The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is very
important at every stage of the history of modern American thought.
It informs William James's evolutionary metaphysics, John Dewey's
theory of logic, W.V.O. Quine's naturalism, and Richard Rorty's
notion of the Linguistic Turn. Similarly, many Continental
philosophers, like Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Jacques
Derrida, and Umberto Eco, have developed Peirce's semiotic logic as
central to their own philosophical views. Yet until now there has
been a yawning gap in the literature on what is arguably the most
essential idea in the entire Peircean corpus, namely his
"fallibilism." The basic idea of fallibilism is that all knowledge
claims, including those metaphysical, methodological,
introspective, and even mathematical claims - all of these remain
uncertain, provisional, merely fallible conjectures.
As Elizabeth Cooke explains in "Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of
Inquiry," one long-standing concern with the idea of fallibilism is
that it might all too easily slide into "skepticism." And this
would certainly undermine the overall project of making Peirce's
fallibilism the linchpin for any realistic pragmatism. So, it is
essential to show Peirce's philosophy does not require any claims
to certitude, in order to keep his fallibilism from falling into
skepticism or contextualism. Cooke's solution to this problem is to
interpret Peirce as having reconceived knowledge - traditionally
defined as "foundational" and even "static" - as a dynamic process
of inquiry, one which evolves within a larger ontological process
of evolution. Her book will be of great interest not only to Peirce
and Pragmatism specialists but also to contemporary epistemologists
more generally.
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