Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of
what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of
arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and
inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is
of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC
Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical
pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't
pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of
them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical,
intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are
genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one
true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound
implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers.
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