of any presidency in history, much of it never transcribed until now-- Fatal Politics tells a story of political manipulation and betrayal that will change how Americans remember Vietnam.

An insightful and personal memoir that shares not only the technical aspects of naval service, but also the joys and sorrows, the separations, fears, sacrifices, and the heady feelings of a job well done. Hal Sacks ("Captain Hal" to those of us who served under his command) tells his terrific story beginnning with Officer Candidate School and Korea in 1953, going on to Vietnam in 1968 and beyond. A fabulous read - for lovers of great storytelling along with history buffs and military aficionados.

From its inception, graduates of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, now Texas A&M University, have marched off to fight in every conflict in which the United States has been involved. Th e Vietnam War was no different. Th e Corps of Cadets produced more officers for the conflict in Southeast Asia than any institution other than the US service academies. Michael Lee Lanning, Texas A&M University class of 1968, has now gathered over three dozen recollections from those who served. As Lanning points out, "anytime Aggie Vietnam veterans get together-whether it is two or two hundred of them-war stories begin." Th e tales they relate about the paddies, the jungles, the highlands, the waterways, and the airways provide these veterans with an even greater understanding of the war they survived. They also allow glimpses into the frequent dangers of fi refights, the camaraderie of patrol, and oft en humorous responses to inexplicable situations. These revelations provide insight not only into the realities of war but also speak to the character of the graduates of Texas A&M University. As Lanning concludes, "these war stories are as much a part of service as is that old green duffle bag, a few rows of colorful ribbons, and a pride that does not diminish. In reality, there is only one story about the Vietnam War. We all just tell it differently."

The Vietnamese stole their land. The NVA raped their daughters. The Green Berets knew them as the most fearless and loyal warriors in the land.... They were the Montagnards, who called themselves "Sons of the Mountains" and always fought to the death. In this incredible memoir of wall-to-wall combat in the jungle near the Laotian border, Special Forces Lieutenant Don Bendell recounts the saga of the A camp of Dak Pek, 242. On those death-strewn hilltops in 1969-70, a handful of Green Berets and an army of 'Yards held off the entire might of North Vietnamese regulars-until even their courage and fighting skill could not staunch the flow of blood and tears.

The Marines in Vietnam, 1954 - 1973, an anthology and Annotated Bibliography, based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps Gazette, has served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam War. In 1974, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional significant articles in the three periodicals have made both the anthology and bibliography somewhat dated. This expanded edition extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in the bibliography to 1984.

This is the eighth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This particular volume details the gradual withdrawl in 1970-1971 of Marine combat forces from South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, as part of an overall American strategy of turning the ground was against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong over to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.