This book develops new theory about the link between debt and
democracy and applies it to a classic historical comparison: Great
Britain in the eighteenth century which had strong representative
institutions and sound public finance vs. ancient regime France,
which had neither. The book argues that whether representative
institutions improve commitment depends on the opportunities for
government creditors to form new coalitions with other social
groups, more likely to occur when a society is divided across
multiple political cleavages. It then presents historical evidence
to show that improved access to finance in Great Britain after 1688
had as much to do with the development of the Whig Party as with
constitutional changes. In France, it is suggested that the balance
of partisan forces made it unlikely that an early adoption of
'English-style' institutions would have improved credibility.
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