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Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge (Hardcover)
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Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge (Hardcover)
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In this collection of essays, most of which are of recent vintage,
and seven of which appear here for the first time, Christopher S.
Hill addresses a large assortment of philosophical issues. Part I
presents a deflationary theory of truth, argues that semantic
properties like reference and correspondence with fact can also be
characterized in deflationary terms, and offers an account of the
value of these 'thin' properties, tracing it to their ability to
track more substantial properties that are informational or
epistemic in character. Part II defends the view that conscious
experiences are type-identical with brain states. It addresses a
large array of objections to this identity thesis, including
objections based on the alleged multiple realizability of
experiences, and objections based on Cartesian intuitions about the
modeal separability of mind and matter. In the end, however, it
maintains that theories of experience based on type-identity should
give way to representationalist accounts. Part III presents a
representationalist solution to the mind-body problem. It argues
that all awareness, including awareness of qualia, is governed by a
Kantian appearance/reality distinction-a distinction between the
ways objects and properties are represented as being, and the ways
they are in themselves. It also presents theories of pain and
visual qualia that kick them out of the mind and assign them to
locations in body and the external world. Part IV defends
reliabilist theories of epistemic justification, deploys such
theories in answering Cartesian skepticism, responds critically to
Hawthorne's lottery problem and related proposals about the role of
knowledge in conversation and practical reasoning, presents a new
account of the sources of modeal knowledge, and proposes an account
of logical and mathematical beliefs that represents them as
immunune to empirical revision.
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