Over the past thirty years, a new form of conflict has ravaged
Latin America's largest countries, with well-armed drug cartels
fighting not only one another but the state itself. In Colombia,
Mexico, and Brazil, leaders cracked down on cartels in hopes of
restoring the rule of law and the state's monopoly on force.
Instead, cartels fought back - with bullets and bribes - driving
spirals of violence and corruption that make mockeries of leaders'
state-building aims. Fortunately, some policy reforms quickly
curtailed cartel-state conflict, but they proved tragically
difficult to sustain. Why do cartels fight states, if not to topple
or secede from them? Why do some state crackdowns trigger and
exacerbate cartel-state conflict, while others curb it? This study
argues that brute-force repression generates incentives for cartels
to fight back, while policies that condition repression on cartel
violence can effectively deter cartel-state conflict. The politics
of drug war, however, make conditional policies all too fragile.
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