This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle
that 'objects conform to our cognition' from the perspective of a
Copernican world-view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant's
because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to
objects. Concerning both Kant's ontological denial in respect of
space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of
'experience' and 'objectivity', Ryall argues that Kant's
transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing
that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would
validate a comparison between his and Kant's critical philosophy,
namely the subject as 'revolving object'. It is only by
presupposing - in a transcendentally realistic sense - that human
beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the
'observer motion' of Copernican theory is vindicated and the
distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In
broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments
of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith,
Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryall's book will be of
interest to both scholars and students of Kant's philosophy alike.
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