How should a prize be awarded after a horse race? Should it go
to the best rider, the best person, or the one who finishes first?
To what extent are bystanders blameworthy when they do nothing to
prevent harm? Are there any objective standards of moral
responsibility with which to address such perennial questions? In
this fluidly written and lively book, Daniel Robinson takes on the
prodigious task of setting forth the contours of praise and blame.
He does so by mounting an important and provocative new defense of
a radical theory of moral realism and offering a critical appraisal
of prevailing alternatives such as determinism and behaviorism and
of their conceptual shortcomings.
The version of moral realism that arises from Robinson's
penetrating inquiry--an inquiry steeped in Aristotelian ethics but
deeply informed by modern scientific knowledge of human
cognition--is independent of cognition and emotion. At the same
time, Robinson carefully explores how such human attributes succeed
or fail in comprehending real moral properties. Through brilliant
analyses of constitutional and moral luck, of biosocial and genetic
versions of psychological determinism, and of
relativistic-anthropological accounts of variations in moral
precepts, he concludes that none of these conceptions accounts
either for the nature of moral properties or the basis upon which
they could be known. Ultimately, the theory that Robinson develops
preserves moral properties even while acknowledging the conditions
that undermine the powers of human will.
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