The conflict in Afghanistan looms large in the collective
consciousness of Americans. What has the United States achieved,
and how will it withdraw without sacrificing those gains? The
Soviet Union confronted these same questions in the 1980s, and
Artemy Kalinovsky s history of the USSR s nine-year struggle to
extricate itself from Afghanistan and bring its troops home
provides a sobering perspective on exit options in the region.
What makes Kalinovsky s intense account both timely and
important is its focus not on motives for initiating the conflict
but on the factors that prevented the Soviet leadership from ending
a demoralizing war. Why did the USSR linger for so long, given that
key elites recognized the blunder of the mission shortly after the
initial deployment?
Newly available archival material, supplemented by interviews
with major actors, allows Kalinovsky to reconstruct the fierce
debates among Soviet diplomats, KGB officials, the Red Army, and
top Politburo figures. The fear that withdrawal would diminish the
USSR s status as leader of the Third World is palpable in these
disagreements, as are the competing interests of Afghan factions
and the Soviet Union s superpower rival in the West. This book
challenges many widely held views about the actual costs of the
conflict to the Soviet leadership, and its findings illuminate the
Cold War context of a military engagement that went very wrong, for
much too long.
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