This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of
voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the
existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the
manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author
begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is
induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice
by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all
possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures
which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete
solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution
to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.
General
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