This volume examines how the Ottoman Army was able to evolve and
maintain a high level of overall combat effectiveness despite the
primitive nature of the Ottoman State during the First World War.
Structured around four case studies, at the operational and
tactical level, of campaigns involving the Ottoman Empire and the
British Empire: Gallipoli in 1915, Kut in 1916, Third
Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, and Megiddo in 1918. For each of these
campaigns, particular emphasis is placed on examining specific
elements of combat effectiveness and how they affected that
particular battle.
The prevalent historiography attributes Ottoman battlefield
success primarily to external factors - such as the presence of
German generals and staff officers; climate, weather and terrain
that adversely affected allied operations; allied bumbling and
amateurish operations; and inadequate allied intelligence. By
contrast, Edward J. Erickson argues that the Ottoman Army was
successful due to internal factors, such as its organizational
architecture, a hardened cadre of experienced combat leaders, its
ability to organize itself for combat, and its application of the
German style of war.
Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I will be of great
interest to students of the First World War, military history and
strategic studies in general.
General
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