The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons
systems -- and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in
part based on those assessments -- illustrates the political and
policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy
specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends
in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use
in the development and implementation of security policy.
Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies -- Pakistan's
development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N.
watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to
Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare
program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others -- the authors
find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD
proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue
states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that
using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents
intractable operational challenges.
Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use -- or overlook --
intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They
document the Bush administration's policy shift from
nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as
sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times
employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with
cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy
makers.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
