In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on
equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its
refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why
equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and
introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the
game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff
functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and
empirically, this theory has many problems. In The Theory of
Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an
alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run
outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players
grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a
foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for
economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
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