The collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe was relatively
quick, peaceful, and unforeseen. In this important new study of
Soviet policy in the region, Chafetz provides a fresh analysis of
why Moscow redefined Soviet interests in Eastern Europe and an
explanation of the decision not to use military force to shore up
the disintegrating bloc. Particular attention is devoted to the
interaction of domestic and international factors in the policy
process; the causes and impact of ideological revision within the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the role of GorbacheV's
perceptions in his decisions.
Most people will admit that in 1985 they could not imagine that
during their lifetime the Soviet Union would permit the Berlin Wall
to fall, would allow democratic elections in Eastern Europe, and
would withdraw its troops from the region, ending the Cold War.
Yet, between 1985 and 1990, the Soviet Union reoriented its foreign
policy rapidly, decisively, and peacefully. This book explains why
the Soviet Union abandoned its long-term policy toward Eastern
Europe: specifically, why the Gorbachev regime abandoned the
Brezhnev Doctrine.
This study of the decisions that resulted in the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe helps us understand the factors and
forces behind not only GorbacheV's Eastern European policy but also
MoscoW's foreign policy in general, Soviet internal
democratization, and the large-scale historical change in the 20th
century. This book is important reading for those concerned with
contemporary international and military relations and Eastern
European studies.
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