The attempt in 2004 to draft an interim constitution in Iraq and
the effort to enact a permanent one in 2005 were unintended
outcomes of the American occupation, which first sought to impose a
constitution by its agents. This two-stage constitution-making
paradigm, implemented in a wholly unplanned move by the Iraqis and
their American sponsors, formed a kind of compromise between the
populist-democratic project of Shi'ite clerics and America's
external interference.
As long as it was used in a coherent and legitimate way, the
method held promise. Unfortunately, the logic of external
imposition and political exclusion compromised the negotiations.
Andrew Arato is the first person to record this historic process
and analyze its special problems. He compares the drafting of the
Iraqi constitution to similar, externally imposed constitutional
revolutions by the United States, especially in Japan and Germany,
and identifies the political missteps that contributed to problems
of learning and legitimacy.
Instead of claiming that the right model of constitution making
would have maintained stability in Iraq, Arato focuses on the
fragile opportunity for democratization that was strengthened only
slightly by the methods used to draft a constitution. Arato
contends that this event would have benefited greatly from an
overall framework of internationalization, and he argues that a
better set of guidelines (rather than the obsolete Hague and Geneva
regulations) should be followed in the future. With access to an
extensive body of literature, Arato highlights the difficulty of
exporting democracy to a country that opposes all such foreign
designs and fundamentally disagrees on matters of political
identity.
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