With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure
of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany
needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field
Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that
represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum
for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry
as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany
concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French
army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have
considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's
military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons
why the plan, as executed, failed.
In this important volume, international scholars reassess
Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new
insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I
but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The
contributors draw on newly available source materials from European
and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the
Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational
planning of relevant European states and provide a broad,
comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring
fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans
as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment
vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military
planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.
General
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