This study of ten fateful decisions made on Indochina between
1961-75 highlights the ascent of the civilian militarists and of
strategy over diplomacy in United States policymaking and reveals
the inexorably interlinked and escalating character of the
decisions and the central purpose of American presidents: not to
have to face the expected domestic political consequences of defeat
in Indochina. As a result, we were led into a prolonged stalemate
in which "acting" and the management of programs became a more
important preoccupation than thinking about our purposes and
values, in which analysis become wholly subjective and therefore
defective, and in which decision-making occurred in a closed system
which did not allow for divergent inputs.
General
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