What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here
H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a
long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how
various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of
domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first
develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain
sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as
to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the
incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans
maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government
they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and
mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back
out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare.
Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw
quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the
populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown
by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of
several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion
of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in
continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans
explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for
resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice
theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany,
Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he
offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic
politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.
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