An explanation of the failure of the Communist insurgency in
Greece between 1945 and 1949, this study provides a striking lesson
in what happens to an armed revolutionary movement when it lacks
adequate manpower and logistical resources, and is divided against
itself on such basic matters as foreign policy and the employment
of its military capabilities. During the period of 1945-1949, the
Greek Communist Party was split into competing factions, each with
its own idea of which course the rebellion should take. The
Stalinist faction, led by Secretary-General Nikos Zachariades, was
pitted against the more pragmatic nationalist wing led by the
commander of the Greek Democratic Army, Markos Vafiades. Shrader
provides a detailed examination of the logistical aspects of the
war, particularly the impact of political decisions and the aid
provided to the Greek Communists by outside supporters on logistics
and operations.
At each successive stage of the conflict, Zachariades
outmaneuvered his rivals and imposed policies that both reduced the
resources available to the Communist-led insurgents and sought to
turn an effective guerrilla force into a conventional army
employing conventional operational methods. The decisions taken by
the Greek Communist Party under Zachariades' leadership alienated
both the domestic supporters of the Communist rebellion and its key
external supporters, such as Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.
Ultimately, the conventionally organized Greek Democratic Army
proved unable to sustain itself logistically, and it was defeated
in August 1949 by the constantly improving Greek National forces
aided by the United States.
General
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