Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and
clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart
of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on
their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic
Johnson argues in "Overconfidence and War," states are no more
rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of
their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the
future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it
figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of
international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into
why states wage war.
Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning
points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war
(World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis
and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how
positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to
overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to
resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds.
In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening
positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful
solutions.
The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored
by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of
the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or
improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book
suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the
modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are
potentially deadly.
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