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Believing by Faith - An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief (Hardcover, New)
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Believing by Faith - An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief (Hardcover, New)
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Can it be justifiable to commit oneself 'by faith' to a religious
claim when its truth lacks adequate support from one's total
available evidence? In Believing by Faith, John Bishop defends a
version of fideism inspired by William James's 1896 lecture 'The
Will to Believe'. By critiquing both 'isolationist'
(Wittgensteinian) and Reformed epistemologies of religious belief,
Bishop argues that anyone who accepts that our publicly available
evidence is equally open to theistic and naturalist/atheistic
interpretations will need to defend a modest fideist position. This
modest fideism understands theistic commitment as involving
'doxastic venture' - practical commitment to propositions held to
be true through 'passional' causes (causes other than the
recognition of evidence of or for their truth).
While Bishop argues that concern about the justifiability of
religious doxastic venture is ultimately moral concern, he accepts
that faith-ventures can be morally justifiable only if they are in
accord with the proper exercise of our rational epistemic
capacities. Legitimate faith-ventures may thus never be
counter-evidential, and, furthermore, may be made
supra-evidentially only when the truth of the faith-proposition
concerned necessarily cannot be settled on the basis of evidence.
Bishop extends this Jamesian account by requiring that justifiable
faith-ventures should also be morally acceptable both in motivation
and content. Hard-line evidentialists, however, insist that all
religious faith-ventures are morally wrong. Bishop thus conducts an
extended debate between fideists and hard-line evidentialists,
arguing that neither side can succeed in establishing the
irrationality of itsopposition. He concludes by suggesting that
fideism may nevertheless be morally preferable, as a less dogmatic,
more self-accepting, even a more loving, position than its
evidentialist rival.
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