Attempting to reveal the real causes of the 1929 stock market
crash, Bierman refutes the popular belief that wild speculation had
excessively driven up stock market prices and resulted in the
crash. Although he acknowledges some prices of stocks such as
utilities and banks were overprices, reasonable explanations exist
for the level and increase of all other securities stock prices.
Indeed, if stocks were overpriced in 1929, then they more even more
overpriced in the current era of staggering growth in stock prices
and investment in securities. The causes of the 1929 crash, Bierman
argues, lie in an unfavorable decision by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities coupled with the popular practice
known as debt leverage in the 1920s corporate and investment
arena.
This book extends Bierman's argument in an earlier book, "The
Great Myths of 1929 and the Lessons to Be Learned" (Greenwood,
1991), in which he discussed and refuted seven myths about 1929 but
could not explain the crash. He now believes he has a reasonable
explanation. He also examines the actions of Charles E. Mitchell
and Sam Insull and their subsequent unjust criminal prosecution
after the crash of the 1929 stock market.
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