This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational
decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal
relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce
the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The
major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation
theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main
rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a
more general conditional decision theory. The book solves a
long-standing problem for Jeffrey's theory by showing for the first
time how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation
for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book
also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose
that some event occurs or that some proposition is true. The most
complete and robust defence of causal decision theory available.
General
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