Mainstream political economy has recognized only recently the
necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic
analysis intended for policy advisors. This text uses recent
advances in contract theory to vigorously build a normative
constitutional approach. The first part of the book remains in the
tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete
contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and
studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to
avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the
separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are
developed.;The second part of the book recognizes the
incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves
discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process.
Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic
policies and the political game becomes a game of costly
redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the
trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little
discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex-post efficiency and a
constitution weighted towards ex-post efficiency but also giving
considerable dis
General
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