The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively
on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current
meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our
self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area
you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those
areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires
constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those
cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental
philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as
evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any
interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many
philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about
their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and
whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to
them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is
unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that
philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions
as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging
in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this
irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy,
it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged
meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what
philosophy is.
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