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Deep Control - Essays on Free Will and Value (Hardcover)
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Deep Control - Essays on Free Will and Value (Hardcover)
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In this collection of essays -- a follow up to My Way and Our
Stories -- John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral
responsibility is associated with "deep control." Fischer defines
deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme
positions: "superficial control" and "total control."
Our freedom consists of the power to add to the given past, holding
fixed the laws of nature, and therefore, Fischer contends, we must
be able to interpret our actions as extensions of a line that
represents the actual past. In "connecting the dots," we engage in
a distinctive sort of self-expression. In the first group of essays
in this volume, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access
to alterative possibilities in order to be morally responsible.
Thus, the line need not branch off at crucial points (where the
branches represent genuine metaphysical possibilities). In the
remaining essays in the collection he demonstrates that deep
control is the freedom condition on moral responsibility. In so
arguing, Fischer contends that total control is too much to ask--it
is a form of "metaphysical megalomania." So we do not need to
"trace back" all the way to the beginning of the line (or even
farther) in seeking the relevant kind of freedom or control.
Additionally, he contends that various kinds of "superficial
control"--such as versions of "conditional freedom" and
"judgment-sensitivity" are too shallow; they don't trace back far
enough along the line. In short, Fischer argues that, in seeking
the freedom that grounds moral responsibility, we need to carve out
a middle ground between superficiality and excessive penetration.
Deep Control is the "middle way."
Fischer presents a new argument that deep control is compatible not
just with causal determinism, but also causal indeterminism. He
thus tackles the luck problem and shows that the solution to this
problem is parallel in important ways to the considerations in
favor of the compatibility of causal determinism and moral
responsibility.
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