Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy.
Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such
elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this
book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination
problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems -
and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic
voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all
electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model
to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily
on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in
testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral
laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political
forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the
electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
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