John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern
discussion of the nature of persons and selves--yet it is widely
thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in
fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous
objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting
Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point.
Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of
the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing,
like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as
a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about
praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to
some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked
out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by
the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity
is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the
actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and
immediate manner.
Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution
both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary
philosophy of personal identity.
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