Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of
"realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new
framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the
anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary"
conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the
intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least
semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded
as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original
critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers
interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of
truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the
theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of
affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.
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